Effectiveness of South Korean Planning Methods Transplanted to Landscape Management in the Kaesong Industrial District in North Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-94
Author(s):  
Kyoungseop Park ◽  
Pathogens ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 244 ◽  
Author(s):  
SeEun Choe ◽  
Ra Mi Cha ◽  
Dae-Sung Yu ◽  
Ki-Sun Kim ◽  
Sok Song ◽  
...  

There has been a rapid increase in the number of classical swine fever (CSF) sero-positive wild boars captured near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), located the border with North Korea. In 2015–2016, few CSFV-positive antibody boars were detected; however, the number has increased steeply since 2017. Most occurred in the northern region of Gyeonggi before spreading slowly to Gangwon (west to east) in 2018–2019. Multi-distance spatial cluster analysis provided an indirect estimate of the time taken for CSFV to spread among wild boars: 46.7, 2.6, and 2.49 days/km. The average CSF serum neutralization antibody titer was 4–10 (log 2), and CSFV Ab B-ELISA PI values ranged from 65.5 to 111.5, regardless of the age and sex of wild boars. Full genome analysis revealed that 16 CSFV strains isolated from wild boars between 2017 and 2019 were identical to the YC16CS strain (sub-genotype 2.1d) isolated from an outbreak in breeding pigs near the border with North Korea in 2016. The rapid increase in CSF in wild boars may be due to a continuously circulating infection within hub area and increased population density. The distribution pattern of CSFV in Korean wild boars moves from west to southeast, affected by external factors, including small-scale hunting, geographical features and highways.


2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.


2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-141
Author(s):  
Jaeho Hwang ◽  
Heungkyu Kim ◽  
Byung-kon Jun ◽  
Myung-Chul Cho
Keyword(s):  

BMJ ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 340 (mar10 2) ◽  
pp. c1369-c1369
Author(s):  
J. Zarocostas

Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document