Rebel-to-party transformations in civil war peace processes 1975–2011

2018 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs ◽  
Sophia Hatz
Keyword(s):  
2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly M. Greenhill ◽  
Solomon Major

In a highly influential article in International Security, Stephen Stedman introduced a model of “civil war spoilers,” which focused valuable attention on the generally underappreciated role of elites in determining the course of negotiations and in implementing intrastate peace accords. For all its virtues, however, the spoiler model did not suggest the best set of strategies for deterring or defeating those who might seek to undermine peace processes. This is because context-specific and actor-specific measures tend to affect diplomatic instruments only at the margin and because, while spoiler type does not change over time, actors' commitment to fulfilling the provisions of peace accords often does; thus these static characteristics cannot be the critical variables the spoiler model suggests they are. Instead, as a detailed reexamination of three of Stedman's case studies (i.e., Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia) demonstrates, a capabilities-based model offers a more parsimonious and generalizable explanation for why, when, and under what conditions actors who seek to undermine the peace will emerge or retreat. As such, the real key to deterring and defeating would-be spoilers lies in the possession and exercise of the material power to coerce or co-opt them, rather than in the capacity to discern their true character or personality type.


Author(s):  
Ayşe Betül Çelik

The growing number of civil wars in the post-Cold War era has been accompanied by a rising number of forcibly displaced people, who either stay within the borders of their own countries, becoming internally displaced persons (IDPs), or cross borders to become refugees. Although many studies have been conducted on the reasons of conflict-induced displacement, various questions remain of interest for the scholars of international relations, especially questions pertaining but not limited to the (a) gendered aspects of conflict, displacement, and peace processes, (b) predicting possible future displacement zones, and (c) best political and social designs for returnee communities in post-civil war contexts. Most studies still focus on the negative consequences of forced migration, undermining how refugees and IDPs can also contribute to the cultural and political environment of the receiving societies. Considering that there is a huge variation in types of conflict, motivations for violence, and the resulting patterns of displacement within the category of civil war, more research on the actors forcing displacement, their intentions, and subsequent effects on return dynamics can benefit research in this field. Similarly, research on return and reconciliation needs to treat displacement and return as a continuum. Paying attention to conflict parties in civil war bears the potential for new areas of exploration whose outcomes can also shed light on policies for post-civil war construction and intergroup reconciliation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 990-1008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs ◽  
Sophia Hatz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Govinda Clayton ◽  
Valerie Sticher

Abstract Ceasefires play a role in almost all civil war peace processes. Yet existing studies undertheorize the ways in which different logics drive the design of ceasefire agreements, and the effect this has on violence suspension. Building on bargaining theory and existing ceasefire literature, we identify different bargaining problems conflict parties face over the course of a conflict, and three classes of ceasefire design they use to address these problems. We argue that the effect of ceasefires is driven both by these underlying logics and by the provisions they contain. Building on the PA-X data to capture the provisions included within all written civil war ceasefires between 1990 and 2019, and using Uppsala Conflict Data Program georeferenced event data, we estimate models of ceasefire survival, with conflict deaths as the main measure of whether a ceasefire remains in place. We find that definitive ceasefires (i.e., agreements with demobilization and incompatibility provisions), followed by preliminary ceasefires (i.e., agreements with compliance mechanisms), are associated with longer periods of violence suspension than cessation of hostilities agreements that lack such provisions. We discuss the implications of our results for conflict parties and third parties seeking to facilitate the transition from war to peace.


Author(s):  
Sophia Dawkins

When civil war swept South Sudan in December 2013, mediators and political elites embarked on an eighteen-month peace process. This produced seven agreements signed and broken as belligerents targeted civilians. The final accord crumbled as violence escalated within the year. This chapter asks: Why negotiate and why mediate when talks beget slaughter? When belligerents seem uncommitted to a negotiated settlement, under what conditions do conflict parties and mediators retain a mutual interest in turning up at the peace table? The chapter sets the dynamics of elite negotiation against realities on the ground, piecing together civilian experiences from fatality counts and human rights reports. It uses these data to evaluate three theories about why mediators and negotiators kept South Sudan’s talks afloat: peace processes offer access to money, power and status; peace processes sustain neo-patrimonial bargaining; and peace processes empower stakeholders to condition each other’s commitments – for better or for worse.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 500-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paulina Pospieszna ◽  
Karl DeRouen,

Violence against civilians is portrayed as an antecedent of civil war, a cause, or both. Civil war creates opportune environments for planning and carrying out these acts that in turn can have detrimental effects on peace processes. Since not all civil war factions will see peace as beneficial, some actors may use violence to undermine the peace talks. The rebels may use indiscriminate violence to demonstrate their ability to exact costs on the government thus forcing the latter to negotiate. This article focuses upon acts of violence committed by rebel groups during mediated peace process. The central hypothesis is that violence against civilians increases the probability of mediation that in turn increases the prospects for violence. Using all civil war episodes from 1970 to 2008 as observations results from bivariate probit analysis endogenizing the choice of mediation bear out this theoretical argument.


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