Freewill, determinism and criminal justice

Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Norrie
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Control ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Behaviour ◽  
Rhetorical Question ◽  
Working Hypothesis ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

‘Supposing, then, that determinism is true – and surely many intelligent and well-informed people believe that it is – how can we any longer uphold the notion of responsibility in our courts of law?’A. Kenny.The substance of this article revolves around Kenny's rhetorical question. It is a widely held view among lawyers and legal philosophers that the idea of criminal justice involves the presupposition of the freedom of the will, but there are good grounds for accepting some version of determinism as a working hypothesis to explain criminal behaviour. Judges themselves on occasion do this. Unless it can be shown, therefore, that determinism is either compatible with free will, or is itself an incoherent doctrine, the whole rationale of the criminal law as a form of social control stands exposed to criticism.

The Voluntary Act

1975 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. O'Connor
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Psychotic Symptoms ◽  
Criminal Behaviour ◽  
General Acceptance ◽  
Actus Reus ◽  
The Will ◽  
Evaluation Of Data ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Considerable Complexity

The importance of the actus reus in the analysis of criminal behaviour has only gained ground in recent years. The defence that the act complained of was involuntary raises directly the question ‘What is meant by voluntary conduct?’ In its earliest formulations the general acceptance of the doctrine of free will led to a ready acceptance of voluntary as simply meaning being a product of an exercise of the free will. More recent investigations, and in particular those following the development of ego psychology, have shown that the mechanism precedent to the operation of the will is of considerable complexity. Perception, cognition and evaluation of data must each be considered in an analysis of voluntary behaviour, so that what may seem voluntary may well flow from a defective capacity in any or all of these functions. The relationship between defective psychic functions such as those described and the pervasive concept of ‘insanity’ in the criminal law, it is suggested, may have led to the neglect of a study of voluntarism since many cases of psychic malfunction have displayed psychotic symptoms. It is argued that the distinction between self-induced and other-induced as a basis for attaching responsibility in law, as is strongly suggested in the cases, is unsatisfactory. The merit of the recent discussions of the nature of voluntary conduct is that the limitations of a pre-Freudian theory of conscious behaviour enshrined in McNaughton will be recognized within the debate on the nature of voluntary and, more particularly, involuntary conduct.

scholarly journals Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theological Fatalism ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Necessity Of The Past

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Freedom of the Will: Not Determinism, Yet Not Indeterminism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Freedom of the Will in 1989, his remarks about free will and determinism have received very little attention. Insofar as these lectures give us an opportunity to see him at work on a traditional—and seemingly intractable—philosophical problem and given the voluminous secondary literature written about nearly every other facet of Wittgenstein’s life and philosophy, this neglect is both surprising and unfortunate. Perhaps these lectures have not attracted much attention because they are available to us only in the form of a single student’s notes (Yorick Smythies). Or perhaps it is because, as one Wittgenstein scholar put it, the lectures represent only “cursory reflections” that “are themselves uncompelling." Either way, my goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s views about freedom of the will merit closer attention.

Free Will, Responsibility, and Blame in Psychotherapy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Zürcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Patient’S Autonomy ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Therapeutic Context ◽  
The Relationship

Freedom of the will is not only an issue in the attribution of moral and legal responsibility—it also fundamentally shapes how we look at ourselves and how we interact with others. This is essential in everyday life but even more so in psychotherapy. In the debate on freedom of will, the main controversy is concerned with the relationship between determinism and free will. In this chapter, different positions are presented and discussed. The compatibilist viewpoint, which claims determinism and freedom of will to be compatible, is defended against competing theories and applied to psychotherapeutic work. Mental disorders affect free will in many ways, as is demonstrated by the examples. Nevertheless, a compatibilist approach to free will can be used as a resource to increase the patient’s autonomy. As a result, it is justified and sometimes appropriate within the therapeutic context to ascribe responsibility and, within certain limits, to express blame.

8. Freedom of the will

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-113
Author(s):  
Edward Craig
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Causal Chains

Do we have free will? ‘Freedom of the will’ starts by looking at Descartes, whose theology encouraged him to believe that he had free will. His thoughts may have been given by God, but he had the power to assent to them. Hegel’s metaphysics can teach us about his account of freedom. His predecessor Kant was possessed by the idea of moral obligations. Hegel argued that we are free, but that the decisions we make are the result of an idea, reason, or spirit. Finally, there is determinism—the idea that things happen because of causal chains—and compatibilism, the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible.

scholarly journals The journey of EU criminal law on the ship of fools – what are the implications for supranational governance of EU criminal justice agencies?

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-211
Author(s):  
Christopher Harding ◽  
Jacob Öberg
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Criminal Policy ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
Working Hypothesis ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
European Public

This article addresses supranational governance of EU criminal justice agencies from the perspective of the various agencies of policy and rulemaking who have contributed to the impressive developments in the field of EU criminal law. Taking as a working hypothesis the happenstance and haphazard character of this field of policy and law, it suggests that there is an absence of design. In the discussion the article proposes the Platonic analogy of the ‘ship of fools’ (Plato, Republic, Book VI) as an explanatory tool. The ship's captain is the guiding spirit of criminal law, but the crew of the ship, who have the power to take control, have diverse interests and ideas about how the ship should be taken to sea and navigated. The article addresses thematically and chronologically the development of EU criminal policy by means of this framework. Subsequently it discusses the extent to which the ‘ship of fools’ analogy is relevant to the development of EU criminal justice agencies, and to the emergence of a European Public Prosecutor. Underlying all this discussion is the uneasy sense that the true pilot of EU criminal law and policy has been displaced, in particular by ‘instrumental’ pilots of securitisation and effectiveness.

Introduction

1992 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Behaviour ◽  
Natural Connection ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Physical Causation ◽  
Philosophical Writings ◽  
Freedom Of Action

This chapter focuses on Cicero's treatise titled On Fate (De fato), which is part of the second group of his philosophical writings that dates from the period of Julius Caesar's ascendancy at the end of the Civil War and the period immediately after his assassination. It explains how De fato considers the relation of the gods to human affairs and problems that arise therefrom. It also discusses the natural connection between different occurrences that the Stoics spoke of as “sympathy” that may have some influence on human behaviour but not remove the freedom of action altogether. The chapter describes how Cicero is characteristically scornful of the arguments by Stoics and favors the view of Carneades that free will could be defended against the Stoics. It talks about the freedom of the will in antiquity that can be divided into areas concerned with physical causation and questions of logic.

The Struggle against Fate

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-67
Author(s):  
Benedetta Zavatta
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

This chapter examines the influence that reading Emerson had on Nietzsche’s treatment of the theme of fate and free will, which is closely tied to two other central themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy: the theme of moral responsibility for one’s own actions, and that of the construction of one’s character, or self-creation. Though rejecting Emerson’s metaphysical assumptions regarding the freedom of the will and of thought, Nietzsche used certain suggestions provided to him by Emerson to work out an account of freedom as agency whereby to be free is not to act in a completely unconditioned way but rather to act as master of one’s own drives and guided by one’s own values. This chapter also examines the feeling of freedom which Nietzsche describes as the feeling of the preponderance of one’s own force vis-à-vis the force of external circumstances. Thanks to his reading of Emerson, Nietzsche comes to consider this feeling as compatible with the perception of necessity or the presence of immutable facts in one’s own life.

Moral Bioenhancement and Free Will: Continuing the Debate

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 384-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
VOJIN RAKIĆ
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Threshold Concept ◽  
Moral Bioenhancement ◽  
Political Concept ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Abstract:This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept (or as one that is analogous to a political concept) is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree. Consequently, I contend, by asserting that freedom is a matter of degree, that Persson and Savulescu have not undermined my arguments favoring voluntary moral enhancement. In addition, I add three further arguments against compulsory moral bioenhancement.

Augustine's Metaphysics and Free Will

1967 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-306
Author(s):  
Frederick Sontag
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Basic Assumptions ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The World ◽  
Crucial Problem ◽  
The Will

“Free Will” is not a problem which can simply be answered. The long history surrounding this issue would seem to indicate that. It is not that an answer is impossible; on the contrary, the problem is that many answers may be given and no single one can be established to the exclusion of all others. Which answer is adopted depends upon one's metaphysics, upon one's basic assumptions about the first principles which govern and structure the world. Does all this leave us lost in a helpless pluralism where freedom of the will is concerned, an issue which might well be the crucial problem of our own era and which certainly has been important in every philosophical age? No, not unless we adopt an attitude of scepticism where metaphysics is concerned. Thus, our success in dealing with free will depends upon our metaphysical competence. If we can analyze previous metaphysical views and then construct and defend our own, we can still structure an answer to the issue of freedom of the will.

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