One World: One Dream

Author(s):  
Phill Wilcox

In this chapter, I consider the growing influence of China and growing numbers of Chinese in Laos and argue that managing this relationship may well be the biggest challenge facing the Lao authorities and is the most likely cause of any legitimacy crisis in Laos. Lao people are making life decisions with increasing reference to China and responding in ways that are marked by pragmatism as Chinese influence increases. Fundamentally, the rise of China in Laos is leading to a renewed sense of Laos and Laoness. This provides the Lao authorities with a renewed sense of legitimacy, as they are expected to do something for the population in response to rising adverse influences from China. Whether they will do anything meaningful to address these concerns is another question.

2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Kumar

In recent years, there has been a rise in China’s profile in South Asia. It is no surprise that Chinese experts have used terms, such as ‘new springtime’ in China–South Asia relations, ‘rediscovery of the strategic status of South Asia’ and ‘most relevant region with regard to the rise of China’.    The objective of this article is to examine the nature and drivers of China’s South Asia policy, especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping vis-à-vis China’s policy towards the region in the past. It is not sufficient to only examine international factors or foreign and security policy in the context of the neighbouring region, such as South Asia. China’s ‘domestic periphery’ presents a significant threat to its national security. These areas are linked to neighbouring countries of South Asia and Central Asia. The announcement by Chinese President Xi Jinping of a ‘New Era’ or ‘third era’ in the history of Communist Party of China (CPC) represents a China which is known for its dictum ‘striving for achievement’ ( fenfa youwei). This is different from the second era’s policy of ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping. Of course, the name of Mao Zedong is synonymous with the first era beginning from 1949.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyu-Deug Hwang

* The first version of this paper was presented at the Fifth European Conference on African Studies (ecas 5), which was held on June 27-29, 2013 at iscte-iul Lisboa, Portugal. I am deeply grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on the previous drafts. This work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund of 2014. The rise of China as an emergent global power in gaining access to energy and mineral resources is one of the main factors for reinforcing Korea’s aid to Africa. Although Korea recognizes the limits of searching for ways of furthering its ‘resource diplomacy’ based primarily on economic pragmatism, the Korean government has strived to utilize foreign aid as a tool for soft power. Korea’s perspective is to play a bigger role in addressing global issues as well as to aspire in becoming a middle power, in the sense that it is not regionally influential in spite of its growing powers. Given that middle power diplomacy tends to pursue a norm-based approach and also provides knowledge and/or ideas relevant to a unique niche that it finds important, it is characteristically soft power-oriented. Taking into account the non-material or ideational factors as well as material ones, constructivists in the field of international relations (ir) recognize the power of ideas, norms, institutions, and interests, which contain the core elements of what Nye calls soft power. In this context, this paper attempts to illuminate some of the important questions as to why and how Korea has endeavored to focus on developing its soft power strategy toward Africa in the new millennium.


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