ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND THE COMMON LAW

2012 ◽  
pp. 93-112
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 450-476
Author(s):  
Nicola Peart ◽  
Prue Vines

New Zealand and Australia are named in that order in the title because New Zealand was the first to develop the discretionary family provision jurisdiction, in 1900, that now applies in New Zealand, Australia, and much of the common law world. This allows courts to make awards to family members from the estate of the deceased. Originally benefitting only the surviving spouse and children, family provision has extended the rules of eligibility in line with changes in the meaning of ‘family’. So as well as spouses, claims can also, in many of the Australasian jurisdictions, be made by civil partners, cohabitants, and same-sex partners. Most jurisdictions have also broadened the class of eligible children to include grandchildren and stepchildren who were being maintained by the deceased as well as children born of new reproductive techniques. Both New Zealand and Australia have significant indigenous populations and their eligibility to claim family provision is modified to accord with their customary law. Over time, the courts have adopted a much broader view of a deceased’s ‘moral duty’ to his or her family, particularly in regard to claims by adult children. The size of awards has increased correspondingly. The chapter discusses this development, as well as the increasing relevance of Indigenous customary law and how the courts deal with disentitling conduct. In view of the greatly expanded scope of family provision in New Zealand and Australia, testamentary freedom may be only an illusion in these jurisdictions.


2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
KWAME AKUFFO

In English law, equity is assigned relatively benign and comfortable roles, functioning as a canon of interpretation of the common law; as its versatile and flexible help-mate and mitigator of its formal strictness. More than this, equity claims a moral justice or conscience function that is deeply embedded in legal culture. As a consequence, equity has been extremely successful in lubricating the machinery of English law, providing it with a ready means of change to meet the needs of the dominant actors within society. This justice function is, however, contradicted by equity's history and its practical functioning, particularly, within the British colonial experience. This article examines the effect of the imposition of English equity on the prevailing customary law systems in colonial West Africa. The analysis challenges the fundamental claim of equity to a moral justice function within the colonial regime and argues that equity served the imperial objective as an instrument for fragmenting and dislocating indigenous property systems in order to facilitate the installation of capitalist property forms.


1967 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon R. Woodman

There are two principal methods whereby land may be used as security for a loan in Ghana. One is the customary law transaction called a mortgage by Sarbah.2 The other is the common law mortgage. It will be convenient to refer to the customary law transaction as a “pledge”, because the creditor obtains possession of the land, and the present article is not concerned with the use of chattels as security. Accordingly, “mortgage” will always mean a common law mortgage.


Author(s):  
Thomas W. Bennett

For the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept – Ubuntu – has been adopted into the common law of the land (which is a mixture of English and Roman-Dutch law). Ever since colonial conquest, the indigenous normative orders of Africa have been treated as inferior. While South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation had the effect of elevating customary law to the same status as that of the common law, the traffic of ideas between the two systems continued to favour the latter as the superior system. The reception of ubuntu into the common law reversed this process. This paper examines the function of ubuntu in its new environment. Most of the discussion about the concept has concentrated on its meaning, a question that has been concentrated on finding a suitable English translation. The most obvious have been the calques, ‘humanity’, ‘personhood’ or ‘humaneness’, but none have been especially helpful, for they cannot hope to convey the full range of functions now performed by ubuntu. It is argued in this paper that searches for a priori meanings are unhelpful: words are continually being exploited by users to serve their own particular ends. In this regard, it must be appreciated that ubuntu is a loanword, and thus especially susceptible to manipulation. The paper shows that the courts have used ubuntu to supply a peculiarly African form of equity that has been used to solve hard cases and conflicts between rules, notably in the area of public law.


Author(s):  
Susan H. Williams

This chapter examines the practice of customary law in Liberia and how it contributes to gender inequality. The familiar menu of constitutional tools to protect equality has often failed, both because external legal limits on customary law are inaccessible to women in traditional communities and because they put those women in the position of opposing their own communities. The only sustainable solution is to empower women to reshape their own customary law. This requires rethinking culture and customary law at three levels: first, we must view culture as an evolving process to which all members contribute; second, we must view customary law as an evolving part of the common law that interacts with state law; and third, we must enhance ‘participatory parity’ for women. The chapter concludes with suggestions for constitutional reform in Liberia to promote the role of women as norm creators.


2020 ◽  
pp. 477-506
Author(s):  
Marius J de Waal

At the time of the reception of Roman-Dutch law at the Cape in the seventeenth century, both children and the surviving spouse enjoyed sufficient protection at the death of the breadwinner (normally the father and husband): children by way of the civilian legitimate portion and the spouse by way of the matrimonial property regime of community of property prevalent in Roman-Dutch law of the time. However, after the English occupation of the Cape in the early nineteenth century this protection was slowly eroded. This happened, first, by the acceptance of the principle of freedom of testation under English influence and, secondly, by the growing popularity of ante-nuptial contracts excluding community of property. This chapter explains how family protection was gradually restored in South Africa. In the case of children, this happened by the courts awarding a maintenance claim against the deceased parent’s estate; and in the case of the surviving spouse it was by means of a statutory maintenance claim against the estate of the other spouse. South African law therefore chose the common law approach of discretionary maintenance over the civilian approach of fixed shares. The chapter sets out the respective histories of these two claims as well as their operation in modern South African law. It discusses other possible protection measures and potential avoidance mechanisms. Finally, the chapter contains a brief discussion of the position of South Africans living under African customary law and the importance of the customary law principle of ‘ubuntu’ in this context.


Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

In the past, customary law has been applied rather haphazardly in the courts. Its inherent adaptive flexibility and indeterminate nature created confusion in a court system ill-equipped to deal with litigation dealing with customary law issues. Understandably, customary law was treated in the same way as a common-law custom, which also originates in a community's acceptance of certain standards of behaviour. This meant that anyone averring a rule of customary law had to prove it, except where the rule was contained in a statute or precedent. The courts were not keen to engage in law-making and where the ascertainment of customary law proved to be difficult, they would merely apply the common law. In 1998, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, which allows the judiciary to take judicial notice of readily accessible customary law, made fundamental changes to this situation. The Act is still in operation, although it must now be interpreted in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). No direction on how this must be done can be found in the wording of the constitutional provisions dealing with the customary law. Besides instructing the courts to apply customary law when "applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law", the Constitution is silent on the way forward. Given the fact that most of the judiciary does not have any knowledge of the content of living customary law and the fact that there are fundamental differences between the evidentiary rules applied in the common and customary laws of South Africa, a few problems are bound to surface when litigating issues involving the customary law. They include: the status of customary law in the South African legal system; the applicability of customary law; and especially the determination of living customary law. The aim of this analysis is to determine if the existing evidentiary rules are appropriate to deal with these challenges in litigating matters involving customary law in the ordinary courts.


2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387
Author(s):  
Bill R Atkin

Canon law is a body of rules that govern churches. It has a venerable history and has at times marched in step with the common law. It has a specialised vocabulary – even the word canon – much of which is derived from Greek. It also has sophisticated legislative systems, which vary from denomination to denomination and from place to place. In the case of the Anglican Church of New Zealand, the system is in part based on the Westminster model but has been modified when thought appropriate, with the result that the language used is partly familiar to the average lawyer but partly not. The exact legal nature of canon law is uncertain and may depend in part on whether the church is the established religion or not. In New Zealand where there is no establishment, a comparison could be made, inter alia, with customary law.


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