scholarly journals Problems of qualification of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in the context of the process of federalization of the Russian Republic of 1917-1922.

Author(s):  
А.В. Бежанов

Автор статьи выявляет неверную квалификацию так называемого грузино-осетинского конфликта, вызванную ошибочной исторической интерпретацией международной правосубъектности сторон конфликта. На основании метода исторко-правового анализа документов и норм национального и международного права в настоящей статье описывается факт вхождения единой Осетии в состав РСФСР в 1921 году. На основании этого факта в статье рассматривается правосубъектность двух суверенных государств (ГССР и РСФСР) в контексте правомочности их юрисдикции на территории Осетии, для политико-правового анализа ответственности каждого из них за нарушение целостности Осетии и этнического суверенитета осетин. В силу неделимого качества этнического суверенитета осетин, она путем самоопределения могла быть передана только одному федеративному государству – Российской Федерации. Автор статьи квалифицирует конфликт как грузино-российский, что открывает совершенно новый подход к урегулированию конфликта посредством переноса его на открытый равносторонний международный уровень. Investigating the problems of the so-called Georgian-South Ossetian confl ict, the author of the article revealed an incorrect qualifi cation of the confl ict caused by an erroneous historical interpretation of the international legal personality of the parties to the confl ict.Based on the method of historical and legal analysis of documents and norms of national and international law, this article reveals the fact of the entry of united Ossetia into the RSFSR in 1921. Based on this fact, the article examines the legal personality of two sovereign states (the SSR of Georgia and the RSFSR) in the context of the legitimacy of their jurisdiction on the territory of Ossetia, for a political and legal analysis of the responsibility of each of them for violating the integrity of Ossetia and the ethnic sovereignty of the Ossetians. Due to the indivisible quality of the ethnic sovereignty of the Ossetians, it could be transferred by self – determination to only one federal state-the Russian Federation. Due to this fact, and the impeccable international legal personality of Georgia and Russia as actual members of the UN, the author of the article qualifi es the confl ict as Georgian-Russian, which opens up a completely new approach to resolving the confl ict by transferring it to an open equilateral international level.

Author(s):  
Sam Klug

Abstract This article charts how African American appeals to international law shifted away from a politics of petition to a politics of sovereignty with the growing influence of postcolonial states in international society and the UN’s recognition of a right to self-determination. Whereas earlier efforts by African-descended peoples in the Americas to gain a hearing before international bodies often required pushing the boundaries of international legal personality to include entities other than states, in the late 1960s and early 1970s a black nationalist group called the Republic of New Afrika (RNA) pursued international subjectivity in its traditional and fullest form: as a sovereign state. Examining the writings of RNA leaders, especially Imari Obadele, this article explores how the group’s claims for territory, reparations, and international subjectivity relied on international legal discourse about plebiscites, self-determination, and national development.


Author(s):  
Weller Marc

This chapter studies Articles 3, 4, 5, 18, 23, and 46(1) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The debate about the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples, and its provisional conclusion through the adoption of the Declaration, represents a very significant step in the development of concepts of international legal personality. First, the change in terminology from ‘populations’ to ‘people’ marks the emergence of indigenous peoples as subjects, rather than objects of international law. Second, there was the possibility of drawing on existing international legal language in relation to a safeguard clause, which was eventually adopted in line with the General Assembly's vulnerable Friendly Relations resolution. Without the adoption of this clause, it is unlikely that the Declaration could have been adopted with a significant majority, if at all.


Author(s):  
Katharine Fortin

This chapter presents and explains the evaluative framework that the study employs when analysing armed groups and legal personality. In doing so, the chapter provides a short historical account of the manner in which international legal personality has been understood and theorized and explains how the evaluative framework will be utilized in the subsequent chapters.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

Chapter 9 reiterates and reflects on the overall conclusions of the previous chapters: (1) that positive international law has consistently supported Kelsen’s ‘a posteriori’ conception of international legal personality; (2) that, consequently, the international legal personality of any entity is solely a matter of (presumption-free) interpretation of international norms; and (3) that we must abandon both the widespread presumption against direct individual rights and obligations (in accordance with the ‘modified States-only’ conception of international legal personality) and the use of the orthodox ‘States-only’ conception of international legal personality as means to distinguish between international law and national law.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

This book scrutinizes the relationship between the concept of international legal personality as a theoretical construct and the position of the individual as a matter of positive international law. By testing four main theoretical conceptions of international legal personality against historical and existing international legal norms that govern individuals, the book argues that the common narrative about the development of the role of the individual in international law is flawed. Contrary to conventional wisdom, international law did not apply to States alone until the Second World War, only to transform during the second half of the twentieth century to include individuals as its subjects. Rather, the answer to the question of individual rights and obligations under international law is—and always was—solely contingent upon the interpretation of international legal norms. It follows, of course, that the entities governed by a particular norm tell us nothing about the legal system to which that norm belongs. Instead, the distinction between international and national legal norms turns exclusively on the nature of their respective sources. Against the background of these insights, the book shows how present-day international lawyers continue to allow an idea, which was never more than a scholarly invention of the nineteenth century, to influence the interpretation and application of contemporary international law. This state of affairs has significant real-world ramifications as international legal rights and obligations of individuals (and other non-State entities) are frequently applied more restrictively than interpretation without presumptions regarding ‘personality’ would merit.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 381
Author(s):  
MSc. Ornela Taci

The article titled “International legal subjectivity: Concept and reality in the UN” the first, identifies debates on subjects of International Law briefly. The identification of debates serves to deal the creation of UNO (United Nations). Then, the article treates a brief historical overview on the functions of the UN since its creation until today to analyze international legal personality and its legal nature opposite functions that are dampened and transnational capabilities, the UN priority today. Also, it gives the reasons why the debate on UN reform should remain open.The aim of this study is to examine from the perspective of a qualitative methodology the characteristics of the legal status of the UN in space and in time to create a model based on Charter and on the real exercise of its functions but not according to denomination. The theories on international legal personality, the distribution of the United Nations and the consequences are not treated for this reason in this study. Also, historical and legal methods are used.The legal status of UNO is a tool to fulfil mission in approach of action of International Law, the challenge of the debate today. UNO was established in 1945 and acts are based on its Charter and international documents. The UN mission has changed today but the International Order is not in danger because the target of the UN is its renewal through reforms. The open debate on reform gives a contribution on evolution of International Law.


Author(s):  
Boris Krivokapić

The paper deals with international legal status of multinational (transnational) companies. The first part gives an overview of this entities and the specifics of their role in the modern world.In the second part, the author deals with the elements of international legal personality of multinational (transnational) companies. Such as international legal regulation of the position of these entities, their specific rights and obligations under international law, international responsibility, process subjectivity before certain international judicial bodies and the special relationship (partnership) with international organizations. It should be added that not only that international law acknowledges their existence, but also multinational companies themselves at least in part influence the development of that law.In the concluding remarks the author notes that multinational (transnational) companies do not have all the elements of a full international personality, the one that is inherent to states. However, even if not complete their personality is beyond doubt. Although between them, depending on the case, there are major differences, there is no dispute that, from the perspective of international law, at least some multinational companies have the legal capacity (the ability to be the holder of a larger or smaller circle of rights and obligations established by international law), legal capacity (the ability to conclude international agreements, create international custom, etc.), tort capacity (the ability to provide for the legal bears responsibility for violating the norms of international law), process capability (active and passive legitimacy before some international courts), etc. In all likelihood, along with the expected further strengthening of the economic, but also political and every other power and role of the companies themselves, their international personality will also become more and more developed, At one point this will require global (universal) agreement which would precisely define rights, but, in particular, the duties and responsibilities of these entities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Mohd. Hisham Mohd. Kamal

An international legal person is a subject of international law who enjoys rights, duties or powers in international law and the capacity to act on the international plane. Under modern international law, States are international persons, whereas private individuals are not. This article discusses whether Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) of the religion of Islam was an international legal person. Evidence shows that his correspondences with other States and nations were in his name “Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdullāh” or “Muḥammad the Messenger of Allah,” and not as the head of the City-State of Medina. Was he recognised as such by the international community at that time? This work finds that Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) was accepted by the international community during his time as an international legal person. His personality was due to his unique position as a prophet.


2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


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