scholarly journals Accountability in EU Economic Governance: European Commissioners in Polish Parliament

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-162
Author(s):  
Tomasz P. Woźniakowski
Keyword(s):  
Annual Cycle ◽  
National Level ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Policy Impact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
Country Specific ◽  
The Eu

This article analyses the interactions between the members of the Polish parliament with the European commissioners in the context of the European Semester, the annual cycle of economic coordination. The Commission drafts crucial documents in this process which assess the implementation of the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs): the Annual (Sustainable) Growth Survey and the Country Reports. The goal of this article is to assess how the Commission is held to account by a national parliament and how this affects the level of implementation of CSRs. The findings suggest that the Commission is accountable to this national parliament, even if the form of accountability taken is rather innovative and its policy impact limited, at both the EU (the CSRs tend to be immune to Members of [national] Parliament’s contestation) and the national level, as the implementation of CSRs seems to be independent of the level of their scrutiny.

scholarly journals The Paradox between the European Pillar of Social Rights and EU Economic Governance: Spanish Reforms to Wage-Setting Institutions and the Working Poor

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-50
Author(s):  
Sergio Canalda Criado
Keyword(s):  
Working Poor ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Fair Wages ◽  
The Right ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
Country Specific ◽  
The Eu

The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was announced as a new platform for advancing social policy in the European Union. Among the principles and rights enshrined in the EPSR, the Commission has included the right of workers to be paid fair wages. However, in the context of EU Economic Governance, the EU country-specific recommendations steer national wage-setting institutions in the opposite direction. The outcomes sought by EU Economic Governance and the EPSR thus produce a paradox. This paper presents the Spanish case as an example of this paradox. More specifically, it assesses the reforms the Spanish Government made to minimum wage rules and the collective bargaining system during the financial crisis. In the end, all those reforms have led to wage stagnation and devaluation, causing an increasing number of working poor. El Pilar Europeo de Derechos Sociales (EPSR) fue presentado como una nueva etapa en la dimensión social de la Unión Europea. Entre los principios y derechos consagrados en la EPSR, la Comisión incluyó el derecho de los trabajadores a un salario justo. Sin embargo, en el contexto de la gobernanza económica de la UE, las Recomendaciones a los países de la UE llevan a las instituciones nacionales de fijación de salarios en la dirección contraria. Por lo tanto, los resultados buscados por la nueva gobernanza de la Unión Europea y el EPSR producen una paradoja. Este artículo toma el caso español como ejemplo de dicha paradoja. Más concretamente, evalúa las reformas adoptadas por el Gobierno español durante la crisis con respecto al salario mínimo y al sistema de negociación colectiva, las cuales han llevado a una moderación o una devaluación de los salarios, favoreciendo el aumento de la pobreza laboral.

Modernisation of Higher Education – Willful Action or Wishful Thinking? The Case of Bulgaria

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Elena Blagoeva
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
National Level ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Case Study Methodology ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

The impact of the last global economic crisis (2008) on the European economy put a strain on higher education (HE), yet it also pushed the sector towards intensive reforms and improvements. This paper focuses on the “Strategy for the Development of Higher Education in the Republic of Bulgaria 2014-2020”. With a case study methodology, we explore the strategic endeavours of the Bulgarian government to comply with the European directions and to secure sustainable growth for the HE sector. Our research question is ‘How capable is the Bulgarian HE Strategy to overcome the economic and systemic restraints of Bulgarian higher education?’. Because the development of strategies for HE within the EU is highly contextual, a single qualitative case study was chosen as the research approach. HE institutions are not ivory towers, but subjects to a variety of external and internal forces. Within the EU, this is obviated by the fact that Universities obtain their funds from institutions such as governments, students and their families, donors, as well as EU-level programmes. Therefore, to explore how these pressures interact to affect strategic action on national level, the case method is well suited as it enabled us to study the phenomena thoroughly and deeply. The paper suggests the actions proposed within the Strategy have the potential to overcome the delay, the regional isolation and the negative impact of the economic crisis on the country. Nevertheless, the key elements on which the success or failure of this Strategy hinges are the control mechanisms and the approach to implementation. Shortcomings in these two aspects of strategic actions in HE seem to mark the difference between gaining long-term benefits and merely saving face in front of international institutions.

Understanding the Crisis Symptoms of Representative Democracy: The New European Economic Governance and France's ‘Political Crisis’

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131
Author(s):  
Julia Lux
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Representative Democracy ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Discursive Space ◽  
New Economic Governance ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
The Eu

This article will investigate the ‘political crisis’ in France (Amable, 2017) to highlight two aspects often set aside in public and academic discussions: 1) the technocratic, neoliberal character of the European Union (EU) that limits democratic debate about political economic issues and 2) the socio-economic context the parties operate in. Using this perspective, I add to the debate on the inherent theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, 2002) by showing how the ‘new economic governance’ increases the democratic problems of the EU by limiting the discursive space. Representative liberal democracy has particularly marginalised anti-capitalism at EU and national level. My analysis shows that the EU's discursive strategies are aligned to those of governing parties and the employers’ association. Left-wing actors and the Front National (FN) oppose the EU's discourse not necessarily for reasons of sovereignty but for political reasons concerning the politico-economic trajectory of France.

scholarly journals Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

2017 ◽  
Vol 239 ◽  
pp. R3-R13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

scholarly journals ‘It’s a total no-no’: The strategic silence about gender in the European Parliament’s economic governance policies

2021 ◽  
pp. 019251212097832
Author(s):  
Anna Elomäki
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Political Conflicts ◽  
Governance Regime ◽  
Productive Factor ◽  
Gender Perspectives ◽  
Governance Processes ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

The European Union’s (EU) economic governance is pivotal for gender equality in the EU, yet gender equality concerns have been sidelined in governance processes. This article analyzes the struggles involved in integrating a gender perspective into the EU’s economic governance in the European Parliament (EP). It explores how the EP, often perceived as a champion of gender equality, constructs gender in relation to economic governance and how conflicts between the EP’s political groups and committees influence the EP’s ability to challenge gendered inequalities related to the governance regime. This article reveals that the EP’s positions have been characterized by strategic silence about gender and understandings of gender equality as a productive factor that legitimized gendered policies. Party-political conflicts and compromises that have sidelined critical views, and a boundary between social and economic issues and actors, were key barriers for the integration of critical gender perspectives.

scholarly journals Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Fabio Franchino ◽  
Camilla Mariotto
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Measurement Errors ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Governance Reforms

Abstract We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may be a reason for its commonly reported poorer accuracy. However, this model is more sensitive to measurement errors. We also show how both models contribute to understanding bargaining success and how the conditional influence of the European Parliament should not be ignored. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for our understanding of the EU.

scholarly journals Pragmatism and the Limits to the European Parliament’s Strategies for Self-Empowerment

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-174
Author(s):  
Carlos Closa Montero ◽  
Felipe González de León ◽  
Gisela Hernández González
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Content Analysis ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
National Level ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Crisis Negotiation ◽  
Policy Decision Making ◽  
Eu Economic Governance

Despite the European Parliament’s (EP) growing role, its influence and scrutiny capacity remain considerably weaker than the role traditionally reserved for parliaments in economic and fiscal policy decision-making at the national level. The EP has exploited any opportunity to enhance these powers: In particular, the EP has a record of using crisis and extraordinary situations to expand its role beyond the formal prerogatives given to the institution. Following this literature, this article examines the role and influence of the EP on economic and fiscal policy, focusing on the response to the Covid-19 crisis. Negotiation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility presents an auspicious area to analyse the strategies implemented by the EP to influence the outcome and reinforce its position in EU economic governance. The article will look specifically at the formal and informal mechanisms used by the EP during the crisis to expand its powers. Moreover, it utilises a research design that combines the content analysis of several official/public documents and statements from key members of the European Parliament (MEPs) involved in economic policy.

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