Unconscious perception and phenomenal coherence
Keyword(s):
Abstract It is an orthodoxy in cognitive science that perception can occur unconsciously. Recently, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters and Ian Phillips have argued that this orthodoxy may be mistaken. They argue that many purported cases of unconscious perception fail to rule out low degrees of conscious awareness while others fail to establish genuine perception. This paper presents a case of unconscious perception that avoids these problems. It also advances a general principle of ‘phenomenal coherence’ that can insulate some forms of evidence for unconscious perception from the methodological critiques of Lau, Peters and Phillips.
2018 ◽
pp. 204-215
1990 ◽
Vol 48
(3)
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pp. 594-595
2019 ◽
Vol 62
(5)
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pp. 1243-1257
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