Christian Morality: God and Moral Truth

Author(s):  
Guenter Lewy
2020 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-228
Author(s):  
Mark J. Cherry ◽  

This paper critically explores key aspects of the gulf between Christian bioethics and the secular moral reflections that dominate contemporary bioethics. For example, in contrast to traditional Christian morality, the established secular bioethics judges extramarital sex acts among consenting persons, whether of the same or different sexes, as at least morally permissible, affirms sexual freedom for children to develop their own sexual identity, and holds the easy availability of abortion and infanticide as central to the liberty interests of women. Secular bioethics seeks to separate children from the authority of their parents, placing children themselves as in authority to make their own judgments about appropriate lifestyle choices, including sexual behaviors. As I argue, however, when God is absent, there exists no standpoint outside of our own cultural socio historically conditioned understanding from which to communicate any deeper perspective of reality or the bioethics that such a perspective would secure. Consequently, rather than discerning moral truth, secular bioethics merely affirms its own particular cultural socio historically conditioned ideological perspective. It is a social and political worldview bereft of definitive moral foundation, independent moral authority, or unambiguous content.


1998 ◽  
pp. 41-42
Author(s):  
V. Jukovskyy

On June 5-7, 1998, in the city of Ostroh, Rivne Oblast, on the basis of the Ostroh Academy, the IV International Scientific and Practical Conference "Educating the Younger Generation on the Principles of Christian Morality in the Process of the Spiritual Revival of Ukraine" was held. This year she was devoted to the topic "The Bible on the Territory of Ukraine". About 400 philosophers, psychologists and educators from many Ukrainian cities, as well as philosophers and educators from Belarus, Canada, Poland, Russia, the USA, Turkey and Sweden participated in her work. The conference was attended by theologians and priests of all Christian denominations of Ukraine.


2021 ◽  
pp. 161189442199268
Author(s):  
Friederike Kind-Kovács

World War I and its aftermath produced a particularly vulnerable group of child victims: war orphans. This group included children whose fathers had fallen in battle, who had disappeared, or who had not (yet) returned home. Most of Europe’s war and postwar societies witnessed the massive presence of these child victims, and responded in various ways to rescue them and secure their future survival. This article offers an exploration of the ways in which the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and then later the post-imperial Hungarian state, became invested in providing care and relief to Hungarian war orphans. In contrast to other groups of child victims, whose parents were blamed for neglecting their parental duties, war orphans as the offspring of ‘war heroes’ profited from the public appreciation of their fathers’ sacrifice for the war effort and the Hungarian nation. The public discourse in the contemporary Hungarian media offers a glimpse into the emergence of a new public visibility of these child victims and of a new recognition of the societal obligation to care for them. Exploring World War I and its aftermath as a telling example of political transformation in the 20th century, the article showcases how war orphans were taken to personify essential notions of war- and postwar destruction, while also capturing visions of postwar recovery. It furthermore examines how welfare discourses and relief practices for Hungary’s war orphans were embedded in contemporary gender norms, notions of proper Christian morality and ethnic nationalism. On this basis, the article assesses the ways in which the case of Hungary’s war orphans not only mirrors the professionalization but also the fundamental transformation of child welfare in the aftermath of World War I.


1952 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-28
Author(s):  
B. De Kretser

The consideration of this problem is important for at least two reasons. In many countries there are reports of an increasing decline in public morals and of growing dishonesty and corruption in the life of the body politic. This is taking place at a time when the established religious systems are being subjected to the pressure of pseudo-scientific secularism on the one hand and the claims of modern alternative faiths on the other. Clearly the two developments are interconnected. Yet, to judge from the burden of many public utterances of responsible leaders, including the now important and significant ‘Moral Re-armament’ Group, the close dependence of moral truth and the truth about the character of reality is not realised. Most people are content to mutter the usual platitudes—‘Honesty is the best policy’, ‘Do please try to be good and speak the truth’. But the problem of truth is more complicated than our naīve moralists would have us believe.


Dialogue ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-452
Author(s):  

Is worrying about whether moral judgments are true or false a philosophical waste of time? It can seem to be if moral truth claims are redundant on thejudgments they claim to be true. If to claim that the judgment “x is wrong” is true is simply to judge x wrong, anyone who is prepared to make judgments can consistently make truth claims. A concern for moral truth is then merely a concern for whether anything is right or wrong, not a separable concern for whether moral judgments are true or false.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe history of ethics contains many moral faculty theories, which usually are sorted by their metaphysics. The usual suspects include moral rationalism (Richard Price, Kant), moral sentiment theory (Hutcheson, Hume, Smith) and the varieties of ethical naturalism. Moral faculty theories differ importantly upon yet another dimension, on how widely it is distributed. Some, the Platonic elitists (Plato, J.S. Mill, R.M. Hare), suppose that moral truth can be discerned only by philosophical argument. Hence, they ascribe a revisionary task to normative theory, that of correcting nonphilosophers' moral errors. Others, the communalists (Aquinas, Hume, W.D. Ross), hold that the moral faculty is universally distributed. Hence, they hold that normative theory's task is not to revise, but rather to discern and explain the shared moral conception that we all apply in our ordinary moral lives. I here offer arguments to support commonalism.


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