Paranormal believers’ proneness to probabilistic reasoning biases: a review of the empirical literature

2014 ◽  
pp. 126-143
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Šrol

The endorsement of epistemically suspect (i.e. paranormal, conspiracy, and pseudoscientific) beliefs is widespread and has negative real-life consequences. Therefore, it is important to understand individual differences in epistemically suspect beliefs and their associations with systematic reasoning errors – cognitive biases. In Study 1 (N = 263), I constructed a novel questionnaire of epistemically suspect beliefs and examined its psychometric properties and relationships with probabilistic reasoning biases. In Study 2 (N = 397), I examined probabilistic reasoning biases and biased evaluation of evidence as predictors of the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs, while accounting for analytic thinking and worldview variables. Although probabilistic reasoning biases, analytic thinking, religious faith, and political liberalism consistently predicted epistemically suspect beliefs, the effect of biased evaluation of evidence was partialled out by analytic thinking. Further research will be needed to examine the interplay between analytic thinking and the tendency toward information evaluation biased by one’s existing beliefs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 226 (3) ◽  
pp. 152-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Mehl ◽  
Björn Schlier ◽  
Tania M. Lincoln

Abstract. Cognitive-behavioral therapy for psychosis (CBTp) builds on theoretical models that postulate reasoning biases and negative self-schemas to be involved in the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, it is unclear whether CBTp induces change in delusions by improving these proposed causal mechanisms. This study reports on a mediation analysis of a CBTp effectiveness trial in which delusions were a secondary outcome. Patients with psychosis were randomized to individualized CBTp (n = 36) or a waiting list condition (WL; n = 34). Reasoning biases (jumping to conclusions, theory of mind, attribution biases) and self-schemas (implicit and explicit self-esteem; self-schemas related to different domains) were assessed pre- and post-therapy/WL. The results reveal an intervention effect on two of four measures of delusions and on implicit self-esteem. Nevertheless, the intervention effect on delusions was not mediated by implicit self-esteem. Changes in explicit self-schemas and reasoning biases did also not mediate the intervention effects on delusions. More focused interventions may be required to produce change in reasoning and self-schemas that have the potential to carry over to delusions.


e-Finanse ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 67-76
Author(s):  
Piotr Bartkiewicz

AbstractThe article presents the results of the review of the empirical literature regarding the impact of quantitative easing (QE) on emerging markets (EMs). The subject is of interest to policymakers and researchers due to the increasingly larger role of EMs in the world economy and the large-scale capital flows occurring after 2009. The review is conducted in a systematic manner and takes into consideration different methodological choices, samples and measurement issues. The paper puts the summarized results in the context of transmission channels identified in the literature. There are few distinct methodological approaches present in the literature. While there is a consensus regarding the direction of the impact of QE on EMs, its size and durability have not yet been assessed with sufficient precision. In addition, there are clear gaps in the empirical findings, not least related to relative underrepresentation of the CEE region (in particular, Poland).


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett Buttliere

Over the last decade, there have been many suggestions to improve how scientists answer their questions, but far fewer attempt to improve the questions scientists are asking in the first place. The goal of the paper is then to examine and summarize synthesize the evidence on how to ask the best questions possible. First is a brief review of the philosophical and empirical literature on how the best science is done, which implicitly but not explicitly mentions the role of psychology and especially cognitive conflict. Then we more closely focus on the psychology of the scientist, finding that they are humans, engaged in a meaning making process, and that cognitive conflict is a necessary input for any learning or change in the system. The scientific method is, of course, a specialized meaning making process. We present evidence for this central role of cognitive conflict in science by examining the most discussed scientific papers between 2013 and 2017, which are, in general, controversial and about big problems (e.g., whether vaccines cause autism, how often doctors kill us with their mistakes). Toward the end we discuss the role of science in society, suggesting science itself is an uncertainty reducing and problem solving enterprise. From this basis we encourage scientists to take riskier stances on bigger topics, for the good of themselves and society generally.


Author(s):  
Darwin Ugarte Ontiveros

Recent evidence suggests that formality improves micro-firms profits in Bolivia. This gain is only for firms with 2 to 5 workers, while smaller and larger firms would lose out by formalizing (McKenzie and Sakho, 2010). However, as much of the empirical literature on this topic, the estimations are based on strong assumptions about unobservables. If the returns to formality vary among firms and these variations influence selection into formality, traditional estimators are biased (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007). In this paper we considerthese elements to estimate the heterogeneous effects of formality on firm profits in Bolivia. We find remarkable heterogeneity in the returns to formality, from -3% to 6%. The group of firms with positive marginal effects from formality corresponds to those which are most likely to register. We also characterize the firms that likely benefit from having a formal status. These would correspond to large firms which work at big scales.


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