Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism
This paper presents a novel challenge for the panpsychist solution to the problem of consciousness. It advances three main claims. First, that the problem of consciousness is really an instance of a more general problem: that of grounding the qualitative. Second, that we should want a general solution to this problem. Third, that panpsychism cannot provide it. I also suggest two further things: (1) that alternative kinds of Russellian monism may avoid the problem in ways panpsychists cannot, and (2) that a kind of neo-Aristotelian or ground-theoretical physicalism fares just as well here if not better.
1977 ◽
Vol 36
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pp. 143-180
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1975 ◽
Vol 26
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pp. 293-295
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2003 ◽
Vol 35
(7)
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pp. 15-21
2000 ◽
Vol 54
(5-6)
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pp. 9-27
2017 ◽
Vol 9
(1)
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pp. 147-162