The impartial spectator and the strictness of rules

2020 ◽  
pp. 278-289
Author(s):  
Mario J. Rizzo
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Adam Schoene

Where Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) extends the domain of spectatorship beyond the ocular realm and claims that we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and conduct, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Dialogues (1776) also attempts to probe beyond the visual surface to examine through careful study the constitution of another, who is actually himself. This chapter traces a Smithian sentiment in the radical division of the self dramatized in Rousseau’s fictional autobiographical Dialogues, emphasizing Rousseau’s attempt to liberate his own gaze and render an unbiased judgment upon himself. Although Rousseau does not write in direct discourse with Smith, he applies a strikingly similar rhetorical device to the spectator within the dialogic structure of his apologia. Reading Rousseau alongside Smith resituates the Dialogues not as a work of madness, as it has frequently been interpreted, but rather as an unrelenting struggle for justice.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.


Author(s):  
Amartya Sen

Our reasoned sense of obligations to others can arise from at least three possible sources: cooperation, having caused harm, and effective power to improve suffering. The last source, this chapter argues, is particularly important in considering our obligations to future generations. It draws on a line of reasoning that takes us well beyond contractarian motivations to the idea of the “impartial spectator” as developed by Adam Smith. The interests of future generations come into the story because they are important in our attempt to be impartial spectators. The obligation of power contrasts with the mutual obligations for cooperation at the basic plane of motivational justification. In the context of climate concerns and intergenerational justice, this asymmetry-embracing approach seems to allow an easier entry for understanding our obligations.


Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Nir Ben-Moshe

Abstract John Rawls raises three challenges – to which one can add a fourth challenge – to an impartial spectator account: (a) the impartial spectator is a utility-maximizing device that does not take seriously the distinction between persons; (b) the account does not guarantee that the principles of justice will be derived from it; (c) the notion of impartiality in the account is the wrong one, since it does not define impartiality from the standpoint of the litigants themselves; (d) the account would offer a comprehensive, rather than a political, form of liberalism. The narrow aim of the article is to demonstrate that Adam Smith's impartial spectator account can rise to Rawls's challenges. The broader aim is to demonstrate that the impartial spectator account offers the basis for a novel and alternative framework for developing principles of justice, and does so in the context of a political form of liberalism.


2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-38
Author(s):  
Raymond Boudon

The classical theory of democracy starts from a model where good sense and common sense play a major role, as the notions of the “impartial spectator" (Adam Smith) or the “general will” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau) show, among others. These notions are indispensable to explain many social and political phenomend of our time: phenomena of political consensus on given issues or of short, mid and long-term moral, political, institutional and social evoltion.


Society ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 538-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Chamlee-Wright

AbstractSelf-censorship is a well-documented phenomenon within the academy. Building from the works of Tocqueville, Mill, and Smith, this paper identifies sources of self-censorship within the academy, namely the values of intellectual abrasion and civility, that are associated with the liberal intellectual tradition. The resulting phenomenon of self-censorship, I argue, has both positive and negative effects on the quality of public and academic discourse. Given the dual nature of self-censorship, scholars seeking to make the morally upright choice of whether to self-censor or to speak up face both an epistemological and a moral challenge. I argue that in discussions of the “impartial spectator” and the virtue of self-command, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments anticipates these challenges and lends guidance to the scholar who is sincerely committed to doing what is right when navigating associational life within the academy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Emmanoel de Oliveira Boff

Abstract Why has the “Adam Smith Problem” recently been discussed in the literature? Although most historians of economic thought regard the problem solved, these discussions cast doubt on this apparent solution. This article suggests that the “Adam Smith Problem” may originate from the concept of the human being developed by Smith in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”: in this book, human beings can be understood as composed of an empirical and a (quasi) transcendental side, in the form of the impartial spectator. It is argued that it is the tension between these two parts which creates supposed inconsistencies between aspects of the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” and the “Wealth of Nations” like, for example, the role of sympathy and self-interest in each of these books.


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