Collective Intentions

2019 ◽  
pp. 241-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Collective Intentions

scholarly journals CAN GROUPS HAVE CONCEPTS? SEMANTICS FOR COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 347-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cathal O'Madagain
Keyword(s):  
Collective Intentions

The British Intelligence Community’s Assessments of Nazi Germany’s Intentions

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Selective Attention ◽  
The Past ◽  
Collective Intentions

This chapter examines the evolution in the stated beliefs of Britain’s intelligence organizations about the nature and scope of Nazi Germany’s foreign policy plans along with its perceptions of the Germans’ willingness to wield their military capabilities. It evaluates how well the predictions of the selective attention thesis and the competing theses fit the evolution in perceived intentions. It shows that the evolution of the British intelligence community’s collective intentions assessments is most consistent with the predictions of the capabilities thesis and organizational expertise hypothesis. The evidence is inconclusive as to the predictions of the past and current actions hypotheses of the behavior thesis.

scholarly journals Mistake, Failure of Consideration and the Planning Theory of Intention

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Sheehan
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Planning Theory ◽  
Background Condition ◽  
Collective Intention ◽  
Planning Agency ◽  
The Law ◽  
Collective Intentions

Recovery of mistaken payments in the law of restitution is often justified by reference to a vitiated intention and that of payments where there is a failure of consideration by reference to a qualified intention. This paper aims to investigate whether this is a misleading characterisation and suggests that both causes of action should be understood in terms of conditions affecting our intentions. Specifically we should look at the failure of our planning agency, and Michael Bratman’s theory of agency in particular. In cases of mistaken payments we should look at the failure of a background condition to the payment. In such cases to fail to allow recovery is to fail to respect me as an autonomous actor, acting under norms having agential authority for me. In failure of consideration cases the autonomy of the other party is at stake, but we can take this into account by positing not a failure of a condition affecting personal intention, but affecting collective intention. There are different views on what collective intention is and how it should be understood, which may themselves have different implications in terms of the concurrency of mistake and failure of consideration as unjust factors. The paper examines different ways in which collective intentions might fail and how they fit the failure of consideration paradigm.

scholarly journals Understanding institutions: replies to Aoki, Binmore, Hodgson, Searle, Smith, and Sugden

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANK HINDRIKS ◽  
FRANCESCO GUALA
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Human Exceptionalism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Collective Intentions

AbstractOur goal is to develop a theory that combines the best insights of philosophical and scientific theories of institutions. We are not committed a priori to save the commonsense notion of institution, or the thesis of human exceptionalism. We think that human cognition is important, but we do not claim that common knowledge or collective intentions are necessary for coordination. Like most of our commentators, we believe that there is continuity between simple rules of precedence and sophisticated institutions like property, marriage, or money. Finally, we argue that a satisfactory account of institutions must be compatible with different theories of normativity, specifying the social and psychological mechanisms that make it possible to override selfish desires.

scholarly journals Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Rachar
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Collective Intention ◽  
Persistence Conditions ◽  
Metaphysical Commitment ◽  
Collective Intentions

AbstractThis paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.

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