Kantian Hesitations around the Proper Philosophical Method

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-348
Author(s):  
Ivaylo Dimitrov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Synthetic Method ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Proper Method ◽  
Synthetic Construction ◽  
Critical Project

According to leading Kant scholars, in mid-1760s Kant realizes that his program for the reform of metaphysics cannot be developed by the method of conceptual analysis which he had previously considered to be more adequate than the synthetic method of the Wolffians that imitates the mathematical one. In this paper, I put into question the claim of a pre-Critical project of ‘analytical metaphysics’ by trying to show that even for the ‘pre-Critical’ Kant the proper method of metaphysics is genuinely synthetic, but the synthetic construction in question should have been prepared by a Critical and subsequent exhaustive analysis of key material-instrumental concepts of the peculiar philosophical science under question.

scholarly journals CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AS A PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD: THEOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENTS

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (3) ◽  
pp. 61-64
Author(s):  
Михаил Мосиенко ◽  
Mikhail Mosienko
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Inquiry ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
The World ◽  
Previous Solution ◽  
Theological Argument ◽  
Scholastic Philosophy

The author poses a question of applicability of conceptual analysis as a tool of philosophical inquiry compared to conceptual analysis as a linguistic research tool. The article contains a critical analysis of the previous solution of this problem. This solution was to prove that the world of physical systems and the world of mental states are isomorphic. This was a solution used by Descartes and by a significant number of post-Cartesian philosophers who borrowed it from scholastic philosophy. The author analyses a strong and a weak version of the theological argument to show that both of these versions are inapplicable for proving the value of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. The article focuses on an alternative way to prove that philosophers can safely use conceptual analysis to benefit their studies. The alternative argument is the following: human language is an evolutionary adaptation, it implicitly contains ideas that adequately reflect non-verbal reality. Conceptual analysis allows one to explicate and structure these initially implicit ideas, which makes conceptual analysis a potent tool of philosophical studies.

scholarly journals Mendelssohn and Kant on Mathematics and Metaphysics

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Callanan
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Critical Periods ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Central Concern ◽  
The Difference ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Prize Essay

AbstractThe difference between the method of metaphysics and the method of mathematics was an issue of central concern for Kant in both the Pre-Critical and Critical periods. I will argue that when Kant speaks of the ‘philosophical method’ in the Doctrine of Method in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he frequently has in mind not his own methodology but rather the method of conceptual analysis associated with rationalism. The particular target is Moses Mendelssohn’s picture of analysis contained in his submission for the 1763 Prize Essay competition. By the time of the first Critique, I argue, Kant wants to maintain his own longstanding commitment to the distinctness of the methods of metaphysics and mathematics. However, Kant wants to use this same analysis of the source of the distinction to diagnose the origins of the dogmatism that is engendered by the method of the rationalists.

Intuitions and Conceptual Analysis in Wittgensteinian Pragmatism

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-91
Author(s):  
David Hommen ◽  
Frauke Albersmeier
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Cognitive Tasks ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Immediate Reactions ◽  
Doxastic States

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘reactions’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.

Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Free Time ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Epistemic Access ◽  
Modal Skepticism ◽  
Work Done ◽  
Method Of Cases

In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should reorient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors. Attempts to resolve such issues are modally immodest: Any resolution would require an epistemic access to metaphysical possibilities and necessities, which, Edouard Machery argues, we do not have. In effect, then, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds defends a form of modal skepticism. The book assesses the main philosophical method for acquiring the modal knowledge that the resolution of modally immodest philosophical issues turns on: the method of cases, that is, the consideration of actual or hypothetical situations (which cases or thought experiments describe) in order to determine what facts hold in these situations. Canvassing the extensive work done by experimental philosophers over the last fifteen years, Edouard Machery shows that the method of cases is unreliable and should be rejected. Importantly, the dismissal of modally immodest philosophical issues is no cause for despair: Many important philosophical issues remain within our epistemic reach. In particular, reorienting the course of philosophy would free time and resources for bringing back to prominence a once-central intellectual endeavor: conceptual analysis.

Newton and Hume

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Hazony ◽  
Eric Schliesser
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Synthetic Method ◽  
Philosophical Method ◽  
Ontological Commitments ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Other Hand

Central aspects of Hume’s proposed “system of the sciences” as described in the Treatise are modeled on Newton’s Principia. But, as recent scholarship has suggested, Hume’s Treatise also bears a deeply subversive message with respect to Newtonian science. This chapter offers a revised overview of what Hume takes from Newton and what he rejects: The first part of the chapter argues that in the Treatise Hume adopts a version of Newton’s “analytic and synthetic method” for philosophy, thereby placing a distinctively Newtonian form of explanatory reduction at the center of his own philosophical method. The second part of the chapter, on the other hand, shows that many of the most important aspects of Hume’s argument in Book 1 of the Treatise can be understood as critical of core conceptual and ontological commitments of Newton’s mechanics as developed in the Principia.

Ecological Limits and the Meaning of Freedom: A Defense of Liberty as Non-Domination

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augustin Fragnière
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Environmental Constraints ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Global Environmental Problems ◽  
Global Environmental ◽  
Two Alternatives

It is now widely acknowledged that global environmental problems raise pressing social and political issues, but relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to their bearing on the concept of liberty. This must surprise us, because the question of whether environmental policies are at odds with individual liberty is bound to be controversial in the political arena. First, this article explains why a thorough philosophical debate about the relation between liberty and environmental constraints is needed. Second, based on Philip Pettit’s typology of liberty, it assesses how different conceptions of liberty fare in a context of stringent ecological limits. Indeed, a simple conceptual analysis shows that some conceptions of liberty are more compatible than others with such limits, and with the policies necessary to avoid overshooting them. The article concludes that Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination is more compatible with the existence of stringent ecological limits than the two alternatives considered.

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