The United Kingdom: When a Coalition Meets the Westminster Model, Who Wins?

This chapter examines the United Kingdom’s sole post-war coalition government and how it interacted with the Westminster Model’s assumption of single-party government. It looks at the issue from two perspectives: firstly, how much the usual processes of single-party government changed to accommodate two parties in government, and secondly, how David Cameron’s Conservatives and Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats worked together as parties in government in ways that fitted with the expectations of the Westminster Model. It examines this single example of coalition government in its political and historical contexts, exploring why a coalition occurred in 2010 and how it managed to continue in office for a full parliamentary term. The chapter begins with the comparatively swift process of negotiation through which the coalition was formed, then proceeds to look at how the expectations of that negotiation survived contact with the actual processes of government. It concludes by examining what the procedural and political impacts of the coalition on the UK have been, including the role of the coalition’s Fixed-Term Parliament Act on the stability of it and future governments.

Back to the Westminster model? The Brexit process and the UK political system

This article investigates the impact of Brexit on the British political system. By critically engaging with the conceptualisation of the Westminster model proposed by Arend Lijphart, it analyses the strains of Brexit on three dimensions developed from from Lijphart’s framework: elections and the party system, executive– legislative dynamics and the relationship between central and devolved administrations. Supplementing quantitative indicators with an in-depth qualitative analysis, the article shows that the process of Brexit has ultimately reaffirmed, with some important caveats, key features of the Westminster model: the resilience of the two-party system, executive dominance over Parliament and the unitary character of the political system. Inheriting a context marked by the progressive weakening of key majoritarian features of the political system, the Brexit process has brought back some of the traditional executive power-hoarding dynamics. Yet, this prevailing trend has created strains and resistances that keep the political process open to different developments.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF ASEAN’S COUNTRIES: QUESTIONING JUDICIAL REVIEW, RELIGIONS AND MINORITY ISSUES

ASEAN countries have culture and ethnic varieties affecting the way of having a state. Those countries in this region have had an energetic constitution moved on adjusting the time. In respecting the spirit of democracy and also part of constitutional practice, those countries have frequently amended their constitution. ASEAN countries have had the numerous models of constitutional practice adopted from the post-colonial era. It has now, nevertheless, been doing a consistent renewal, in particular, activated and greatly animated by the need to re-examine and re-evaluate existing rules to make them relevant to common and indigenous models and value systems. Looking the system ASEAN countries implementing their constitution, it can be reviewed that there are three models of constitutional practice have been taking place in ASEAN; firstly is the Westminster Model, Socialist Model, and Mixed Model.

Nations, Regions and Local Democracy

This chapter talks about Sir Ivor Jennings, who observed in the context of decolonization in the 1950s that one must first decide who are the people before one can decide how the people are to govern themselves. It proposes a constitutional renewal project that must recognize the United Kingdom as a complex 'Union state' made up of distinct nations. It also describes the United Kingdom as a messy amalgam of two kingdoms, a principality, and a dismembered province that were forged together by civil wars, bribery, and dynastic wrangling. The chapter looks at the geographical, cultural, historical, and demographic complexity of the polity being constituted that will determine much of its constitutional architecture even when fairly standard Westminster Model constitutionalism is applied. It illustrates India and Bangladesh, two countries whose constitutions are thoroughly Westminster influenced but show different design because of the demands of context.

Parliament II: Privileges, Organization and Procedures

This chapter delves into the privileges of parliament as an integral part of the Westminster System, going back to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. It lists freedom of speech, the immunity of members from legal liability for statements made in the House, and the freedom of each House to order its own affairs without interference by the Crown as the privileges of Parliament. It also refers to Westminster Model constitutions that replicate privileges in the parliament by directly specifying and enumerating them in the constitution, or by conferring on parliament the power to determine its own privileges. The chapter cites the Constitution of Trinidad & Tobago as a typical example that applies the privileges of the House of Commons. It discusses how the constitution gives parliament the power to prescribe the powers, privileges, and immunities of each House.

Parliament I: Functions, Powers and Composition

This chapter focuses on Westminster Model constitutions around the world that prescribe the composition of parliament, such as the manner in which members are chosen, qualifications and disqualifications for being a member, and their terms of office. It highlights the functions that a parliament is expected to perform in a Westminster Model democracy by synthesizing several classic authorities, namely Walter Bagehot's The English Constitution. It also mentions Sir Ivor Jennings' Parliament, which outlines seven main functions of parliament. The chapter explains how parliament in a Westminster Model democracy does not actively govern, but it does make and break governments. It examines the parliamentary duty to determine who will have the authority to make decisions or conditions on policy making.

Should I stay or should I go? British voter you got to let me know! Prime Ministers, intra-party conflict, and membership referendums in the British Westminster model

We explain the referendums on British membership of the European Communities and European Union from a principal–agent perspective between the Prime Minister and the rank-and-file. We show that announcing a referendum on the Prime Minister’s membership proposal helps the incumbent party to win the general election when the rank-and-file is divided on the terms of membership. When the Prime Minister overcomes the rank-and-file’s mistrust of her effectiveness in negotiating new membership terms with other member states, the voters are more likely to follow her proposal. However, when intra-party controversies reveal principal–agent problems, the initially uninformed voters can learn about the dysfunctionality of the terms and are more likely to reject the Prime Minister’s proposal.