scholarly journals Board Gender Diversity, Social Performance, and CEO Compensation

1970 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
K. Gilley ◽  
Kelly Weeks ◽  
Joseph Coombs ◽  
Myrtle Bell ◽  
Donald Kluemper

This study examines the extent to which board gender diversity and corporatesocial performance influence CEO compensation. The sample includes 1,829observations from 262 Fortune 500 companies over multiple years. Findings indicatethat board gender diversity and corporate social performance interact to predict CEOcompensation. The data show that boards comprised of a higher percentage of womenplace increasing emphasis on certain kinds of corporate social performance whensetting CEO pay, and decreasing emphasis on other types of social performance. Ourfindings highlight the complex interrelationships between executive compensation,board composition, and corporate social performance.

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 789-802 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khine Kyaw ◽  
Mojisola Olugbode ◽  
Barbara Petracci

Purpose This paper examines if gender diversity on corporate boards promotes corporate social performance (CSP) across industries and across countries. Design/methodology/approach Fixed-effect panel models are estimated using Europe-wide data from 2002 through 2013. Instrumental variable estimation and propensity score matching are also used to control for potential endogeneity. Findings Board gender diversity (BGD) improves environmental and social performance and consequently the CSP. Although the positive effect of gender diversity is prevalent across industries, the effect is more pronounced for firms in emerging markets. Practical implications The findings suggest that gender law that fosters gender diversity can promote CSP in firms, and the benefit can be enjoyed with just an introduction of one female director to the board. Promotion of gender diversity in Europe is most beneficial in emerging markets. Originality/value The results provide new insights to the literature, as we find that a critical mass of female directors on boards is not required to promote CSP. The research also highlights that BGD enhances CSP irrespective of the industry, and the effect on CSP is more pronounced in emerging markets where regulations regarding CSR are not so clear-cut.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 3142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khwaja Naveed ◽  
Cosmina L. Voinea ◽  
Zahid Ali ◽  
Fawad Rauf ◽  
Cosmin Fratostiteanu

This paper examines the heterogeneous links between board gender diversity and corporate social performance in different industries across China. OLS regression models are approximated using the data of Chinese industries from 2009 to 2015. Robustness test and two-stage least square (2SLS) methods are incorporated to cater for robustness and endogeneity. Board gender diversity (BGD) stimulates corporate social performance (CSP) of firms with environmental and social risk exposure regardless of critical mass and directors’ independence. It does so for firms with governance risk exposure while incorporating the critical mass effect and the director’s independence. Overall, the positive effect of BGD is prevalent in different industries at an aggregate level while considering firms with an overall ESG risk exposure. The findings imply that BGD can mitigate the ESG risk exposure in terms of enhancing the CSP and the advantage can be transpired with the inclusion of even one female director (independent or executive) to the board. The study also highlights that BGD enhances CSP in industries with more environmental and social risk exposure while doing so in industries with governance risk exposure after complementation by critical mass and independent director effects.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Caleb Thibodeau

This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 200-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy A. Hart ◽  
Parthiban David ◽  
Feibo Shao ◽  
Corey J. Fox ◽  
Michelle Westermann-Behaylo

2020 ◽  
pp. 000765032096515
Author(s):  
Klavdia Evans ◽  
Ashley Salaiz ◽  
Seemantini Pathak ◽  
Dusya Vera

We draw upon the attention-based view of the firm to identify the conditions under which community influentials (CIs) on a board impact a firm’s corporate social performance (CSP). We test our hypotheses with a panel data set of Fortune 500 firms from 2004 to 2008, including 3,955 unique firm–director combinations (aggregated to the board level). Although CIs are often considered less powerful directors, we identify that when the firm is experiencing poor CSP, CIs have a positive effect on CSP. The ability of CIs to influence CSP is also conditional on the access of CIs and other board members to socially oriented board ties. Our article points out that power and influence is contingent on the decision context and the relative knowledge of organizational players, and that players with relatively lower power may improve their status and command attention when they can offer exclusive insight into important issues.


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