Acting from respect for the moral law

2005 ◽  
pp. 57-71
Keyword(s):  
Moral Law

Boutwerk, Balthazar Barbosa, Willaschek e os Paradoxos da Filosofia do Direito de Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
João Carlos Brum Torres
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
External Character ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Positive Character ◽  
Made In

O artigo tem por objeto o exame de três registros de gritantes e distintos paradoxos na Doutrina do Direito de Kant. Registros feitos em tempos e contextos históricos diferentes por Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek atribuiu a Kant a mais paradoxal das proposições jamais enunciadas por qualquer autor, a de que a mera ideia de soberania deve obrigar-nos a obedecer como a nosso inquestionável senhor a quem quer que se haja estabelecido como tal, sem que caiba indagar quem lhe deu o direito de comandar-nos. Willaschek aponta a incompatibilidade de duas teses centrais da doutrina kantiana: a do caráter externo dos vínculos jurídicos e a da incondicionalidade obrigacional do direito positivo, pois não é possível entender como é possível termo-nos como obrigados por imperativos jurídicos e, ao mesmo, vermo-nos internamente isentados do dever de obedecê-los. O ponto crítico de Balthazar é alegar que não pode haver na filosofia kantiana uma crítica da razão político e jurídica, simplesmente porque o conceito de imputação, base da normatividade própria dessas esferas, pressupõe uma pluralidade de agentes livres que, justamente, só pode ser uma pressuposição, pois nosso acesso à normatividade prática só pode ter lugar em primeira pessoa. No exame a que o artigo submete essas alegações, o artigo argumenta, em objeção à tese de Balthazar, que o caráter universal e categórico da força que vincula o sujeito quando confrontado com a lei moral em primeira pessoa necessariamente se desvaneceria se, ao mesmo tempo, ele não fosse tomado pela evidência de que a realidade objetiva dos princípios morais é não só instanciável, mas assegurada pela múltipla instanciação. Com relação às dificuldades levantadas por Willaschek e Bouterwek, o artigo argumenta que o princípio exeundum e statu naturali, enquanto norma metapositiva, anterior à divisão do domínio prático entre doutrina do direito e doutrina da virtude, permite ao mesmo tempo compreender a exigência de obediência ao poder constituído e a restrição das obrigações jurídico-políticas exclusivamente ao foro externo.AbstractThe object of the article is to examine three claims about three distinct and allegedly blatant paradoxes in Kant's Doctrine of Right. These three critical points had been made in distinct times and contexts by Friedrich Bouterwek, Marcus Willaschek e Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Bouterwek attributed to Kant the most paradoxical of all paradoxical propositions, the statement that by the mere idea of sovereignty we are obliged to obey as our lord who has imposed himself upon us, without questioning from where he got such right. Willaschek points out the incompatibility of two main theses of Kantian doctrine of right: the claims that the legal bounds are of external character and that they are the source of unconditional obligations, since it seems impossible to understand how it would be possible to be obliged by juridical norms and decisions and at the same time to be exempted of the internal duty of compliance. The radical objection of Professor Balthazar is the claim that in the context of Kantian Philosophy it is impossible to admit a critique of the juridical and political reason because the concept of imputation, ground of the normativity in these domains, requires not only the presupposition of free agents, but a true and secure epistemic access to them, which is, according to him, impossible considering that the moral law and the other practical principles are accessible for us only in the first person. In the course of the appraisal of such claims, the article contest that objection arguing that the universal and categorical force of the normative bound experienced by the subject when confronted with the moral law in the first person would ineluctably vanish if, at the same time, he had not been taken by the evidence that the objective reality of the moral principles is secured by multiple instancing. Regarding the difficulties raised by Willaschek and Bouterwek, the article argues that the principle exeundum e statu naturali, as a norm of meta-positive character, prior to the division of practical domains between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, is the cue both to the understanding of the requirement of unquestioning obedience to the constituted power and to the restriction of the validity of this requirement only in foro externo.

Kant on the Ground of Human Dignity

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Apaar Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Human Constitution ◽  
The Law

Abstract Kant interpreters have contrasting views on what Kant takes to be the basis for human dignity. Several commentators have argued that human dignity can be traced back to some feature of human beings. Others contend that humans in themselves lack dignity, but dignity can be attributed to them because the moral law demands respect for humanity. I argue, alternatively, that human dignity in Kant’s system can be seen to be grounded in the reciprocal relationship between the dignity of the moral law and the dignity inherent in the human constitution. The latter includes the dignity of personhood, construed as rational inner purposiveness, and the dignity of giving oneself the law and striving to follow it.

Constructivist Moral Realism

1998 ◽  
pp. 147-153
Author(s):  
J. K. Swindler
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Social Reality ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Social World ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Realm

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.

scholarly journals „Wer sich aber zum Wurm macht …“ – Würde als Selbstverpflichtung

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (5) ◽  
pp. 607-625
Author(s):  
Katharina Bauer
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Context ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Individual Personality ◽  
Practical Necessity ◽  
Dignified Life

Abstract Kant introduces a duty to oneself to respect oneself and to avoid servility – or not to make oneself a worm. I argue for a wider understanding of this duty: Persons ought to respect their own dignity as persons with autonomy, rationality, and morality (A), but also as personalities, who embody dignity and live a dignified life (B). A corresponds to Kant’s concept of duty as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law, B is an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as an individual personality in a socio-cultural context. A and B relate to two types of dignity that are discussed in current debates. I argue that both types of dignity are equally relevant for understanding and respecting one’s own dignity. Finally I discuss why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

English Law and the Moral Law

1956 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 328
Author(s):  
J. B. Milner ◽  
A. L. Goodhart
Keyword(s):  
Moral Law ◽  
English Law

Partially Moral Legal Relations. Who is to Blame? (Review of the Monograph: Serkov P. P. Legal Relation. The Morality of Modern Legal Regulation. M.: Norma, 2020. – 686 p.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 67-74
Author(s):  
E. I. Kolyushin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Arts ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Legal Relation ◽  
Legal Science

The solution to the problem of the relations between morality and law proposed in the monograph is a serious attempt to create a new concept of moral law and legal relations using the achievements of other liberal arts in contrast to the ideas in legal science prevailing now. Conclusions and suggestions are justified only in those parameters in which the researcher does not absolutize the role of morality in each of the named manifestations.

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