— The Retributive Theory of Punishment

Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 1624-1630
Author(s):  
Anga Dlakulu ◽  
Ishmael Mugari ◽  
Emeka E. Obioha

For over a century, the role of court sentencing on crime deterrence has generated significant debate. In this study, we explored the citizens’ perceptions on the role of court sentencing in South Africa’s Mthatha area. The findings are looked in the context of the broad theories of punishment namely: retributive theory, deterrence theory, preventive theory, reformative theory and compensation theory. A total of purposefully sampled 90 respondents were invited to participate in this study through closed-ended questionnaires. The univariate perception results of the study reveal that reformation of the offender, protection of the offender from being harmed by the victim in retaliation, and ensuring that the victims get justice are the most significant roles of court sentencing. Collectively, the reality that severe sentence scares potential criminals not to commit crime stands out and is the most correlated role of court sentencing. Court sentencing was also viewed to be having two pronged preventive effect on criminal activities. First, the criminal is incapacitated from engaging in criminal activities during the time of imprisonment; and second, the offender is removed from the environmental factors that led to offending. As part of the conclusion, the study recommends sentencing policies that mainly support reformation of offenders.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo

The existence of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection is part of the state's commitment to protect children. The Law has been amended for the second time through Perpu No. 1 of 2016. The emphasis in this second amendment is to aggravate the punishment of offender of sexual violence against children to provide a deterrent effect and prevent comprehensively the occurrence of sexual violence against children. This study used primary and secondary legal materials, with normative-juridical, policy, and philosophical approaches. This study concluded that punishment regulatin policy in Perpu No. 1 of 2016 reflects the purpose of punishment in the form of a combined theory that compromises between relative theory and retributive theory. While the policy of chemical chemistry regulation as a treatment reflects the purpose of punishment as rehabilitation.


교정담론 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91
Author(s):  
Keuk-Hoon Cho ◽  
Keyword(s):  

1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 376-387
Author(s):  
Antony Flew

(1) During my lifetime most of the discussion of punishment in British philosophical journals has started from an article first published in 1939. Thirty years later this was reprinted, along with a selection of eleven of the most substantial subsequent contributions, to form a volume which has since served to introduce further student generations to The Philosophy of Punishment. In that seminal paper the late John Mabbott — whom it was later my good fortune to have as one of my tutors — proposed “to defend a retributive theory of punishment, and to reject absolutely all utilitarian considerations from its justification”.His initial claim perhaps sounded bolder, or rasher, than it was. For Mabbott in his second paragraph explained: “The question I am asking is this. Under what circumstances is the punishment of some particular person justified, and why?” After giving and defending his retributive answer to this question Mabbott turned to the “distinction between abolishing injustice in punishment and abolishing punishment altogether”. While still insisting that “punishment is a corollary of law breaking …” he went on to allow that “considerations of utility come in on two quite different issues. Should there be laws, and what laws should there be? … The choice which is the essential prius of punishment is the choice that there should be laws”.


Philosophy ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 56 (216) ◽  
pp. 203-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Primorac

Most of the standard arguments against the retributive theory of punishment are hardly new. That the retributive view of punishment is but a rationalization of a primitive urge for revenge; that the retributivists, instead of providing an answer to the question about the source of our moral right to add a new evil (punishment) to an already perpetrated one (the crime), simply assert dogmatically that punishment is an intrinsic good, i.e. something that needs no further moral justification; that it is impossible to apply the lex talionis in practice; that the retributivist thesis that the criminal has a right to punishment is absurd, because the criminal himself would be the first to deny that he has any such right; that the retributive theory is incompatible with the claims of forgiveness and mercy; that the practical consequences of the theory are conservative, the theory itself being in fact an apology for the existing laws and the existing social order; that the Hegelian idea of punishment as a ‘negation’ or ‘annulment’ of crime is either unintelligible or essentially utilitarian in character–most of this had been said already in the last century, or even earlier. All these arguments are still in use.1 But in recent literature–in a number of papers published in the last twenty years or so–we find a new argument against the retributive theory. It is only natural that this particular argument should not have been used earlier: methodologically it is typical of a philosophical orientation which emerged only in our century–analytical philosophy.


Author(s):  
Douglas Husak

The principle of proportionality, a cornerstone of retributive penal philosophy, requires (ceteris paribus) the severity of the punishments imposed to be a function of the seriousness of the crimes committed. This principle cannot be applied without a metric or common denominator to assess whether two impositions of punishment are equal or unequal in severity. To identify such a metric, we must first decide whether it is wholly objective or at least partly subjective, involving an essential reference to the psychological response of whoever is punished. Even when this issue is resolved, no single measure of punishment severity may exist. Instead, all we might be able to say is that a given instance of punishment is more severe along one dimension and less severe along another, with no clear means to specify which is more or less severe, all things considered. This conclusion has potentially grave implications for the adequacy of a retributive theory of punishment that takes desert and proportionality as central. No solution is readily available without a substantial retreat from ideal theory. Perhaps the best way forward is to adopt a deflationary role for proportionality and desert rather than to abandon them altogether.


Philosophy ◽  
1956 ◽  
Vol 31 (117) ◽  
pp. 154-157
Author(s):  
C. H. Whiteley

A retributive theory of punishment must at least say that it is a necessary condition for the justification of a punishment that the person punished should be guilty. But “guilty” here may be taken in two different senses, giving two very different kinds of justification. In the first sense, to be guilty is to have wilfully disobeyed a law or order of some authority, and it is the defiance of this authority which justifies punishment. Mr. Mabbott has put up a good case for a view of this kind. It is clear that we regularly do justify the punishment of offenders on the ground that they have broken rules, and therefore deserve to be punished. And there are some moral situations (those of officials charged with the administration of regulations) in which this is the only fact to be considered in deciding whether or not to punish. As to the view that this constitutes the only valid justification of punishment, I wish to make two comments.


Mind ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol LXXII (285) ◽  
pp. 121-124
Author(s):  
A. C. EWING
Keyword(s):  

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