Obedient rebellion: conceiving the African nuclear weapon-free zone

Why do nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs)—areas which prohibit nuclear weapons—emerge in some contexts, and not others? Focusing on the African case, this article introduces the concept of ‘obedient rebellion’ to explain the African NWFZ's early conception. ‘Obedient rebellion’ is an attitude of ambivalence toward global nuclear order. To newly-decolonizing African states, the African NWFZ symbolized both postcolonial anti-nuclear solidarity and nuclear responsibility; it represented both ‘obedience’ to—and ‘rebellion’ against—global nuclear order. This ambivalence, between ‘obedience’ and ‘rebellion’, paradoxically accommodated multiple conflicting audiences simultaneously, thereby stabilising the zone. The African NWFZ's ambiguous meanings made it viable, even though those meanings conflicted. The zone's early conception offers insight into the complex, contending forces that continue to bind the world's NWFZs—and indeed nuclear order itself—to the present. NWFZs epitomize the tensions which stabilize nuclear order: between sovereign equality and nuclear inequality; between local solidarities and global loyalties; and between contestation and compromise. At first, these tensions seem to imperil NWFZs; in fact, these tensions stabilize NWFZs. The African zone also poses challenges to the African blind spot that continues to exist in International Relations theory.

Recent Developments of International Law Commission Work on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

Immunity is a well bedded concept within international law and mainly within the principle of sovereign equality of states. There are different procedural implications of the concept of immunity – diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities, State jurisdictional immunities and also immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. The Article focuses on the latter one and portrays on recent developments of immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction as it is elaborated by the UN International Law Commission (‘ILC’). The author frames (in the introduction) the concept of immunity and especially the immunity of State officials and puts it in a large theoretical structure of international law and in the work of ILC. Then, he focuses his attention on the phenomenon of progressive development of international law (2) and how it is used with respect to the topic considerated by the ILC. He then presents main ILC conclusions regarding limitations and exceptions to immunity of State officials (3) and finally outlines latest development (4) of the ILC work dealing mainly with relationship between foreign criminal jurisdiction and international criminal jurisdiction and other procedural questions.

‘Parity with all nations’: The ‘coolie’ trade and the quest for recognition by China and Japan

This article explores the quest for sovereign equality by China and Japan as it unfolded in a specific historical moment, the third quarter of the nineteenth century. It does so by focusing on the debate around the ‘coolie trade’, i.e., the traffic of Chinese indentured labourers, which offered an opportunity for non-Western countries such as China and Japan to position themselves with respect to Western conceptions of ‘modernity’ or ‘civilization’ and thereby advance their quest for ‘parity with all nations’. Through a study of the Maria Luz case, decided in the early 1870s by Czar Alexander II and drafted by de Martens, the article sheds light on the different approaches of Japan and China with respect to international law at this critical historical juncture. Specifically, it shows that, although the coolie trade mostly affected China, it was Japan who first managed to reap a parity dividend by firmly condemning the practice, whereas China’s action was steered by the circumstances. Eventually, however, China’s growing interest in Chinese populations abroad paved the way for the establishment of its first permanent diplomatic representations overseas. For both countries, the events encapsulated by the Maria Luz case unveil an important, yet overlooked, moment in their quest for parity with all nations and, more generally, in their engagement with international law.

1. The nature of international law and the international legal system

This chapter briefly discusses the nature of the international legal system. The premise is that the structure of the international legal system is fundamentally different from that of national legal order: contrary to the vertical structure encountered in domestic settings, in international law the structure is horizontal. States enjoy sovereign equality, while both international law-making and international adjudication are based on the consent of the States. There are various theories that have attempted to describe the nature of the international law, including naturalism, positivism, formalism, and realism. Also significant is the the existence of a certain hierarchy in the international legal system, in the sense that there are some peremptory norms of international law, such as the prohibition of torture and genocide, to which there is no derogation.

Baltic – Black Sea Area as a Geopolitical Reality: Does It Exist?

As the social and political transformations observed in the modern world have recently made current the issue of formation of new geopolitical regions, the Baltic – Black Sea Area deserves particular attention because the geopolitical status of this junction territory still remains questionable. The geopolitical boundaries of the Baltic – Black Sea Area are constantly changing not only functionally, but also structurally, which is why it can be considered as a specific geopolitical formation located at the junction of the two geopolitical mega-regions of Western Europe and Northern Eurasia. This area is highly fragmented and still undergoing very painful political, cultural, and economic transformations. The power competition between Russia, NATO and the EU, as well as the region’s historical legacy have determined the path of its development. As a result, the Baltic – Black Sea Area does not have any system of political division or economic management, but close connections between the countries located there and many spheres of their common interest promote comprehensive cooperation and dialogue on a variety of issues. If their cooperation leads to multilateral relationships based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states which are trying to expand the scope of their collaboration and limit the scope of confrontation, they could organize a system of complementary elements which provide synergies and ensure the existence of the Baltic – Black Sea Area as a geopolitical reality.

Part II Predominant Security Challenges and International Law, Technological Security, Ch.36 Cybersecurity and International Law

This chapter discusses the international law of cybersecurity, which, at just over two decades old, remains in a relative state of infancy. States continue to struggle with such basic issues as sovereignty in cyberspace. In great part, the challenge is that many States are conflicted over the application and interpretation of key aspects of international law in the cyber context. After all, although international law can serve as a normative firewall against hostile cyber operations, the principle of sovereign equality means that protective norms also can act as barriers to a State's own cyber operations, some of which may be deemed essential to the State, especially with respect to national security. These differences in normative perspective often play out domestically in disagreements between ministries with different roles vis-à-vis cyberspace, and internationally between States wielding offensive cyber capability and those that see themselves primarily as victims thereof. To examine the relationship between cybersecurity and international law, the chapter begins by cataloguing the development of the international law of cyberspace. It then turns to the substantive legal issues, paying particular attention to those matters that presently are the source of contention amongst States.

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.

From Versailles to the Kellogg-Briand Pact: Prohibiting and Justifying Aggression in the Interbellum

The article is a historical re-description of international legal debates concerning the ius ad bellum in the Interwar period (1919–1936). Using a core/periphery heuristic, it is demonstrated that the normative changes created by the League Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were being drafted and interpreted by the great powers in a way that still allowed them to justify military interventions in their peripheries. Even military violence between Western states could only be partially outlawed by these instruments. Legal uncertainties produced during the drafting of the new instruments could readily be exploited by the Western dominated international legal discourse. And yet, with the principle of sovereign equality on the rise in the Interbellum, and the battle of semi-periphery governments against the ‘standard of civilisation', traditional justifications for military violence came under increasing pressure. At that very moment, international lawyers in the core introduced a broader understanding of self-defence, gradually replacing former justifications for military interventions both within the core and in the peripheries of Western powers. All of this taken together in practice arguably consumed a substantial part of the alleged ‘progress' made by international legal pacifism in the Interbellum.