The Evolution of an International Monetary System: The Gold Standard Until 1914

2017 ◽  
Vol 133 (1) ◽  
pp. 295-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Farhi ◽  
Matteo Maggiori

AbstractWe propose a simple model of the international monetary system. We study the world supply and demand for reserve assets denominated in different currencies under a variety of scenarios: a hegemon versus a multipolar world; abundant versus scarce reserve assets; and a gold exchange standard versus a floating rate system. We rationalize the Triffin dilemma, which posits the fundamental instability of the system, as well as the common prediction regarding the natural and beneficial emergence of a multipolar world, the Nurkse warning that a multipolar world is more unstable than a hegemon world, and the Keynesian argument that a scarcity of reserve assets under a gold standard or at the zero lower bound is recessionary. Our analysis is both positive and normative.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Dehem

In the light of monetary experience and theory, the EMS appears to be unsustainable. Monetary history of the past sixty years shows that every attempt to stabilise the international monetary System has been frustrated as a consequence of divergent egocentric monetary policies. The breakdown of the rules of the gold standard game in the twenties, as well as the use of money as an instrument in national macroeconomic policies under the Bretton Woods regime have ultimately led to the demise of the fixed exchange rates System. In the sixties, European views on monetary policies were quite divergent, but in the seventies institutional attempts were made to bring them apparently into line. The "snake" arrangements, initiated in 1972, soon degenerated. The more ambitious attempt of 1979, the institutionally more elaborate EMS, suffers from the same basic weakness as all the previous ones. It lacks a common monetary standard, such as the one proposed in the 1975 Ail-Saints Manifesto. Such a standard is a necessary and a sufficient condition for a sustainable common monetary System.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Green

This chapter examines Anglo-American development from the nineteenth century to World War II. It focuses on the “great reversal” in power that occurred as US development caught up to and closed the gap with the UK, after which leadership of the international monetary order came to depend increasingly upon their cooperative efforts, a process encapsulated by the ill-fated attempt to resuscitate the gold standard after World War I. The chapter emphasizes the nascent but insufficient foundations of Anglo-American financial integration as a central factor in the failure of the interwar gold standard. Anglo-American cooperation was ultimately undermined by the lack of US willingness and capacity to play a greater leadership role and respect its duties and obligations under the gold standard system, leading to the collapse of the gold standard and the increasing rivalry and protectionism of the 1930s. The failure of Anglo-American management of the international monetary system in the interwar years had a formative impact upon the priorities instituted at Bretton Woods during the 1940s.


Author(s):  
Harold James

Why do central banks attempt to cooperate with other central banks? Why should those political systems (in practice, in the advanced modern industrial world, democratic states), to whom ultimately the central banks are accountable, accept a cooperative strategy of the central banks? What overall gain do they expect to achieve? The answers clearly depend on the definition of the fundamental tasks of central banks, and thus on how cooperation might be envisaged as a tool in the accomplishment of those goals. The purposes and functions of central banks, however, have changed dramatically over the course of time, in accordance with the changing international monetary system from the gold standard, through the Bretton Woods system to the post-1973 order, including European monetary integration. This chapter reviews the pattern, motivation, and record of central bank cooperation in the broader international context of debate about macroeconomic cooperation from the nineteenth century onwards.


Author(s):  
Eric Helleiner

This chapter explores ways in which nationalist values helped to shape the emergence of modern territorial currencies in the United States and elsewhere during the nineteenth century. Turning to international monetary systems, it shows how more cosmopolitan nonpecuniary values helped to inspire a failed initiative to create a world monetary union in the 1850s and 1860s. It also examines the international gold standard of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, offering a critique of what many have seen as Karl Polanyi's well-known argument about the economy's socially disembedded nature. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the creation of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1940s, the gold standard's successor, as a clear example of an international monetary system invested from the start with social meaning.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document