Treaty withdrawal and recalcitrant States

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-240
Author(s):  
Joseph Crampin

The recent prevalence of high-profile unilateral treaty withdrawals raises broader questions over trust in treaty-making. Given the foundational importance of trust in treaties to international law, these withdrawals present risks to the international legal order generally. The issue for international law is how it can regulate treaty withdrawal in a way that preserves trust in the international legal system. The problem of trust is twofold. If international law adopts too permissive a stance towards unilateral withdrawal, then this will undermine trust in the binding force of treaties: pacta sunt servanda. If it is too restrictive, it will undermine the authority of international law, since it will result in situations in which recalcitrant States (ie States which have decided no longer to comply with their obligations) disobey, and are seen to disobey, their obligations. The paper seeks to explore this tension that underlies the regulation of treaty withdrawal. First, it analyses historical approaches to the problem, and, second, how the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has sought to resolve it. It then examines how the principle is and can be used to achieve a balance between integrity and authority that can assist international law in regulating withdrawal and recalcitrance in a manner that preserves trust in treaty-making.

Author(s):  
Salerno Francesco

The issue of treaties establishing objective regimes has been neglected by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Building on the principle of relativity of treaties, the Convention only deals with the effects of specific treaty rules on third states. This chapter argues that third states never acquire the same status of states parties, even when they consent to the specific treaty rules that affect them. Analysing the significance of treaties establishing objective regimes under general international law, it clarifies that such treaties may affect third states even when they do not embody rules of customary law. Due to the relevance for the international legal order of the unique erga omnes regime created by the treaty, the situation regulated by it can no longer fall within the scope of the absolute ‘freedom’ previously accorded to third states.


Author(s):  
Sarah Thin

AbstractTraditional ideas about the private nature of the international legal order are increasingly being forced to contend with the development of public legal elements at the international level. The notion of the international community interest is key to understanding these developments and, as such, has transformed our understanding of international law. There are many different approaches to the public/private distinction in law, broadly categorised into relational, public authority, and interest-based approaches. These can be reduced to four key elements of publicness: the existence of a community or public; the universality of the public regime in question with its own boundaries; normative and institutional hierarchies; the objectivity of obligation and responsibility. The development of the community interest and related norms of international law can be seen to have introduced and strengthened all of these elements of publicness within the international legal system. It is thus on its way to becoming an international public legal order. This has important implications for our understanding of international law and the future development of the international legal order.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter briefly discusses the nature of the international legal system. The premise is that the structure of the international legal system is fundamentally different from that of national legal order: contrary to the vertical structure encountered in domestic settings, in international law the structure is horizontal. States enjoy sovereign equality, while both international law-making and international adjudication are based on the consent of the States. There are various theories that have attempted to describe the nature of the international law, including naturalism, positivism, formalism, and realism. Also significant is the existence of a certain hierarchy in the international legal system, in the sense that there are some peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of torture and genocide, to which there is no derogation.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter briefly discusses the nature of the international legal system. The premise is that the structure of the international legal system is fundamentally different from that of national legal order: contrary to the vertical structure encountered in domestic settings, in international law the structure is horizontal. States enjoy sovereign equality, while both international law-making and international adjudication are based on the consent of the States. There are various theories that have attempted to describe the nature of the international law, including naturalism, positivism, formalism, and realism. Significant is also the existence of a certain hierarchy in the international legal system, in the sense that there are some peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of torture and genocide, to which there is no derogation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-60
Author(s):  
Danae Azaria

Abstract Although it is widely accepted that the pronouncements of expert treaty bodies are not binding, this does not mean that they are deprived of any effect in law. This study focuses on their legal effects vis-à-vis the interpretation of treaties, and explores how the International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission have dealt with the pronouncements of expert treaty bodies in relation to the interpretation of treaties. The tale about the Court’s and the Commission’s approaches in this respect demonstrates the profound belief of both the Court and the Commission that international law is a legal system, which calls for reliance on the pronouncements of expert treaty bodies as integral actors within the legal system with some ‘authority’ concerning the determination of the law (within their mandate). This does not mean that the Court and the Commission support a ‘blind reliance’ on such pronouncements; rather the quality of each pronouncement is a criterion for relying on it. The reasoning of the Court and (and implicitly of) the Commission also shows that they consider that international law as a legal system, which necessitates ‘legal consistency’. This in turn suggests that the reliance on pronouncements of expert treaty bodies, which are mandated to supervise the application (and interpretation) of particular treaties, may constitute an exercise of ‘systemic integration’ which exceeds the confines of the rule set forth in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.


Author(s):  
Trinh Hai Yen

This chapter explores international law in Viet Nam. It is difficult to comprehensively conceptualize international law in Viet Nam’s legal system. There is no formal documentation concerning two of the main sources of public international law: international custom and general principles of law. Treaties, by contrast, are dealt with in great detail. Viet Nam adopts a modified monist approach by maintaining the primacy of the Constitution and the priority of treaties and incorporating treaties into the muninipal law on a case-by-case basis. The use of treaties in Viet Nam can be divided into two phases: (i) colonial times and (ii) since independence in 1945 when modern Viet Nam, proactively relying on international law in the quest for ultimate independence and unification in 1975 and since, started a period of robust engagement in the international legal order. The chapter finally looks at Viet Nam’s current practice of concluding and enforcing treaties.


Author(s):  
Olivier Corten ◽  
Pierre Klein

Can peace agreements concluded between a State and a non-State entity produce legal effects in the international sphere, as mentioned in Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? Could it be considered that, following the conclusion of such agreements, some areas that were traditionally conceived as pertaining to the national jurisdiction of States (such as the use of violence within national borders, or the choice of a political system) are as of now governed by international law? On the basis of numerous agreements reviewed in this study, a clearly affirmative answer would appear excessive. As far as the international legal effects of such instruments are concerned, much will depend on the specificities of each agreement and on the way it has been implemented. Most of these agreements prove to be rather ambiguous, a significant portion of their components evidencing their rooting in the domestic legal order. This ambiguity finds confirmation in the very pragmatic treatment of peace agreements by the Security Council and States when they call for compliance with these instruments. In the vast majority of cases, such demands are made in the name of the maintenance of international peace and security, without much attention being paid to the characterization in legal terms of the parties' undertakings under these agreements. It therefore appears difficult to reach clear-cut conclusions as to the legal effects of such peace agreements in the international sphere — and, as a consequence, as to their possible characterization as ‘treaties’ under international law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-484
Author(s):  
Graham Melling

Due to the nature of the international legal system, the International Court of Justice (icj) is regularly presented with new questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is thereby incomplete. The approach of the icj when faced with such gaps raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial function of the icj. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue of how the icj responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law.


2015 ◽  
Vol 01 (02) ◽  
pp. 205-222
Author(s):  
Sheng Hongsheng

Dramatic changes have taken place in the international legal system since the end of World War II, such as the expanding arenas for application of international law, the emergence of a series of new legal institutions, and the parallel extension of both rights and obligations of states. In recent years, new developments have been arising in the international legal system, manifested by three important sets of transition, that is, from a "sovereign priority" to a "human rights priority"; from "consent-orientation" to "coercion-orientation"; and from "integrity" to "fragmentation." The rise of China and the evolution of international law are closely related: while China's ascent has been achieved within the parameters of the international legal system, a more prosperous and stronger China will certainly influence the future trajectory of the evolving system. China should and can be a positive force in constructing a contemporary international legal order through promoting domestic justice and international rule of law. In this process, China needs to take a more proactive role and evolve from being a recipient to a rule-maker, in order to modify the outdated principles and rules in international law.


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