scholarly journals China vs. United States: A Cosmopolitan Copyright Comparison

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Amy Rosen

China has a notorious reputation for infringing on intellectual property, especially copyrights. Despite making substantial improvements in its copyright laws over the years, China continues to be haunted by this reputation. But is it really true? By analyzing China’s Copyright Law, this piece explores whether the assumption that China is a notorious infringer is valid. By comparing the copyright laws of the United States to those of China, and by comparing the number of litigated copyright cases that have recently occurred in both countries, this Article concludes that unfortunately Chinese citizens are still severely infringing on international copyrights. Such infringement harms not only foreign copyright owners, but Chinese citizens as well. Notwithstanding this dire conclusion, there is still hope. This paper posits three possible resolutions to help cure China’s reputational ills and weighs each solution's effectiveness.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (00) ◽  
pp. 141-169
Author(s):  
Fredrick Vega Lozada

Non-consensual pornography is an act of violence that undermines the dignity, reputation and honor of people. This research presents some of the existing legal alternatives to face these acts of violence with intellectual property law, specifically with copyright. This research is based on the legal system of the United States of America, the United States Copyright Law of 1976, the Electronic Non-Theft Act of 1997, The Communication Decency Law of 1996, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and the exceptions and clarifications presented by the jurisprudence. The investigation concludes that there are alternatives available to victims of these acts of non-consensual pornography. However, to make North American copyright remedies accessible to victims, it is recommended to amend some of the current Acts analyzed.


Author(s):  
Amara Lopez

Should the flavor of a cheese fall under copyright protection? The Court of Justice of the European Union recently confronted this question in Levola Hengelo BV v. Smilde Foods. Although the court ultimately denied protection, its reasoning opened many doors for those seeking intellectual property protection for scents and flavors. The court implied that it was the subjective nature of a cheese flavor that bars it from enjoying the protection copyright affords, which begs the question of what would happen if there were a sufficiently objective way to describe a flavor. Recent developments in technology have led to the digitization of scent and flavor. In the intellectual property space, digitization provides a superior means of fixation for scents and flavors but it also threatens to make reverse engineering much easier. This would take away the protection trade secret law affords to scents and flavors. This will undoubtedly push industry leaders to seek more protection from the law. This Note explores how copyright law in the United States and the European Union might handle this new technology and argues that protection should not come in the United States until Congress weighs all considerations and adds a new subject matter category for scents and flavors to the U.S. Copyright Act.


Author(s):  
Sabine Jacques

This chapter examines the legality of the parody exception in light of international treaties and domestic copyright laws. More specifically, it considers whether the parody exception may only be introduced into national copyright law if it satisfies the three-step test enshrined in international treaties. The chapter first traces the history and evolution of copyright law before explaining whether copyright law requires a specific parody exception and why a specific parody exception rectifies the balance between right-holders, users, and subsequent authors. It then discusses the three-step test, first incorporated into the Berne Convention to protect the ‘right of reproduction’, and its adoption in European Union texts and national legislations. It also outlines the differing interpretations of the three-step test and concludes with an analysis of whether the current parody exceptions in each of the five jurisdictions (France, Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom) comply with this test.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Katz

Conventional wisdom holds that the European Union has opted to apply its competition law to the exercise of intellectual property rights to a much greater extent than has the United States. We argue that, at least in the context of copyright protection, this conventional wisdom is false. While European antitrust regulation of refusal to license one's intellectual property does seem much more robust and activist than U.S. antitrust regulation of similar conduct, focusing solely on one narrow aspect of antitrust doctrine — the treatment of a unilateral refusal to deal — tells less than half the story.Once various doctrines of copyright law are taken into account, the substantive difference between the European and American approaches not only narrows, but in some key respects is reversed. While European jurisdictions have relatively expansive copyright protection which may require antitrust intervention to check anti-competitive uses of copyrighted works, American copyright law provides stronger internal limits on copyright protection, which thereby lessens the need for resort to antitrust law as an external check on anti-competitive uses of copyrighted works. Furthermore, when the broader impact that antitrust law might have on the exercise of IPRs in the United States is considered (not only in substance, but also in antitrust process), it becomes apparent that in key respects, when innovative-competition is at stake, U.S. law grants overall weaker copyright protection than that available in Europe. We also explain why the two jurisdictions have adopted distinct approaches to resolving similar problems and evaluate those approaches.


Author(s):  
Herman T. Tavani

This chapter critically examines current copyright protection schemes that apply to digital information. We begin with a brief examination of the way in which copyright law has evolved in the United States, from its Anglo-American origins to the present, and then we examine three traditional philosophical theories of property that have been used to justify the granting of copyright protection. Arguing that each property theory is inadequate, we next consider and reject the view that intellectual property should not be protected at all (and thus should be completely free). We then critically analyze the notion of information, arguing that it should not be viewed as a commodity that deserves exclusive protection but rather as something that should be communicated and shared. Building on this view, we argue for a new presumptive principle for approaching the copyright debate — namely, the principle that information wants to be shared. Finally, we argue that presuming in favor of this principle would enable us to formulate a copyright policy that can avoid the extremes found in the two main competing contemporary positions, both of which are morally unacceptable: (1) the view that access to all digitized information should be totally free; and (2) the view that overreaching, and arguably oppressive, copyright legislation, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act, is needed to protect digital information.


Author(s):  
Oren Bracha

This chapter surveys the history of intellectual property law in the United States from its colonial origins to the present, and focuses on the three subfields that have a claim for seniority in terms of their longevity and importance: patent, copyright, and trademark. The development of these subfields is described as a process in which law has interacted with technology, economic factors, ideology, and politics. The chapter describes how at the end of the eighteenth-century American patent and copyright law emerged out of two sources: British laws and institutions and local colonial practices. The further development of American intellectual property law is analysed as comprising three stages: early patent, copyright, and trademark law; the consolidation of the modern framework of these fields through significant transformations beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century; and the various developments from the early twentieth century to the present.


2010 ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Ananda M. Chakrabarty

It is widely recognized that scientific and technological innovations are key to industrial and economic development of a country. Innovations, however, must be protected, usually through patent or copyright laws, before they can be marketed globally. Thus sensible patent laws, and their legal enforcement, are important for the advancement of economic and industrial development. Patent laws, as mentioned here, are complex and subjective, so that patent infringement cases are plentiful and often unpredictable. Given the rapid advancements of the science of genetics and biotechnology during the last 30 years, and the propensity to create intellectual property out of a bourgeoning field of science, many interesting cases have been decided in the courts of law or have been subjects of deliberations in the legislative bodies of individual countries. This article summarizes some of the interesting court cases involving genetics and biotechnology, mainly in the United States, and points to some of the differences between the judicial systems in Europe and in the United States, concerning both intellectual property laws and the concept of morality and public order, as well as their impacts on our society.


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