be undesirable to allow a driver to be indemnified by his employer because he might then drive less carefully. In this respect, the court was not concerned with terms implied in fact, but rather with the question whether a term in law should be implied. But if this is the case, the policy issue is perhaps one which ought to be resolved by Parliament rather than the courts. The implication arising from the decision in Irwin is that there is a difference between the officious bystander test and that based on necessity. This distinction is also borne out by a later decision in the House of Lords, where it has been observed that there is a difference between ‘the search for a term necessary to give business efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary incident of a definable category of contractual relationship’. The problem with this view is that the word ‘necessary’ is used in the formulation of both tests which would seem to suggest a degree of duplication in the apparently quite different tests for implying a term in a contract. Phang illustrates the problems which may flow from this apparent confusion:

1995 ◽  
pp. 299-300
Keyword(s):  
Policy Issue ◽  
Contractual Relationship ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law

The House of Lords on the Law of Trespass to Realty and Children as Trespassers

1910 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 491
Author(s):  
F. M. B. ◽  
Thomas Beven
Keyword(s):  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law

Consent after the House of Lords: Taking and leading astray the Law of Theft

Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Specific Definition

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.

scholarly journals Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Justice System ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Character Theory ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Do So

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.

Criminal Responsibility of the Insane

1894 ◽  
Vol 40 (171) ◽  
pp. 609-621
Author(s):  
Oscar Woods
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law

Many of those now present will probably agree with me that the law of criminal responsibility, as at present laid prisoners is not the same in England, Ireland, and Scotland. The existing law is ruled by the answers of the judges to certain questions put to them by the House of Lords in reference to the case of the “Queen v. McNaghten,” tried in 1843.

The house of lords and the law of contract

1968 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-11
Author(s):  
A.G. Guest
Keyword(s):  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law

Exclusive possession or the intention of the parties? The relation of landlord and tenant in Northern Ireland

2017 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-223
Author(s):  
Mark Hayward
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law

The seminal House of Lords judgment in Street v Mountford established that the test for distinguishing between a lease and a licence is whether the occupant has been granted exclusive possession of the premises. The test is objective: the relation of landlord and tenant exists where exclusive possession has been granted, regardless of the intention of the parties. However, this stands at odds with the law in both parts of Ireland, where s 3 of Deasy's Act states that the relation of landlord and tenant 'shall be deemed to be founded on the . . . contract of the parties'. This article analyses the historical background that led to Deasy's Act, surveys contemporary case law in both parts of Ireland on leases vs licences and argues that the law in this area in Northern Ireland differs from that in England and Wales.

opinion. It surely makes more sense to construe the words ‘so liable’ in s2(1) as merely referring to the general existence of damages under s2(1), which had formerly only existed in respect of fraudulent misrepresentation rather than as importing all the rules of fraud into what is, at root, a negligence action. In Smith New Court Ltd v Citibank NA, Lord Steyn at the very least raised a critical eyebrow. ‘The question is whether the rather loose wording of [s 2(1)] compels the court to treat a person who was morally innocent as if he was guilty of fraud when it comes to the measure of damages. There has been trenchant academic criticism of the Royscott case: see Richard Hooley ... (1991) 107 LQR 547. Since this point does not directly arise in the present case, I express no concluded view on the correctness of the decision in Royscott’. Of course, fact that fraud rules on damages and remoteness of loss apply to an action under s2(1) does not mean that all the rules applicable to actions for deceit are also applicable. For example, there may be different rules for the purposes of limitation of actions. Much of the law in relation to damages for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations have been reviewed recently by the House of Lords in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA (originally Scrimgeour Vickers Ltd and Another). The case concerned the losses caused by the dramatic fall in

1995 ◽  
pp. 717-717
Keyword(s):  
House Of Lords ◽  
General Existence ◽  
The Law ◽  
Limitation Of Actions ◽  
Dramatic Fall ◽  
As If

The Contractualisation of Labour Law

2018 ◽  
pp. 33-47
Author(s):  
John Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Employment Relationship ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
Work Relations ◽  
Contractual Relationship ◽  
The World ◽  
British Labour ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Main Ideas

This chapter explores the idea that labour law rests on ‘a contractual foundation’, and the idea that work relations today are ever more ‘contractualised’. Section 1 lays out some essentials of British labour law and its connections with the common law of contract. Section 2 explains what contractualisation is, not yet focusing attention on the specific context of labour law. The main claims are that contract is not a specifically legal device, and that contractualisation is therefore not a specifically legal process, even when the law is complicit in it. Section 3 shifts attention to the world of work, especially the employment relationship. Here the main ideas are that the employment relationship is not (apart from the law) a contractual relationship, and that all the norms of the employment relationship cannot therefore be captured adequately in a contract, legally binding or otherwise. Section 4 illustrates the latter point by focusing on the rationale and the limits of the employer’s authority over the employee. A contractual rationale yields the wrong limits. It gives its blessing to authoritarian work regimes and lends credence to the miserable view that work is there to pay for the life of the worker without forming part of that life. Throughout the chapter there are intimations of the conclusion drawn in section 5: that contractualisation, in the labour market at least, is a process that lovers of freedom, as well as lovers of self-realisation, should resist—or rather, should have resisted while they still had the chance.

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