RUSSIA AND THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: A NEW MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIME FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND DUAL-USE ITEMS

2013 ◽  
pp. 214-233
Author(s):  
L. S. Revenko ◽  
N. S. Revenko

The current military and political situation in the world raises the necessity of use by Russia of all existing tools to counter actions targeted against it. Participation of the country in international export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement (the WA), is one of these tools. Membership in the WA allows to Russia to maintain its international status, to contribute to strengthening of international stability, to ensure the non-targeting of this forum against the country, to participate in the development of decisions affecting its interests. Participation in the WA is also important from the view of modernizations of Russian economy towards transition to a new technological mode accompanied by emergence of new groups of innovative products and modification of existing ones. Control of crossing the country's borders by dual-use goods and services is one of conditions for carrying out their export. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1995 to replace COCOM in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability. A huge work is carried out within the forum aimed at enhancing control over transfers of conventional weapons and high-tech dual-use goods. Russian export control system fully meets requirements of international export control regime, including the WA, and effectively functions. Export of the controlled goods from Russia or their transfer to foreign individuals and legal entities are possible only on the basis of decisions of the Export control Commission of the Russian Federation. The dilemma between the need to support exporters by reducing administrative barriers and the ensuring security interests of the country gain momentum in current stage of scientific-and-technological advance development.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamed Alavi ◽  
Tatsiana Khamichonak

Abstract Export controls for dual-use items are an important constituent element of both the security policies of state exporters and WMD non-proliferation efforts. Dual-use goods and technologies can be used for both civil and military purposes, which requires careful oversight over their export to countries that are considered unfriendly or have ambiguous foreign policy attitudes. By their very nature, dual-use items may be used both to further legitimate ends, like promoting technological development and strengthening economic ties, and to aid in unwarranted acts. State exporters are faced with the responsibility of balancing the security objectives pertaining to exports of dual-use items with the competitiveness of local economies. The paper discusses the EU export control regime and EU membership in international export control groups. In doing so, comparative and normative research methods are chosen to analyze existing literature on Council Regulation 428/2009 and other international export control groups, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The paper will conclude by identifying shortcomings and addressing possible amendments to the regulation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Luo

After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and civilian and military dual use technologies have been one of the most important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties have been signed and the international organizations have been established to promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and domestic export control regimes.


2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 205-242
Author(s):  
A. Baskaran

Multilateral export control regimes such as the London Club and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aim to prevent the flow of complex dual-use technologies to certain ‘target’ countries. The underlying belief has been that these regimes would be able to delay or cripple strategic weapon programmes in ‘target’ countries. However, little attention has been paid to understand the factors that influence the effectiveness of these regimes. In recent years, the limitations of export controls have become increasingly clear. This paper introduces a conceptual framework and analyses the case of India'S space and missile programmes to trace the factors that determine the effectiveness of export control regimes and to understand why these regimes, particularly the MTCR are increasingly ineffective on certain ‘target’ countries.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-599
Author(s):  
Cindy Whang

ABSTRACT On 13 August 2018, US President Donald Trump signed a legislation called the ‘Export Controls Act of 2018’ (ECA) that is important for reinvigorating the export control regime in the USA. This paper argues that contents of the ECA will not only impact the USA but also the way that the ECA is structured will potentially have a long-lasting influence on international export control regimes and the role that export controls play in international trade. International export control regimes were established post-World War II as a trade measure to pursue common strategic and national security goals among allied countries. Due to the sensitive nature of national security issues, international export control agreements were structured as non-binding agreements that heavily relied on the consensus of participating countries in formulating export control lists that the participating countries could then adopt in their domestic regulations. The cohesiveness of the global export control regimes has been based on the cornerstones of the consensus-building and list-based standards. The USA established its export control regimes to complement these international export control regimes and has been a strong proponent of requesting countries to adopt the international export control lists into domestic regulations. With the passage of the ECA, the infusion of economic policy considerations such as maintaining the USA’s technological leadership through adding a category of emerging and foundational technology has changed the long-standing export control narrative. Through the changes made to the US ECA, the scope of national security subject to export control regimes has expanded from being focused on military-oriented goods and technology into one that now includes commercial technology. While the changes made through the ECA serve to protect the USA’s technological interests, the statute could also undermine important elements of the global export control regime that the international community has established in the past seventy years post-World War II.


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