Automatic pilot and conscious awareness

2017 ◽  
pp. 31-34
Author(s):  
Rebecca Crane
1991 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 623-624
Author(s):  
Mardi J. Horowitz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
A. Fiorini ◽  
A. Ferraiuolo ◽  
A. Ollagnier ◽  
M. Monnoyer ◽  
P. Rocabois ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher

This chapter examines the concept of free will as it is discussed in philosophy and neuroscience. It reviews reflective and perceptual theories of agency and argues against neuro-centric conclusions about the illusory nature of free will. Experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet suggest that neural activations prior to conscious awareness predict specific actions. This has been taken as evidence that challenges the traditional notion of free will. Libet’s experiments, arguably, are about motor control processes on an elementary timescale and say nothing about freely willed intentional actions embedded in personal and social contexts that involve longer-term, narrative timescales. One implication of this interpretation is that enactivism is not a form of simple behaviorism. Agency is not a thing reducible to elementary neuronal processes; nor is it an idea or a pure consciousness. It rather involves a structure of complex relations.


Author(s):  
Drew Leder

This chapter undertakes a phenomenology of inner-body experience, starting with a focus on visceral interoception. While highly personal, such experience also reveals a level of the lived body that is pre-personal, beyond our understanding and control. In contrast to exteroception, elements of the visceral field can be inaccessible, or surface only indistinctly and intermittently to conscious awareness. Nonetheless, interoception is more than just a series of such sensations. This chapter argues for the “exterior interior”—that is, we interpret inner body experiences through models drawn from the outer world, and interoception itself is bound up with emotion, purpose, and projects. In the West, we tend to valorize the interiority of rational thought; by contrast, experience of the inner body is a kind of “inferior interior,” often overlooked or overridden, yet inside insights—gained from attending to messages from the inner body—may preserve our health and wellbeing.


PsyCh Journal ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 228-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Montemayor

2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eimer ◽  
Monika Kiss ◽  
Amanda Holmes

Author(s):  
A. Ferraiuolo ◽  
A. Fiorini ◽  
E. Menigault ◽  
M. Monnoyer ◽  
A. Ollagnier ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Analysis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake Quilty-Dunn

Abstract It is an orthodoxy in cognitive science that perception can occur unconsciously. Recently, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters and Ian Phillips have argued that this orthodoxy may be mistaken. They argue that many purported cases of unconscious perception fail to rule out low degrees of conscious awareness while others fail to establish genuine perception. This paper presents a case of unconscious perception that avoids these problems. It also advances a general principle of ‘phenomenal coherence’ that can insulate some forms of evidence for unconscious perception from the methodological critiques of Lau, Peters and Phillips.


1977 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-206
Author(s):  
Marjorie H. Holden

Research on young children's word awareness, the ability to identify the lexical constituents of a meaningful utterance, has received different interpretations: Either word awareness is related to linguistic and cognitive changes associated with the early school years or is a concept that children can learn when appropriate techniques are employed. This study was devised to clarify the nature of variables influencing word awareness during early childhood by analyzing responses of 26 kindergarten and 24 first-grade children to the Homophones Test of Word Awareness. Responses were assigned to seven categories representing a continuum characterized as ranging from discrete to global. Older children made fewer errors, and they gave a higher proportion of discrete responses. Younger children gave more global responses. Memory was evidently not the source of the younger children's inability to perform as well as the older ones. Rather, the difficulty appeared to stem from the younger children's inability to divorce sound from meaning in spoken messages. The role of developmental factors in children's conscious awareness of language structure and lexical units is supported by these findings.


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