Persistence Conditions of Institutional Entities: Investigating Copredication Through a Forced-Choice Experiment

The conditions under which certain complex polysemous nominals can sustain coherent sense relations (informally, can “survive”) is investigated through a two-alternative forced choice experiment. Written scenarios were constructed which permitted copredication, through which multiple, semantically different sense types are associated with a single nominal. Participants were presented with two scenarios involving a polysemous nominal (e.g., bank, city) and had to select which scenario (and, hence, which combination of predicates) appeared to be the most prototypical, faithful realization of the nominal. In order to achieve this, an additional manipulation was added, such that the number of senses hosted by each forced choice was either equal (2 senses choice vs. 2 senses choice) or unequal (1 sense choice vs. 2/3 senses choice). In order to address certain concerns in the literature about prototypicality, a core question addressed was whether the institutional sense of the nominals strongly determined the option chosen by participants, or whether the number of senses more strongly predicted this. It was found that the best predictor of sense “survival” was not sense frequency, but rather sense complexity or approximation to the institutional sense.

Effects of a Submesoscale Oceanographic Filament on Zooplankton Dynamics in the Arctic Marginal Ice Zone

Submesoscale structures, characterized by intense vertical and horizontal velocities, potentially play a crucial role in oceanographic dynamics and pelagic fluxes. Due to their small spatial scale and short temporal persistence, conditions for in situ measurements are challenging and thus the role of such structures for zooplankton distribution is still unclear. During RV Polarstern expedition PS107 to Arctic Fram Strait in July/August 2017, a submesoscale filament was detected, which initiated an ad hoc oceanographic and biological sampling campaign. To determine zooplankton taxonomic composition, horizontal and vertical distribution, abundance and biomass, vertical MultiNet hauls (depth intervals: 300–200–100–50–10–0 m) were taken at four stations across the filament. Zooplankton data were evaluated in context with the physical-oceanographic observations of the filament to assess submesoscale physical-biological interactions. Our data show that submesoscale features considerably impact zooplankton dynamics. While structuring the pelagial with distinct zooplankton communities in a vertical as well as horizontal dimension, they accumulate abundance and biomass of epipelagic species at the site of convergence. Further, high-velocity jets associated with such dynamics are possibly of major importance for species allocation and biological connectivity, accelerating for instance processes such as the ‘Atlantification’ of the Arctic. Thus, submesoscale features affect the surrounding ecosystem in multiple ways with consequences for higher trophic levels and biogeochemical cycles.

Quasi-Psychologism about Collective Intention

This paper argues that a class of popular views of collective intention, which I call “quasi-psychologism”, faces a problem explaining common intuitions about collective action. Views in this class hold that collective intentions are realized in or constituted by individual, mental, participatory intentions. I argue that this metaphysical commitment entails persistence conditions that are in tension with a purported obligation to notify co-actors before leaving a collective action attested to by participants in experimental research about the interpersonal normativity of collective action. I then explore the possibilities open to quasi-psychologists for responding to this research.

The Effects of Media Coverage on the Dynamics of Disease in Prey-Predator Model

In this paper, an eco-epidemiological model with media coverage effects is established and studied. An -type of disease in predator is considered. All the properties of the solution of the proposed model are discussed. An application to the stability theory was carried out to investigate the local as well as global stability of the system. The persistence conditions of the model are determined. The occurrence of local bifurcation in the model is studied. Further investigation of the global dynamics of the model is achieved through using a numerical simulation.

Locke’s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

This chapter offers a close analysis of Locke’s approach to questions of individuation and identity over time. It examines how Locke distinguishes individuation from identity and proposes that Locke’s approach to identity is best understood as kind-dependent. This means that the persistence conditions vary depending on the kind of being under consideration. For Locke it is important to first examine the kind under consideration, before persistence conditions for members of this kind can be specified. More precisely, if the nominal essences of kind F and kind G vary, then it is likely that the persistence conditions for members of kind F will vary from the persistence conditions for members of kind G. This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity.

Moral Personhood and Personal Identity

This chapter applies Locke’s kind-dependent account of identity to persons. First, the author argues that Lockean persons belong to a moral and legal kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. This interpretation gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term, but it also shows that his arguments presuppose a particular conception of morality that is grounded in divine law and the power to enforce morality by reward and punishment. Next, the chapter asks how Locke’s moral and legal account of personhood enables us to specify persistence conditions for persons. It is argued that it is helpful to examine Locke’s understanding of just accountability. For Locke sameness of consciousness is a necessary condition for moral accountability. This makes it possible to establish that sameness of consciousness is a necessary condition for personal identity. Yet it is also acknowledged that Locke thinks about moral accountability in particular and controversial ways. The chapter ends by offering fine-grained distinctions for understanding the relation between morality and metaphysics in Locke’s account of personal identity.

Persistence conditions of institutional entities: Investigating copredication and prototypicality through a forced-choice experiment

The conditions under which certain complex polysemous nominals can sustain coherent sense relations (informally, can “survive”) is investigated through a forced-choice experiment. The materials permitted copredication, through which multiple, semantically different sense types are associated with a single nominal. Participants were presented with two scenarios involving a certain polysemous nominal (e.g. bank, city) and had to select which scenario (and, hence, which combination of predicates) appeared to be the most prototypical, faithful realisation of the nominal. In order to achieve this, an additional manipulation was added, such that the number of senses hosted by each choice was either equal (2 senses choice vs. 2 senses choice) or unequal (1 sense choice vs. 2/3 senses choice). In order to address certain concerns in the literature about prototypicality, a core question was whether the institutional sense of the nominals strongly determined the option chosen by participants, or whether the number of senses more strongly predicted this. It was found that the best predictor of the results was not sense frequency, but rather sense complexity or approximation to the institutional sense.

The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism

The Stoics are famously committed to the thesis that only bodies are, and for this reason they are rightly called “corporealists.” They are also famously compared to Plato’s earthborn Giants in the Sophist, and rightly so given their steadfast commitment to body as being. But the Stoics also notoriously turn the tables on Plato and coopt his “dunamis proposal” that being is whatever can act or be acted upon, to underwrite their commitment to body rather than shrink from it as the Giants do. The substance of Stoic corporealism, however, has not been fully appreciated. This paper argues that Stoic corporealism goes beyond the dunamis proposal, which is simply an ontological criterion for being, to the metaphysics of body. This involves, first, an account of body as metaphysically simple and hence fundamental; second, an account of body as malleable and continuous, hence fit for blending (krasis di’ holou) and composition. In addition, the metaphysics of body involves a distinction between this composition relation seen in the cosmology, and the constitution relation by which the four-fold schema called the Stoic Categories proceeds, e.g. the relation between a statue and its clay, or a fist and its underlying hand. It has not been appreciated that the cosmology and the Categories are distinct — and complementary — explanatory enterprises, the one accounting for generation and unity, the other taking those individuals once generated, and giving a mereological analysis of their identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and qualities. The result is an elegant division of Plato’s labor from the Battle of Gods and Giants. On the one hand, the Stoics rehabilitate the crude cosmology of the Presocratics to deliver generation and unity in completely corporeal terms, and that work is found in their Physics. On the other hand, they reform the Giants and “dare to corporealize,” delivering all manner of predication (from identity to the virtues), and that work is found in Stoic Logic. Recognizing the distinctness of these explanatory enterprises helps dissolve scholarly puzzles, and harmonizes the Stoics with themselves.

Complex Dynamical Behavior of a Three Species Prey–Predator System with Nonlinear Harvesting

In this manuscript, we consider an extended version of the prey–predator system with nonlinear harvesting [Gupta et al., 2015] by introducing a top predator (omnivore) which feeds on more than one trophic levels. Consideration of third species as omnivore makes the system a food web of three populations. We have guaranteed positivity as well as the boundedness of solutions of the proposed system. We observed that the presence of third species complicates the dynamical behavior of the system. It is also observed that multiple positive steady states exist for the proposed system which makes the problem more interesting compared to the similar models studied previously. Sotomayor’s theorem is being utilized to study the saddle-node bifurcation. The persistence conditions are discussed for the proposed model. The local existence of periodic solution through Hopf bifurcations is also guaranteed numerically. It is observed that the proposed model is capable to exhibit more complicated dynamics in the form of chaos in both the cases when there are unique and multiple coexisting steady states. Bifurcation diagrams and Lyapunov exponents have been drawn to ensure the existence of chaotic dynamics of the system.

Qua Objects and Their Limits

It is both a matter of everyday experience and a tenet of sociological theory that people often occupy a range of social roles and identities, some of which are associated with mutually incompatible properties. But since nothing could have incompatible properties, it is not clear how this is possible. It has been suggested, notably by Kit Fine (1982, 1999, 2006), that the puzzling relation between a person and their various social roles and identities can be explained by admitting an ontology of social qua objects—objects constituted by, yet distinct from, the persons on which they are based. This article argues that admitting even a rich ontology of such qua objects does not suffice to explain the puzzle cases of interest. Instead, alternative resources are required which, once available, diminish the motivation for adopting an ontology of social qua objects in the first place. The paper concludes by considering whether there remains work for social qua objects in explaining differences in persistence conditions between a person and the social individuals to which they may give rise, but reaches a negative verdict. Social qua objects, if they exist, have little work to do in our theorizing about the relation between a person and their various social roles and identities.