Income Tax Rates Increase Policy of Tire Industry Imports

Author(s):  
Siti Mahdya Wardah ◽  
Adang Hendrawan ◽  
Milla Sepliana Setyowati
Keyword(s):  
1998 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-564
Author(s):  
THOMAS A. BARTHOLD ◽  
THOMAS KOERNER ◽  
JOHN F. NAVRATIL

1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-390
Author(s):  
RANDALL D. WEISS
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davidson Sinclair ◽  
Larry Li

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ ownership structure is related to their effective tax rate. The People’s Republic of China provides an interesting environment to examine the corporate income tax. Government has significant ownership stakes in the for-profit economy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are liable to the corporate income tax. This is very different to most other economies where SOE tends to dominate the not-for-profit economy and pays no corporate income tax. Government ownership also varies between the central government and local government in addition to state asset management bureaus. This provides a rich institutional background to examining the corporate income tax. Design/methodology/approach A panel data analysis approach is used to examine relationship between ownership structure and effective tax rates of all public firms in China from 1999 to 2009. Findings The authors report that effective tax rates do appear to vary across the ownership types, but that SOEs pay a statistically higher effective tax rate than to non-state-owned. In addition, local government owned SOE pay higher effective tax rates than central government and SAMB owned SOE. The authors also investigate Zimmerman’s (1983) political cost hypothesis. Unfortunately, these results are econometrically fragile with the statistical significance of those results varying by empirical technique. Originality/value This paper provides insight into government ownership and taxation in China.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seruni J. Prang ◽  
Sifrid S. Pangemanan ◽  
Harijanto Sabijono

Income tax article 21 is a tax on income which becomes the obligation of taxpayer to pay for it. Income in the form of salary, honorarium, allowances and other payments with any name in connection with the work, services or activities undertaken by the taxpayer of a domestic individual. The law used to regulate the amount of tax rates, the procedure of payment and tax reporting is the law No. 36 of 2008. The purpose of this study is to find out how to analyze the calculation of income tax article 21 fixed employment and accounting application of PT. Bank SulutGo (Persero) Tbk. Cabang Utama. The method of analysis used in this research is descriptive method that is discussing the problem by collecting, deciphering, calculating, comparing and explaining a situasion so that it can be drawn conclusion covering the calculation of pph article 21 and accounting for permanent employees at PT. Bank SulutGo (Persero). Based on the results of the study found that the calculation of income tax article 21 at PT. Bank SulutGo (Persero), is in compliances with the new taxation legislation, namely law no. 36 of 2008 on income tax and the regulation of the director general of tax number PER-16/PJ/2016.Keywords:  accounting, income tax article 21


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
장용성 ◽  
장보현 ◽  
김선빈
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andrej Vyacheslavovich Mikheev

The article highlights a probabilistic model constructed for calculating the number of poor and the total income tax levied on all taxpayers under different income tax systems. There is considered the proportional income tax system adopted in the Russian Federation, as well as single-stage systems with both fixed and variable tax rates, in which individuals with low incomes are exempted from income tax. For these tax systems there have been found the dependences of the expected value of the number of the poor and the total income tax on the tax rate, tax-free minimum, and also on the laws of probabilities distribution of total income and the living wage of an individual. A numerical simulation of the found dependences was carried out. The conditions under which the abolition of income tax for individuals with low incomes reduces the number of poor were determined. Mathematical criteria are formulated with the help of which it is possible to assess the feasibility of moving from a proportional system to single-stage income tax systems.


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