Post, Emil Leon (1897–1954)

Author(s):  
Michael Scanlan

Emil Post was a pioneer in the theory of computation, which investigates the solution of problems by algorithmic methods. An algorithmic method is a finite set of precisely defined elementary directions for solving a problem in a finite number of steps. More specifically, Post was interested in the existence of algorithmic decision procedures that eventually give a yes or no answer to a problem. For instance, in his dissertation, Post introduced the truth-table method for deciding whether or not a formula of propositional logic is a tautology. Post developed a notion of ‘canonical systems’ which was intended to encompass any algorithmic procedure for symbol manipulation. Using this notion, Post partially anticipated, in unpublished work, the results of Gödel, Church and Turing in the 1930s. This showed that many problems in logic and mathematics are algorithmically unsolvable. Post’s ideas influenced later research in logic, computer theory, formal language theory and other areas.

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 727-738
Author(s):  
Victor Sadovnichii ◽  
Yaudat Talgatovich Sultanaev ◽  
Azamat Akhtyamov

AbstractWe consider a new class of inverse problems on the recovery of the coefficients of differential equations from a finite set of eigenvalues of a boundary value problem with unseparated boundary conditions. A finite number of eigenvalues is possible only for problems in which the roots of the characteristic equation are multiple. The article describes solutions to such a problem for equations of the second, third, and fourth orders on a graph with three, four, and five edges. The inverse problem with an arbitrary number of edges is solved similarly.


1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Putnam

The purpose of this paper is to present two groups of results which have turned out to have a surprisingly close interconnection. The first two results (Theorems 1 and 2) were inspired by the following question: we know what sets are “decidable” — namely, the recursive sets (according to Church's Thesis). But what happens if we modify the notion of a decision procedure by (1) allowing the procedure to “change its mind” any finite number of times (in terms of Turing Machines: we visualize the machine as being given an integer (or an n-tuple of integers) as input. The machine then “prints out” a finite sequence of “yesses” and “nos”. The last “yes” or “no” is always to be the correct answer.); and (2) we give up the requirement that it be possible to tell (effectively) if the computation has terminated? I.e., if the machine has most recently printed “yes”, then we know that the integer put in as input must be in the set unless the machine is going to change its mind; but we have no procedure for telling whether the machine will change its mind or not.The sets for which there exist decision procedures in this widened sense are decidable by “empirical” means — for, if we always “posit” that the most recently generated answer is correct, we will make a finite number of mistakes, but we will eventually get the correct answer. (Note, however, that even if we have gotten to the correct answer (the end of the finite sequence) we are never sure that we have the correct answer.)


2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMUEL MIMRAM

Game semantics describe the interactive behaviour of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order propositional logic. One of the main difficulties that has to be faced during the elaboration of this kind of semantics is to characterise definable strategies, that is, strategies that actually behave like a proof. This is usually done by restricting the model to strategies satisfying subtle combinatorial conditions, whose preservation under composition is often difficult to show. In this paper we present an original methodology to achieve this task, which requires a combination of advanced tools from game semantics, rewriting theory and categorical algebra. We introduce a diagrammatic presentation of the monoidal category of definable strategies of our model using generators and relations: these strategies can be generated from a finite set of atomic strategies, and the equality between strategies admits a finite axiomatisation, and this equational structure corresponds to a polarised variation of the bialgebra notion. The work described in this paper thus forms a bridge between algebra and denotational semantics in order to reveal the structure of dependencies induced by first-order quantifiers, and lays the foundations for a mechanised analysis of causality in programming languages.


1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-357
Author(s):  
Charles G. Costley

L2(a, b)1with the property2were originally defined by T. Carleman [4]. Here he imposed on the kernel the conditions of measurability and hermiticity,3for all x with the exception of a countable set with a finite number of limit points and4where Jδ denotes the interval [a, b] with the exception of subintervals |x - ξv| < δ; here ξv represents a finite set of points for which (3) fails to hold.


Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

As with any logic, the semantics of first-order logic yield rules for deducing the truth of one sentence from that of another. In this chapter, we develop both formal proofs and resolution for first-order logic. As in propositional logic, each of these provides a systematic method for proving that one sentence is a consequence of another. Recall the Consequence problem for propositional logic. Given formulas F and G, the problemis to decide whether or not G is a consequence of F. From Chapter 1, we have three approaches to this problem: • We could compute the truth table for the formula F → G. If the truth values are all 1s then we conclude that F → G is a tautology and G is a consequence of F. Otherwise, G is not a consequence of F. • Using Tables 1.5 and 1.6, we could try to formally derive G from {F}. By the Completeness Theorem for propositional logic, G is a consequence of F if and only if {F} ├ G. • We could use resolution. By Theorem1.76, G is a consequence of F if and only if ∅ ∈ Res(H) where H is a formula in CNF equivalent to (F ∧¬G). Using these methods not only can we determine whether one formula is a consequence of another, but also we can determine whether a given formula is a tautology or a contradiction. A formula F is a tautology if and only if F is a consequence of (A∨¬A) if and only if ¬F is a contradiction. In this chapter, we consider the analogous problems for first-order logic. Given formulas φ and ψ, how can we determine whether ψ is a consequence of φ? Equivalently, how can we determine whether a given formula is a tautology or a contradiction? We present three methods for answering these questions. • In Section 3.1, we define a notion of formal proof for first-order logic by extending Table 1.5. • In Section 3.3, we “reduce” formulas of first-order logic to sets of formulas of propositional logic where we use resolution as defined in Chapter 1.


1950 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 182-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kalicki

Theorem. There is an effective procedure to decide whether the set of tautologies determined by a given truth-table with a finite number of elements is empty or not.Proof. Let W(P) be a w.f.f. with a single variable P and n a given n-valued truth-table with elements (values)Substitute 1, 2, 3, …, n in succession for P. By the usual contraction process let W(P) assume the truth-values w1, w2, w3, …, wn respectively. The sequencewill be called the value sequence of W(P).Value sequences consisting of designated elements of exclusively will be called designated; others will be called undesignated.All the W(P)'s will be classified in the following way:(a) to the first class CL1 of W(P)'s there belongs the one element P,(b) to the (t + 1)th class CLt + 1 belong all the w.f.f. which can be built up by means of one generating connective from constituent w.f.f. of which one is an element of CLt and all the others (if any) are elements of CLn ≤ t.For example, if N and C are the connectives described by a truth-table etc.Let ∣CLn∣ stand for the set of value sequences of the elements of CLn.


1964 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 509-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. S. Mendelsohn

This paper describes a systematic procedure which yields in a finite number of steps a solution to the following problem. Let G be a group generated by a finite set of generators g1, g2, g3, . . . , gr and defined by a finite set of relations R1 = R2 = . . . = Rk = I, where I is the unit element of G and R1R2, . . . , Rk are words in the gi and gi-1. Let H be a subgroup of G, known to be of finite index, and generated by a finite set of words, W1, W2, . . . , Wt. Let W be any word in G. Our problem is the following. Can we find a new set of generators for H, together with a set of representatives h1 = 1, h2, . . . , hu of the right cosets of H (i.e. G = H1 + Hh2 + . . . + Hhu) such that W can be expressed in the form W = Uhp, where U is a word in .


2021 ◽  
Vol 105 (563) ◽  
pp. 237-244
Author(s):  
Greg N. Frederickson

A geometric dissection is a cutting of a geometric figure (or a finite set of figures) into pieces that we can rearrange to form another geometric figure (or finite set of figures). If our figures are required to be polygons, then there is always a dissection that has just a finite number of pieces. This was established by John Lowry [1], William Wallace [2], Farkas Bolyai [3], and Karl Gerwien [4]. The American Sam Loyd [5] and the Englishman Henry Ernest Dudeney [6, 7] emphasised the goal of minimising the number of pieces that resulted from such a standard dissection.


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