Analysis Of The Failure Of Organizations For Prohibited of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) As The Organization For Disarmament On The Conflict Of Syria

<p>This paper analyzes the failure of the Organization for Prohibited of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) in handling chemical weapon disarmament in Syria. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government against its own citizens poses a challenge for OPCW in its role to ban the use and development of chemical weapons worldwide. OPCW itself formed in 1997 is an implementation of Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) in 1993. The main problem of this study is OPCW failure factors to ban the use and development of chemical weapons in Syrian conflict. The study results show that the chemical weapon disarmament efforts in Syria by the OPCW by sending and destroying government-owned chemical weapons has failed. Although OPCW has claimed Syria has been freed from chemical weapons, it is still encountered the use of chemical weapons by ISIS terrorist groups and unofficial opposition groups. In conclusion, the role of the OPCW according to the concept of disarmament and the international organization is still not fully successful. OPCW is only able to detect the use of chemical weapons committed by the Syrian government. This organization has no authority in overcoming the problem of the misused chemical weapons committed by non-state actors.</p><p><span>Keywords: Chemical weapons, Syrian conflict, OPCW, Disarmament. </span><br /><span> </span></p>

OPCW Proficiency Test: A Practical Approach Also for Interlaboratory Test on Detection and Identification of Pesticides in Environmental Matrices

An overview of general strategy, standard procedures, and critical points, which may be found during carrying out an OPCW Proficiency Test concerning detection and identification of scheduled compounds relevant to Chemical Weapon Convention, has been presented. The observations have been illustrated following the case of the Eight OPCW Designated Laboratories Proficiency Test, which was performed in the OPCW Laboratory in Rijswijk in November and December 2000. Various useful hints, comments, and practical observations concerning the case study have been included as well. The same methodology and procedures may be also applied for detection, identification, and environmental analyses of pesticides and biocides, especially organophosphorus compounds.

ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION SPIKING CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WEAPON CONVENTION IN UNKNOWN WATER SAMPLES USING GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY AND GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY ELECTRON IONIZATION MASS SPECTROMETRY

The identification and analysis of chemical warfare agents and their degradation products is one of important component for the implementation of the convention. Nowadays, the analytical method for determination chemical warfare agent and their degradation products has been developing and improving. In order to get the sufficient analytical data as recommended by OPCW especially in Proficiency Testing, the spiking chemical compounds related to Chemical Weapon Convention in unknown water sample were determined using two different techniques such as gas chromatography and gas chromatography electron-impact ionization mass spectrometry. Neutral organic extraction, pH 11 organic extraction, cation exchanged-methylation, triethylamine/methanol-silylation were performed to extract the chemical warfare agents from the sample, before analyzing with gas chromatography. The identification of chemical warfare agents was carried out by comparing the mass spectrum of chemicals with mass spectrum reference from the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) library while the retention indices calculation obtained from gas chromatography analysis was used to get the confirmation and supported data of the chemical warfare agents. Diisopropyl methylphosphonate, 2,2-diphenyl-2-hydroacetic acid and 3-quinuclidinol were found in unknown water sample. Those chemicals were classified in schedule 2 as precursor or reactant of chemical weapons compound in schedule list of Chemical Weapon Convention. Keywords: gas chromatography, mass spectrometry, retention indices, OCAD library, chemical warfare agents

On site inspection for nuclear test ban verirication

The problem of verifying compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty is mainly a technical one. However the problem of detecting, locating and identifying nuclear explosions has, since the late 1950s, been intimately involved with the political problems associated with negotiating a treaty. In fact there are few other areas in which policy, diplomacy and science have been so interwoven. This paper attempts to illustrate how technology can. be applied to solve some of the political problems which arise when considering the role of an On Site Inspection (OSI) to determine whether or not a nuclear explosion, in violation of a treaty, has occurred or not. It is hoped that the reader, with a scientific background, but with little or no experience of treaty negotiations, will gain an. insight as to how technical matters can interact with political requirements. The demands made on scientists to provide technical support for negotiating and rnonitoring compliance of a treaty have increased significanfly over the last 40 years. This is a period in which a number of major treaties have contained a significant technical component e.g. the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Treaty) and the Chemical Weapon Convention. This paper gives an indication of some of the political decisions which will have to be made and suggests some of the technical methods which are of value in the identification of a clandestine nuclear explosion.