The Effect of Technological Change and Regulation on the Evolution of the New Zealand Telecommunications Market

<p><b>The absence of industry specific regulation of access to the incumbent'stelecommunications network in New Zealand for an extended period, between1989 and 2001, is unique compared with other countries with developedtelecommunications markets that were opened to competitive entry. This featureof the New Zealand market provides an opportunity to compare the conduct andperformance of antitrust regulation with industry specific regulation introducedin 2001.</b></p> <p>Of particular interest is the place of the concepts of natural monopoly andperfect competition in the regulation of a dynamic market. This thesisestablishes the characteristics that contribute to dynamic supply and demandconditions in the telecommunications market including network effects,discontinuity in demand due to participation, ongoing technological progress ofhardware, sunk costs of software development, and the irreversible investmentof augmenting capacity to meet expected growth in demand. The economicliterature on conjectural variations indicates that under such conditions theconcepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition do not explaincompetitive conduct due to an unstable market equilibrium. The implication isthat forming a reasonable view of competitive conduct is limited to the presentperiod of time.</p> <p>It is shown that decisions made under antitrust regulation are limited to theparticular context of disputed competitive conduct, and these decisions do notspeculate on future competitive conduct. In contrast, industry specific regulationhas formed a sequence of views of competitive conduct, looking forward, that isbased on concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition. It is observedthat with time, these views of competitive conduct have evolved with thechanging market conditions. If regulatory actions evolve with a changing view ofcompetitive conduct they risk reducing dynamic efficiency.</p>

The Effect of Technological Change and Regulation on the Evolution of the New Zealand Telecommunications Market

<p><b>The absence of industry specific regulation of access to the incumbent'stelecommunications network in New Zealand for an extended period, between1989 and 2001, is unique compared with other countries with developedtelecommunications markets that were opened to competitive entry. This featureof the New Zealand market provides an opportunity to compare the conduct andperformance of antitrust regulation with industry specific regulation introducedin 2001.</b></p> <p>Of particular interest is the place of the concepts of natural monopoly andperfect competition in the regulation of a dynamic market. This thesisestablishes the characteristics that contribute to dynamic supply and demandconditions in the telecommunications market including network effects,discontinuity in demand due to participation, ongoing technological progress ofhardware, sunk costs of software development, and the irreversible investmentof augmenting capacity to meet expected growth in demand. The economicliterature on conjectural variations indicates that under such conditions theconcepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition do not explaincompetitive conduct due to an unstable market equilibrium. The implication isthat forming a reasonable view of competitive conduct is limited to the presentperiod of time.</p> <p>It is shown that decisions made under antitrust regulation are limited to theparticular context of disputed competitive conduct, and these decisions do notspeculate on future competitive conduct. In contrast, industry specific regulationhas formed a sequence of views of competitive conduct, looking forward, that isbased on concepts of natural monopoly and perfect competition. It is observedthat with time, these views of competitive conduct have evolved with thechanging market conditions. If regulatory actions evolve with a changing view ofcompetitive conduct they risk reducing dynamic efficiency.</p>

Domestic and foreign experience of antimonopoly regulation of the food market in the context of economic globalization

The globalization of the economy creates new opportunities for the formation of global food supply chains as a new type of infrastructure, which requires improved antitrust regulation of global food markets. The purpose of this work is to identify trends in the system of antimonopoly regulation of the food market in the context of globalization based on the systematization of the most important research results of foreign and domestic authors and the practice of competition authorities. The work uses the methods of a systematic approach, logical-structural analysis. The study is based on the provisions and conclusions of modern theories of the foundations of competition, competitive advantage. Information and analytical materials of the Federal Antimonopoly Service play an important role in the work. Results. The content of changes in the contours of global food supply chains is revealed, which manifests itself in the complication of the chain around leading large retailers; active education in the chain of new technology companies; improving chain management processes, leading to lower costs. The analysis of theoretical views on antitrust regulation of global food supply chains is carried out, which makes it possible to identify a number of fundamental provisions on which the activities of competition authorities should be based - to stimulate the competitive behavior of participants in the chain. An assessment of the practice of antimonopoly regulation of global food supply chains in a number of countries is given, focusing on a detailed analysis of all links of the chain, identifying constraints on the development of competition in the segments of the chain. The dynamics of the main indicators of the activities of FAS Russia in the food market is presented, indicating an increase in the identified violations in this economy. Attention is focused on new mechanisms for ensuring competition through the technological transfer of innovative material to Russian companies to enhance their competitiveness. Scientific novelty. The trends and features of the development of global food supply chains are identified based on the identification of specific factors in the context of globalization. Some principles of state antimonopoly control of global food supply chains have been formed, which makes it possible to improve the practice of their regulation.

Digital Platforms in China and Europe: Legal Challenges

The paper considers the processes of platformatization of the economy and public government, which have become the last decade’s primary trend. Analysis of the digital markets in Russia, China, and Europe proved the dominance of the digital platforms of large technology companies. According to the authors, the concentration of market power in digital platforms threatens a competitive environment in digital markets. In this regard, the demand for antitrust regulation of their activities is justified. Another legal challenge arises concerning the trend of creating public services on the digital platforms of large technology companies. The paper analyzes China’s experience in the platformatization of legal proceedings, where the process of establishing online courts is conducted in close cooperation with the leading digital platforms of the PRC. In contrast to China, in Russia, the main focus is on combining public services, and information systems of various departments within a single platform to provide public services, with large technology companies acting as operators. Therefore, the authors conclude that it is necessary to strengthen legal mechanisms to protect citizens’ rights and interests during the digitization of public services – primarily citizens’ rights to data protection. The problems revealed demonstrate the necessity of a balanced approach to the legal regulation of digital platforms. While it is important to stimulate their development, it is necessary to limit the opportunities for violating the rights and interests of other participants in the digital environment.

Commentary on the article “Export Cartels: the Problem of Antitrust Regulation”

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Export Cartels: the Problem of Antitrust Regulation

The legal assessment of export cartels today is one of the most pressing problems in the field of antitrust regulation, including in relation to transnational markets. The authors analyze the essence of the export cartel phenomenon, judicial and other law enforcement practice in cases of export cartels, identify its characteristic features and propose ways to solve the problem, including in relation to the Eurasian Economic Union.

Moving Away from Consumer Welfare in the Antitrust of Digital Platforms

This article aims to characterize the new theoretical and methodological reversal observed today in the American antitrust regulation of digital platforms. To this end, the author retrospectively describes the history of the development of the theory and methodology of antitrust regulation in the United States. The article describes the ideas of economic structuralism of the “Harvard school”. Further, the author reveals the theoretical and methodological revolution associated with the theory of prices; describes the fundamental differences between the “Harvard” and “Chicago” schools in terms of assessing the relationship between market structure and the intensity of competition. The article reveals the formation of the doctrine of consumer welfare as the dominant one in antitrust regulation. The consequences of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in antitrust regulation are described: the narrowness of ideas about barriers to entry, public welfare; breadth of understanding of competitive forces; ignoring the structural and sectoral characteristics of competition; absolutization of indicators of consumer prices and output volumes. The author gives a negative assessment of the effectiveness of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in the antitrust regulation of digital platforms. The paper explains how the focus on consumer welfare has been used by digital platforms to generate gigantic market power. In this context, a criticism of the ideas of the Chicago School in relation to digital markets is presented. Reanimation of ideas and methods of economic structuralism in decision-making within the framework of antimonopoly regulation of monopolistic activities of digital platforms is argued.