Do the Prohibition of the Use of Force and Self-defence Apply to Non-State Actors?

2014 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Self Defence

Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors: PS to Hague Academy Lectures

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dire Tladi
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Apparent Contradiction ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
The Hague ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Self Defence

In July 2021, the author presented a Special Course for the Hague Academy of International Law Summer Courses on the Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors. The course focused on two bases for the extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors, namely self-defence and intervention by invitation. The lectures came to a conclusion that may, at first glance, appear contradictory. With respect to the use of force in self-defence, the lectures adopted a restrictive (non-permissive) approach in which the use of force is not permitted save in narrowly construed exceptions. With respect to intervention by invitation, the lectures adopted a more permissive approach in which the use of force is generally permitted and prohibited only in narrowly construed exceptions. This article serves as post-script (PS), to explain the apparent contradiction. It concludes that the main reason for this apparent contradiction is the application of the fundamental principles of international law—sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence—which are consistent with intervention by invitation but are undermined by self-defence against non-state actors.

Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberley N Trapp
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Community ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Right ◽  
Self Defence

The International Court of Justice's decision inDRCvUgandatouches on, but fails to address, the circumstances under which a State has a right to use force in self-defence against non-State actors.1In particular, the Court holds that, because the attacks carried out by anti-Ugandan rebels operating from the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) territory are not attributable to the DRC, Uganda has no right to use force in self-defenceagainst theDRC.2The separate opinions inDRC v Ugandalament the Court's failure to take the opportunity to address the right to act in self-defence against non-State actors3–an issue of such obvious importance to the international community in an age of terrorism. As will be examined below, there are arguably good reasons–on the facts of the case–for the Court's refusal to pronounce itself on the matter. Furthermore, its decision need not be read as absolutely precluding a use of force in foreign territory in response to armed attacks by non-State actors.

Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-state Actors in the Light of Recent State Practice: A Step Forward?

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Operation Enduring Freedom ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
The Us ◽  
State Practice ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.

The Armed Activities Case and Non-state Actors in Self-Defence Law

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
First Time ◽  
Self Defence

In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case the International Court of Justice has – for the first time in its history – found a state to have violated the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For the first time also, the Court has discussed the scope of self-defence directly under Article 51. In this article the focus lies on this aspect of a wide-ranging judgment. In finding that Uganda had violated the Charter, the Court kept to its jurisprudence constante; it did not bow to ‘post-11 September’ pressure to extend the logic of Article 51 to private actors. This article discusses the merits of the scholarly claims for both sides, but warns of drawing conclusions for the Court's future jurisprudence – the apparent unity among judges may have to do more with the case rather than the wider issue.

2 The Caroline Incident—1837

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wood Michael
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
Upper Canada ◽  
Niagara River ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Us ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Daniel Webster ◽  
Self Defence

This contribution summarizes the facts of the celebrated incident from 1837, in which British militia from Upper Canada crossed to the US shore of the Niagara River and set adrift a small rebel-operated vessel, The Caroline (which drifted over the Falls). The chapter cites the lengthy correspondence between US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and British Government’s representatives in Washington (Mr Fox and Lord Ashburton), in which Webster repeatedly used the celebrated Caroline formula (“a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”). The case is referred to, even today, in discussions of anticipatory self-defence, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, and the use of force against non-State actors. The chapter concludes by examining differing views on the current relevance of the Caroline incident and formula.

The Prohibition of the Use of Force in Arbitrations and Fact-Finding Reports

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaios Koutroulis
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Arbitral Tribunal ◽  
Commissions Of Inquiry ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Law ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
The Right ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the approach used by arbitral tribunals and commissions of inquiry or fact-finding missions with respect to rules governing the use of force after the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, with emphasis on the right to self-defence and the conditions relating to its exercise. It assesses the legal significance of arbitral awards and fact-finding reports and considers how they have interpreted and applied jus contra bellum—the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its exceptions. The chapter focuses on two significant arbitration precedents: the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission and an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Finally, it discusses questions relating to the threshold for the application of jus contra bellum rules, namely Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, and whether such rules are applicable to non-state actors.

Remotely Piloted Warfare as a Challenge to the Jus Ad Bellum

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Paust
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Enforcement Action ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the use of remotely piloted and other robotics during war and outside the context of war during permissible measures of self-defence and their implications for the jus ad bellum, interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, and applications of underlying general principles. It discusses the phenomenon of ‘remotely piloted warfare’ as it applies to the use of force by state and non-state actors with respect to self-defence, collective self-defence, self-determination assistance, regional action, and enforcement action authorized by the Security Council. It then considers the use of remotely piloted attacks, self-defence, and warfare in relation to compliance with the principles of reasonable necessity, distinction in targeting, and proportionality. In particular, the chapter looks at the use of weaponized drones and the possible challenges they present to compliance with basic legal principles that limit violence, and some current applications and issues regarding compliance.

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