First Approach to the Criminal Liability of Political and Military Leaders for International Crimes

Author(s):  
Brady Sheelagh

At first sight, transnational organised crime (TOC) and international criminal law (ICL) are completely separate: the four ICL core crimes constitute the most heinous crimes, committed by political and military leaders of armed conflicts, whereas TOC as lower-level deviance being committed by private individuals falls short of that. This chapter takes a closer look at this relationship and discovers the lines between these two areas to be blurred: because, as international crimes, they have already been discussed in that context (e.g. while drafting the Rome Statute), and nowadays TOC can even amount to one of the four core crimes de lege lata in individual cases. Apart from that, TOC can also evolve into international crimes de lege ferenda once universal jurisdiction can be established. The chapter concludes that although TOC typically characterizes crime that is different to the four core ICL crimes, both areas approximate greatly in different ways.


Author(s):  
Alejandro Chehtman

Antony Duff and his coauthors have influentially argued that citizenship plays a central role in accounting both for the way in which the state makes individuals criminally responsible for certain wrongs and for calling them to answer for their wrongs. This paper takes issue with this citizenship-based understanding of the scope of the criminal law. It argues that Duff's model of civic criminal liability faces difficulties in explaining states' right to punish foreigners for crimes committed on their territory, and sits very uncomfortably with states claiming universal jurisdiction over international crimes. In contrast, it advocates a territorial conception of the criminal law. It suggests that to account for the allocation and scope of the right to punish, we need to look at the (collective) interest of those individuals who actually are in the territory of a particular state, not merely its citizens. Finally, it examines whether the notion of citizenship plays any meaningful role in a convincing account of the authority of the state to try an offender. Contra Duff and others, it argues that this authority rests exclusively on defendants receiving a fair trial and a verdict based on reliable evidence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-612
Author(s):  
Ines Peterson

This article explores icty and ictr jurisprudence on central aspects of aiding and abetting liability, in particular with respect to holding high-ranking military and political figures accountable for international crimes in which they were not directly involved. A close look is taken at the Tribunals’ interpretation – both in law and fact – of the actus reus of aiding and abetting (specifically substantial contribution, encouragement and moral support as well as the temporary alignment between an act of assistance and knowledge that it will contribute to crimes), mens rea (including the threshold of intent, requisite specificity of knowledge regarding crimes and a comparison with relevant case law on superior responsibility) and, finally, the controversial notion of specific direction. It is suggested that the icty and ictr have at times over-expanded criminal liability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-659
Author(s):  
Lachezar Yanev

Abstract The past few years have witnessed a proliferation of universal jurisdiction proceedings in Europe, many of which concern asylum seekers suspected of committing international crimes in Syria and the wider region. Alongside the known practical challenges of such trials, these trials also raise a range of normative questions regarding inter alia the scope of universal jurisdiction and the applicable legal standards in such proceedings. This article unpacks several such questions through the lens of a recent Dutch case in which a former refugee, who was granted asylum in The Netherlands and later obtained Dutch citizenship, was tried and convicted by a local court in The Hague of war crimes committed in Ethiopia four decades ago. The judges used an amalgam of Dutch and (customary) international criminal law to convict the accused. They defined the charged war crimes in strict conformity with the standards established in international legislation and jurisprudence, relied exclusively on Dutch law to define one of the applied modes of criminal liability (co-perpetration), and synthesized Dutch and international law to define the other (command responsibility). To what extent does the notion of universal jurisdiction accommodate such choices of law, and how is the use of domestic criminal law on modes of liability in such proceedings compatible with the principle of legality?


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES G. STEWART

AbstractModes of liability, such as ordering, instigation, superior responsibility, and joint criminal liability, are arguably the most-discussed topics in modern international criminal justice. In recent years, a wide range of scholars have rebuked some of these modes of liability for compromising basic concepts in liberal notions of blame attribution, thereby reducing international defendants to mere instruments for the promotion of wider sociopolitical objectives. Critics attribute this willingness to depart from orthodox concepts of criminal responsibility to international forces, be they interpretative styles typical of human rights or aspirations associated with transitional justice. Strangely, however, complicity has avoided these criticisms entirely, even though it, too, fails the tests international criminal lawyers use as benchmarks in the deconstruction of other modes. Moreover, the source of complicity's departures from basic principles is not international as previously suggested – it stems from international criminal law's emulation of objectionable domestic criminal doctrine. If, instead of inheriting the dark sides of domestic criminal law, we apply international scholars’ criticisms across all modes of liability, complicity disintegrates (as do all other modes of liability) into a broader notion of perpetration. A unitary theory could also attach to all prosecutions for international crimes, both international and domestic, transcending the long-endured fixation on modes of liability within the discipline.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-67
Author(s):  
Dumitrita Florea

In international law doctrine carried on extensive talking and still it is a actual subject, if the individual is liable of responsability and, implied, of sanction for international crimes. Before to reveal some aspects of natural persons responsability for international crimes a couple of clarifications is required. Thus, we recall that the first author which use the term international criminal law was Jeremy Bentham, who distinguished between the criminal law of the community of states and the criminal law of a state. Over time, legal doctrine has extrapolated the concept of legal relationships with an international element, making the distinction between public international law and private international law. If criminal law is a branch of public law, then international criminal law becomes a sub-branch of international law, regulating criminal legal relationships with an international element. In other words, referring to private international law, we specify that it represents the totality of legal norms that resolve conflicts of laws or conflicts of jurisdiction and those regarding the legal status of the foreign national. In this context, the international element appears as a factual circumstance related to a legal relationship due to which this relationship is related to several legal systems (or laws belonging to different countries). With regard to international criminal law, we specify that this is a branch of public international law and designates the set of legal norms stipulated in various conventions and treaties by which states, in their capacity as subjects of law, order the repression of illicit acts that infringe fundamental rights of the international community. In other words, international criminal law consists of rules of general international law that govern the criminal liability of natural persons, individuals, for acts that harm international public order and constitute crimes against humanity.


2020 ◽  
pp. 427-453
Author(s):  
Paola Gaeta ◽  
Jorge E. Viñuales ◽  
Salvatore Zappalà

This chapter begins with an overview of international crimes, namely, offences entailing the personal criminal liability of the individuals concerned (as opposed to the responsibility of the State) under international law. International crimes include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, aggression, and terrorism. The discussion then turns to the prosecution and punishment by State courts, focusing on the grounds of criminal jurisdiction and in particular universal criminal jurisdiction. It ends with an overview of the prosecution and punishment by international criminal courts and tribunals, with an emphasis on the International Criminal Court, and with an assessment of the main problems besetting international criminal proceedings.


Author(s):  
Hauck Pierre

At first sight, transnational organised crime (TOC) and international criminal law (ICL) are completely separate: the four ICL core crimes constitute the most heinous crimes, committed by political and military leaders of armed conflicts, whereas TOC as lower-level deviance being committed by private individuals falls short of that. This chapter takes a closer look at this relationship and discovers the lines between these two areas to be blurred: because, as international crimes, they have already been discussed in that context (e.g. while drafting the Rome Statute), and nowadays TOC can even amount to one of the four core crimes de lege lata in individual cases. Apart from that, TOC can also evolve into international crimes de lege ferenda once universal jurisdiction can be established. The chapter concludes that although TOC typically characterizes crime that is different to the four core ICL crimes, both areas approximate greatly in different ways.


Author(s):  
Charles Chernor Jalloh

In June 2014, the African Union adopted the first treaty that would establish an unprecedented regional court with a combined jurisdiction over criminal, human rights, and general matters. The protocol introduced various innovations by, for instance, advancing expanded definitions of core international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; providing for corporate criminal liability; and prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste into the environment. The AU’s new treaty was concluded in the shadow of tensions between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and some African states and raises theoretical, legal, and policy issues with serious implications for regional and international law. This chapter draws on the lessons of international human rights law to explore the likely impact of the new tribunal on the present and future of international criminal law enforcement globally, especially given the recent purported withdrawals of Burundi, The Gambia, and South Africa from the Rome Statute establishing the ICC.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document