scholarly journals Action and Interaction, Shaun Gallagher

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (151) ◽  
pp. 470-474
Author(s):  
Emiliano Villareal Rosales
Keyword(s):  

En su libro introductorio a la feno- menología, en las primeras páginas, el filósofo estadounidense y profesor de la Universidad de Memphis, Shaun Gallagher, manifiesta una idea bas- tante llamativa en referencia a su interpretación de dicho método. Señala que el punto de partida del análisis fenomenológico se ubica en la concien- cia de que “nosotros, en tanto agentes que deben actuar y seres pensantes que intentan capturar lo que hacen, siempre nos encontramos ya situados en el mundo”.

2018 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Andrés Buriticá

En este texto se presenta una propuesta sobre cómo comprender la cognición off-line o no situada a partir de la noción de esquema corporal. Se expone qué es un esquema corporal y cómo, a partir de Jean Piaget, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Shaun Gallagher e Immanuel Kant, se puede ofrecer una noción de esquema corporal o esquema sensoriomotriz desde la cual marcar una ruta de investigación que permita responder a una crítica al enfoque enactivo de la mente, a saber, si este enfoque sostiene que la cognición es situada, ¿cómo puede el enactivismo dar cuenta de los casos de la cognición que no es situada?


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-415
Author(s):  
Manuel Bremer

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 225-250
Author(s):  
Leon de Bruin ◽  
Sanneke de Haan

Abstract Although the enactive approach has been very successful in explaining many basic social interactions in terms of embodied practices, there is still much work to be done when it comes to higher forms of social cognition. In this article, we discuss and evaluate two recent proposals by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Hutto that try to bridge this ‘cognitive gap’ by appealing to the notion of narrative practice. Although we are enthusiastic about these proposals, we argue that (i) it is difficult to see them as continuous with the enactivist notion of direct coupling, and (ii) the failure to account for folk psychological action interpretation suggests that the enactive approach should adopt a broader notion of coupling.


Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Marta Agata Chojnacka

Husserl’s phenomenology was particularly influential for a number of French philosophers and their theories. Two of the most prominent French thinkers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, turned to the instruments offered by phenomenology in their attempts to understand the notions of the body, consciousness, imagination, human being, world and many others. Both philosophers also provided their definitions of perception, but they understood this notion in very different ways. The paper describes selected aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology that were adopted by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and depicts the presumptions of their respective theories of perception, as well as the differences between them. The main thesis presented here is that theories as different as those proposed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty may, and indeed do, lead to the same conclusion, i.e. that perception represents a different form of cognition. Despite the differences between these theories, they can both be placed in the contemporary context of phenomenological research carried out by cognitive philosophers Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, as well as by the proponent of the enactive theory of perception, Alva Noë.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document