United States Law of the Sea policy and the strategic minerals supply problem

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moritaka Hayashi

Abstract One disturbing element in an overall stable order built on the Law of the Sea Convention is the disagreement between some States over the use of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal State by another State for military purposes. While it appears to be generally accepted that military activities in the EEZ of another State are part of “the freedoms . . . of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms . . .” under Article 58(1), some States, notably China, hold an opposing view. The disagreement has led to several incidents involving forceful disturbance of activities of United States military vessels and aircraft in and above the EEZ of China. There is an urgent need for the States concerned and the international community to find a common understanding on the issue or some kind of practical arrangement for avoiding further serious incidents.


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11 (109)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
German Gigolaev

The USA, as well as the USSR, initiated the convocation of the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973—1982). However, after the Ronald Reagan administration came to the White House, American diplomacy significantly changed its policy toward the Conference, which eventually resulted in US refusal to support the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was worked out during the Conference. This behavior was in line with policy course of the Reagan administration — more aggressive than that of their predecessors. The article considers the American policy regarding Law of the Sea negotiations in the first months of Reagan's presidency, during the Tenth Session of the III UNCLOS.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-178 ◽  
Author(s):  

In 1982 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted a treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that succeeded in resolving the most fundamental questions of the law of the sea in accordance with three basic principles: 1.The rules of the law of the sea must fairly balance the respective interests of all states, notably the competing coastal and maritime interests, in a manner that is generally acceptable.2.Multilateral negotiations on the basis of consensus replace unilateral claims of right as the principal means for determining that balance.3.Compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms should be adopted to interpret, apply, and enforce the balance.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke T. Lee

The decision of the United States and 22 other countries not to sign the Law of the Sea Convention in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, raises the important question of the legal effects of the. Convention upon nonsignatories (hereinafter referred to as “third states”). Will the latter be entitled to claim and enjoy treaty provisions beneficial to them, such as those pertaining to military or commercial navigation through international straits, including submerged passage and overflight rights, or will these rights be considered as contractual in nature, exercisable only by states parties? Clearly, the question is of critical importance to the regime of the law of the sea. Since there has been to date no systematic legal analysis of this important question in debates surrounding the Law of the Sea Convention, this essentially legal question has been consigned to general policy pronouncements.


2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-258
Author(s):  
Miriam Wright

Abstract The intensification of offshore fishing by European trawlers in the northwest Atlantic in the 1950s and 1960s had many repercussions for the Newfoundland fishery. With only a three-mile fishing limit between themselves and the more technologically advanced Europeans, many people involved in the Newfoundland fishery demanded the federal government extend fishing rights to twelve miles from shore. The international debate on the extended fishing rights/territorial waters issue, however, was complicated by its entanglement in Cold War politics. Indeed, the Canadian government's attempts to find a solution in the aftermath of the failed United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences in 1958 and 1960 came face-to-face with the defence agenda of the United States Navy. In such an atmosphere, the Canadian government could do little to protect the resource without risking the wrath of its neighbour and largest trading partner.


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