scholarly journals Private pension funds in emerging economies: from broken promises to financialisation

2019 ◽  
pp. 58-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Bonizzi ◽  
Diego Guevara
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (76) ◽  
pp. 148-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Heitor Campani ◽  
Leonardo Mesquita de Brito

ABSTRACT From 2005 to 2015, the total assets managed by open private pension funds increased more than six times in Brazil, where the Free Benefit Generating Plan (PGBL) and the Free Benefit Generating Life (VGBL) represent 90% of these assets. However, private pension institutions are characterized by the collection of high management fees, thus keeping for themselves much of the benefits offered by the government as incentive for investment in this modality. High management fees are justified only when there is active management of these funds, theoretically generating higher performance: this study indicates that this is not the case in this market segment. Similar problems have been faced in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden, which filed investigation concerning funds that charge high management fees for active management, while they actually provide management that may be regarded as passive. This demonstrates the scale and relevance of this issue, which has been surveyed and addressed by this study. To do this, dynamic style analysis was performed, through rolling regressions, followed by Kalman filter analysis in funds from the top-five private pension institutions in Brazil. Analyzing the exposure evolution of these funds to various asset classes and the R2 generated, passivity traces were found, mainly in composite variable income funds. Such funds are precisely those that should be more actively managed, as they charge the highest management fees. This article also demonstrates it is possible to build a passive portfolio, having a very similar style and returns without statistically significant differences, but at a lower management fee (and aligned with passive funds).


Author(s):  
R. Polischuk

The problem of lack of interest of the population to participate in the formation of pension savings is one of the key problems of private pension funds. Accounting and registration of various rights, licensing and accreditation of institutions, establishment of norms, quotas and other restrictions, control and supervision, as well as the application of material sanctions and measures of administrative coercion are state regulation of private pension provision. The National Securities and Stock Market Commission, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine exercise state supervision and control over the activities of non-state pension funds. The current distribution of powers to oversee the activities of private pension funds between regulators is not effective enough. State intervention in the field of private pension funds should be timely, appropriate and limited. The need to invest heavily in setting up an administrator and an asset management company significantly reduces the attractiveness of private pension provision for potential investors, and the over-regulation of the institution under review reduces the level of confidence of ordinary citizens, employers and investors. The lack of components in the management system of non-state pension funds responsible for risk management and internal audit, the purpose of which is to protect against risks and exercise internal control, respectively, is a significant shortcoming of today. Ways to solve the above problems are, in particular: the unification of state regulators of the financial market in Ukraine and the creation of a mega-regulator for the activities of NPFs; abolition of normative legal acts, which in practice have proved their ineffectiveness, in terms of regulating the activities of NPFs, with the simultaneous adoption of new legislation that would “reduce the cost” of the mechanism of creation and operation of the institution of NPFs; implementation of EU Directive 2016/2341 of 14 December 2016 into the legislation of Ukraine regarding the functions of risk management and internal audit of NPFs; introduction of legal norms prohibiting, in particular, the National Bank of Ukraine from interfering in the activities of NPFs in terms of return of their assets by insolvent banks and investment activities, on grounds not expressly provided by the Law of Ukraine “On Non-State Pension Provision” and establishing legal grounds for personal liability persons for such actions.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalia Borisovna Pochinok ◽  
Galina Ivanovna Andryushchenko ◽  
Margarita Vitalievna Savina ◽  
Alexander Nikolaevich Maloletko

1961 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-327
Author(s):  
Eugene Miller

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1611-1630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrius Kabašinskas ◽  
Kristina Šutienė ◽  
Miloš Kopa ◽  
Eimutis Valakevičius

2005 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ichiro Iwasaki ◽  
Kazuko Sato

The new pension system launched in Hungary in 1998 is epoch-making for having introduced a mandatory private pension scheme (MPPS). However, the political decision-making on pension reform and the scheme operations have been greatly influenced by conflicts of interests among ministries, political conflicts between parties, and the presence of special interest groups, including trade unions and financial institutions. This situation may have had a certain negative influence on the legal framework of the MPPS and on the management performance of private pension funds. In order for the MPPS to be sustainable in the future and to make insurance beneficiary profits a top priority, the corporate governance reform of pension funds and reinforcement of the monitoring system over them, and political neutralisation of the public pension system are necessary.


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