Précis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice

2021 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Gregg D Caruso
Keyword(s):  
2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Andrew Chambers

AbstractDefining brain mechanisms that control and adapt motivated behavior will not only advance addiction treatment. It will help society see that addiction is a disease that erodes free will, rather than representing a free will that asks for or deserves consequences of drug-use choices. This science has important implications for understanding addiction's comorbidity in mental illness and reducing associated public health and criminal justice burdens.


Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen

This chapter introduces utilitarian versus retributive (i.e., deontological) motives to punish. Utilitarian motives aim to prevent further harm from occurring; retributive motives aim to make offenders suffer for their actions. The chapter reviews the various types of utilitarian motives that are applied in a criminal justice setting (i.e., deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), and discusses to what extent punishment is successful in deterring offenders. Furthermore, the chapter introduces retributive motives, suggesting that people are willing to sacrifice their self-interest to establish justice through punishment, and that free-will beliefs influence punishment. Also, the chapter reviews evidence that emotional states can “spill over” and shape punishment of offenders, and notes that punishment can be intuitive even if no strong emotions are involved.


Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Norrie

‘Supposing, then, that determinism is true – and surely many intelligent and well-informed people believe that it is – how can we any longer uphold the notion of responsibility in our courts of law?’A. Kenny.The substance of this article revolves around Kenny's rhetorical question. It is a widely held view among lawyers and legal philosophers that the idea of criminal justice involves the presupposition of the freedom of the will, but there are good grounds for accepting some version of determinism as a working hypothesis to explain criminal behaviour. Judges themselves on occasion do this. Unless it can be shown, therefore, that determinism is either compatible with free will, or is itself an incoherent doctrine, the whole rationale of the criminal law as a form of social control stands exposed to criticism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 443-473
Author(s):  
Steve Case ◽  
Phil Johnson ◽  
David Manlow ◽  
Roger Smith ◽  
Kate Williams

This chapter reflects on criminological theories. It begins by considering what a theory is, how a theory can be assessed, and exploring the overarching ideas in criminology. Criminological theory improves the understanding of why laws are made, how and why we enforce rules and punish those who break them, the effects of crime control, how and why people choose to break or obey rules, and the effects of rule breaking. The main theoretical schools in criminology include classicism, positivism, interpretivism, and critical criminology. The chapter then looks at the importance of free will and rational choice and demonstrates how these ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries underline the modern criminal justice system and may explain how and why we, as a society, feel we can and should punish those who choose to break the law.


Author(s):  
Farah Focquaert ◽  
Andrea L. Glenn ◽  
Adrian Raine

In Chapter 13, the authors address the issue of free will skepticism and criminal behavior, asking how we should, as a society, deal with criminal behavior in the current era of neuroexistentialism and if our belief in free will is essential to adequately addressing it, or if neurocriminology offer a new way of addressing crime without resorting to backward-looking notions of moral responsibility and guilt. They argue for a neurocriminological approach to “moral answerability” and forward-looking claims of responsibility that focus on the moral betterment or moral enhancement of individuals prone to criminal behavior and on reparative measures toward victims, placed within a broader public health perspective of human behavior. Within this framework, neurocriminology approaches to criminal behavior may provide specific guidance within a broader moral enhancement framework. Rather than undermining current criminal justice practices, the free will skeptics’ approach can draw on neurocriminological findings to reduce immoral behavior.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolas Rose

This article argues that a new diagram is emerging in the criminal justice system as it encounters developments in the neurosciences. This does not take the form that concerns many ‘neuroethicists’ — it does not entail a challenge to doctrines of free will and the notion of the autonomous legal subject — but is developing around the themes of susceptibility, risk, pre-emption and precaution. I term this diagram ‘screen and intervene’ and in this article I attempt to trace out this new configuration and consider some of the consequences.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Mears ◽  
Joshua C. Cochran
Keyword(s):  

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