EU economic governance and labour rights: diversity and coherence in the EU, the Council of Europe and ILO instruments

2015 ◽  
pp. 118-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Hendrickx ◽  
Pieter Pecinovsky
Keyword(s):  
Economic Governance ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Labour Rights ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

scholarly journals Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

2017 ◽  
Vol 239 ◽  
pp. R3-R13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

scholarly journals Accountability in EU Economic Governance: European Commissioners in Polish Parliament

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-162
Author(s):  
Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
Keyword(s):  
Annual Cycle ◽  
National Level ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Policy Impact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
Country Specific ◽  
The Eu

This article analyses the interactions between the members of the Polish parliament with the European commissioners in the context of the European Semester, the annual cycle of economic coordination. The Commission drafts crucial documents in this process which assess the implementation of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs): the Annual (Sustainable) Growth Survey and the Country Reports. The goal of this article is to assess how the Commission is held to account by a national parliament and how this affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The findings suggest that the Commission is accountable to this national parliament, even if the form of accountability taken is rather innovative and its policy impact limited, at both the EU (the CSRs tend to be immune to Members of [national] Parliament’s contestation) and the national level, as the implementation of CSRs seems to be independent of the level of their scrutiny.

scholarly journals ‘It’s a total no-no’: The strategic silence about gender in the European Parliament’s economic governance policies

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212097832
Author(s):  
Anna Elomäki
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Political Conflicts ◽  
Governance Regime ◽  
Productive Factor ◽  
Gender Perspectives ◽  
Governance Processes ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s (EU) economic governance is pivotal for gender equality in the EU, yet gender equality concerns have been sidelined in governance processes. This article analyzes the struggles involved in integrating a gender perspective into the EU’s economic governance in the European Parliament (EP). It explores how the EP, often perceived as a champion of gender equality, constructs gender in relation to economic governance and how conflicts between the EP’s political groups and committees influence the EP’s ability to challenge gendered inequalities related to the governance regime. This article reveals that the EP’s positions have been characterized by strategic silence about gender and understandings of gender equality as a productive factor that legitimized gendered policies. Party-political conflicts and compromises that have sidelined critical views, and a boundary between social and economic issues and actors, were key barriers for the integration of critical gender perspectives.

scholarly journals Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Fabio Franchino ◽  
Camilla Mariotto
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Measurement Errors ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Governance Reforms

Abstract We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may be a reason for its commonly reported poorer accuracy. However, this model is more sensitive to measurement errors. We also show how both models contribute to understanding bargaining success and how the conditional influence of the European Parliament should not be ignored. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for our understanding of the EU.

scholarly journals The Paradox between the European Pillar of Social Rights and EU Economic Governance: Spanish Reforms to Wage-Setting Institutions and the Working Poor

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-50
Author(s):  
Sergio Canalda Criado
Keyword(s):  
Working Poor ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Fair Wages ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
Country Specific ◽  
The Eu

The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was announced as a new platform for advancing social policy in the European Union. Among the principles and rights enshrined in the EPSR, the Commission has included the right of workers to be paid fair wages. However, in the context of EU Economic Governance, the EU country-specific recommendations steer national wage-setting institutions in the opposite direction. The outcomes sought by EU Economic Governance and the EPSR thus produce a paradox. This paper presents the Spanish case as an example of this paradox. More specifically, it assesses the reforms the Spanish Government made to minimum wage rules and the collective bargaining system during the financial crisis. In the end, all those reforms have led to wage stagnation and devaluation, causing an increasing number of working poor. El Pilar Europeo de Derechos Sociales (EPSR) fue presentado como una nueva etapa en la dimensión social de la Unión Europea. Entre los principios y derechos consagrados en la EPSR, la Comisión incluyó el derecho de los trabajadores a un salario justo. Sin embargo, en el contexto de la gobernanza económica de la UE, las Recomendaciones a los países de la UE llevan a las instituciones nacionales de fijación de salarios en la dirección contraria. Por lo tanto, los resultados buscados por la nueva gobernanza de la Unión Europea y el EPSR producen una paradoja. Este artículo toma el caso español como ejemplo de dicha paradoja. Más concretamente, evalúa las reformas adoptadas por el Gobierno español durante la crisis con respecto al salario mínimo y al sistema de negociación colectiva, las cuales han llevado a una moderación o una devaluación de los salarios, favoreciendo el aumento de la pobreza laboral.

scholarly journals Adapting the EU Economic Governance to New Macroeconomic and Political Realities

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (5) ◽  
pp. 320-324
Author(s):  
Raffaele Fargnoli
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Governance System ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Political Realities ◽  
Governance Modes ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

Abstract There was a widespread consensus on the need to modify fiscal rules in the EU even before the COVID-19 crisis. The aim of this article is to reflect on the reform of fiscal rules from a broader perspective, looking at three different dimensions: the political economy of fiscal rules in the current political and economic environment, the renewed debate about fiscal policy roles and objectives, as well as the current incomplete nature of the European Monetary Union and the prospects for its completion. The main contribution of this paper is to analyse EMU fiscal policy and the related governance modes from a broader perspective. Furthermore, the article briefly discusses ideas for a new model of fiscal and economc surveillance based on a cooperative governance system in order to better fit with with current macroeconomic and political realities.

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