The Armed Activities Case and Non-state Actors in Self-Defence Law

2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
JÖRG KAMMERHOFER
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
First Time ◽  
Self Defence

In the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case the International Court of Justice has – for the first time in its history – found a state to have violated the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For the first time also, the Court has discussed the scope of self-defence directly under Article 51. In this article the focus lies on this aspect of a wide-ranging judgment. In finding that Uganda had violated the Charter, the Court kept to its jurisprudence constante; it did not bow to ‘post-11 September’ pressure to extend the logic of Article 51 to private actors. This article discusses the merits of the scholarly claims for both sides, but warns of drawing conclusions for the Court's future jurisprudence – the apparent unity among judges may have to do more with the case rather than the wider issue.

scholarly journals EXAMINING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE: THE CASE OF RUSSIA AND GEORGIA; ISRAEL AND GAZA

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
FT Abioye
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Oil Platforms ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Self Defence

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter establishes the doctrine of the prohibition of the use of force amongst member states of the UN. Article 51 lays down exceptions to this rule in terms of the fact that there can be an individual and/or collective use of force in self-defence in the case of an armed attack. This individual or collective use of force is permitted to continue until such a time as the Security Council takes such actions as are necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has further confirmed this prohibition of the use of force in the Nicaragua case, Congo v Uganda and Oil Platforms cases. This area ofinternational law has seen a lot of discussions and developments over the years. The purpose of this article is to examine the efficacy of the use of force between Russia and Georgia; and Israel and Gaza in 2008. It would be examined if these armed attacks are justifiable by the doctrine of self-defence and the recent developments in the field in international law, or if they in fact constitute a breach of the international law prohibition on the use of force. 

Necessity

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Corten
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Subsidiary Condition ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the doctrine of necessity as an element of the prohibition of the use of force and as a subsidiary condition of the legality of self-defence. It begins by discussing the thesis of necessity as a general justification of the use of force within the context of the international law of responsibility. It then analyses necessity as a condition enshrined in self-defence and in the United Nations collective security system. The chapter also considers the methodological problems that arise from any interpretation of the concept of necessity, especially with respect to the use of force. It highlights the fact that the International Law Commission, the International Court of Justice, and state practice have never recognized necessity as a general justification to use force.

Intervention in the International Court

1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 903-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip C. Jessup
Keyword(s):  
Continental Shelf ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
First Time

For the first time the International Court of Justice has squarely faced and ruled upon the right of a third state to intervene in a case to which two other states are parties. The litigation was the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application of Malta for Permission to Intervene, Judgment of April 14, 1981. The Court unanimously denied permission to intervene, but three judges appended separate opinions which contain matters of considerable interest.

Legal Perspectives

2018 ◽  
pp. 78-103
Author(s):  
José E. Alvarez
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Third World ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Scholarly Work ◽  
Soft Or ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Legal Frameworks

This chapter surveys how international legal scholars have catalogued and sought to explain the legal impact of the UN even though its political and judicial organs have not been delegated the power to make law. It explains how the UN attempts to adhere to, but also challenges, the traditional sources of international law—treaties, custom, and general principles—contained in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It enumerates how the turn to UN system organizations—amidst newly empowered non-state actors, increasing resort to ‘soft’ or ‘informal’ norms, and recourse to institutionalized processes—have led to distinct legal frameworks such as process or deliberative theories, interdisciplinary ‘law and’ approaches, feminist and ‘Third World’ critiques, and scholarly work that renews attention to or revises legal positivism.

Crimea in International Courts and Tribunals: Matters of Jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 378-403
Author(s):  
Gaiane Nuridzhanian
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Territorial Integrity ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Preliminary Examination ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
International Court ◽  
Inter State

The events taking place in Crimea since early 2014 have given rise to a number of international disputes currently pending before international courts and tribunals. Ukraine instituted inter-State proceedings against Russia before the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and an unclos Annex vii Tribunal. Seven investor-State cases have been commenced against Russia. The Prosecutor of the icc is conducting preliminary examination into the crimes allegedly committed in Crimea in 2014 and afterwards. Foreign courts have also had to deal with cases related to the annexation of Crimea. This article provides an overview of cases pending before international courts and tribunals in relation to events in Crimea. The focus is on the questions related to jurisdiction of the international courts and tribunals seized in Crimea-related cases. The study explores the limits of the jurisdiction of international courts to adjudicate disputes concerning the interpretation and application of a treaty arising in connection with a larger dispute regarding the use of force, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The article also discusses novel and debated jurisdiction-related matters that arise in cases brought in relation to events in Crimea. A brief description of cases heard in foreign courts is provided as well.

The invocation of the right to self-defence in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups: Implications for attribution

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 91-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika de Wet
Keyword(s):  
Due Diligence ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Actors ◽  
The Right ◽  
United Nations Charter ◽  
Territorial States ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe right to self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is increasingly being invoked in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups located in a territory of another state, with or without the (direct) assistance of such a state. This article examines the implications of the invocation of the right to self-defence under these circumstances for the principles of attribution within thejus ad bellumparadigm. First, it illuminates how the threshold requirements for indirect armed attacks (that is, the state acting through a private actor) have been lowered since the 1986Nicaraguadecision of the International Court of Justice. In so doing, the article suggests that in order to prevent a complete erosion of the benchmarks of an indirect armed attack, the notions of ‘substantial involvement’ in an armed attack, ‘harbouring’, and ‘unwillingness’ should be interpreted as manifestations of due diligence. Thereafter, the article illustrates that there is also an increasing attribution of armed attacks directly to non-state actors, notably those located in areas over which territorial states have lost control. Such states could be depicted as being ‘unable’ to counter the activities of non-state actors. The article further submits that particularly in these instances, the principle of necessity within the self-defence paradigm can play an important role in curbing the potential for abuse inherent in the vague notion of ‘inability’, if interpreted in light of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

Rescuing Nationals Abroad

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias Forteau
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
Current Position ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally to rescue its nationals abroad when their lives or security are threatened. It first considers the definition of the phrase ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ and the legal scope and legal nature of the justification based on the necessity of carrying out such an act. It analyses the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the matter before assessing the current position of international law on the permissibility of rescuing nationals abroad. It also discusses whether the use of force to rescue nationals abroad can be invoked for humanitarian assistance purposes involving non-nationals. The chapter shows that the notion of ‘rescuing nationals abroad’ is ambiguous from a legal perspective and that the legality of using force to rescue nationals abroad has remained unclear since 1945.

Action Against Host States of Terrorist Groups

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay Moir
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
The Icj ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the problems that could arise when a state invokes self-defence to justify action against terrorist groups in another state. It first considers indirect armed attack against armed groups and the controversy surrounding the use of self-defence where armed groups are controlled by a foreign state, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence. It then discusses the possibility that an armed attack could occur, permitting a forcible response in the context of international law, without attribution to a state by citing the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ pronounced that self-defence is permissible against a host state in effective control of an armed group. The chapter also looks at the case of Afghanistan and its relationship to Al Qaeda as an example of a state’s claims of self-defence against terrorism.

The Resilience of the Restrictive Rules on Self-Defence

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Institutional Practice ◽  
Jus Ad Bellum ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The Law ◽  
Self Defence

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.

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