scholarly journals IPO Pricing and Dealers’ Interaction: A Stochastic Frontier Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Marco Cucculelli ◽  
Manuela Geranio ◽  
Camilla Mazzoli ◽  
Sabrina Severini
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stochastic Frontier ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Stochastic Frontier Approach ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Ipo Pricing ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates the impact of ongoing relationships between underwriters and institutional investors on Initial Public Offerings (IPO) pricing. Differently from previous studies that are focused on allocations of underpriced shares we propose a model of primary market pricing in which the incomplete adjustment of the offer price to its maximum achievable level depends on the intensity of interactions that occurred between players in the years before the IPO. Using a stochastic frontier approach on a sample of 1 677 US IPOs between 2000 and 2016 the paper shows that the more investment banks and investors regularly work together the more the IPO offer price is set closer to the fair value of the issuing firm. This analysis helps to disentangle the ambiguous effects of underwriters’ discretion on IPO primary market pricing when bookbuilding is used. We then support the idea that banks can maximize value to issuers by fostering a regular clientele of investors.

Do IPO Certification Mechanisms Work? Empirical Evidence from India

2021 ◽  
pp. 097215092110197
Author(s):  
B. S. Mahalakshmi ◽  
Juhi Gupta ◽  
Smita Kashiramka ◽  
P. K. Jain
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Multivariate Regression ◽  
Multivariate Regression Analysis ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
The Impact

In initial public offerings (IPOs), underpricing refers to pricing the issue at a price lower than its fair value which results in the listing price being much higher than the issue price. This higher information asymmetry results in more underpricing. To reduce such asymmetry, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) introduced IPO grading and anchor investor participation in India. This article aims to assess the impact of these two factors on the underpricing of Indian IPOs over 2007–2017. This study uses multivariate regression analysis to compare the impact of graded versus ungraded IPOs and of anchor-backed versus non-anchor backed IPOs on underpricing; it finds that IPO grading and anchor investment do not have a significant overall impact on underpricing. These results justify the scrapping of mandatory IPO grading. Although insignificant, IPO grading has a greater influence on underpricing than anchor investor participation. Furthermore, the current study also analyses the subscription patterns of qualified institutional buyers (QIBs), non-institutional investors (NIIs) and retail individual investors (RIIs) and their influence on one another. Accordingly, it reveals that QIB subscription influences both NII and RII subscriptions.

scholarly journals Do Discounts Enhance or Degrade IPOs Valuation Performance?

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 34-41
Author(s):  
Douaa Tizniti ◽  
Mohammed Rachid Aasri
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Fundamental Analysis ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Final Offer ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Impact

In the present study, we investigate the impact of discounts on the valuation performance of initial public offerings. Review of existing literature reveals that such valuation performance lacks examination in terms of discounts as most studies focus on valuation methods. Accordingly, we examine the valuation performance of initial public offerings before and after applying discounts. Whereby, underwriters apply a deliberate discount to fair value estimate before setting the final offer price. We assess the valuation performance of initial public offerings through bias and accuracy errors as well as explainability. When valuation errors are low, the valuation performance is deemed superior. Our sample consists of 39 initial public offerings conducted on the Moroccan stock exchange between 2004 and 2018. We use publicly available prospectus to collect necessary data. Our results reveal that discounts applied to fair value estimate when setting the final offer price reduce valuation errors. Consequently, discounts enhance the valuation performance of initial public offerings. In fact, both optimistic and pessimistic final offer price are closer to market price in comparison with optimistic and pessimistic fair value estimate. We conclude that if valuations conducted by underwriters are objective, discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to initial public offerings. This indicates the superior fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if valuations conducted by underwriters are subjective, then underwriters deliberately overestimates fair value estimate to justify applying discounts when setting the final offer price. Nonetheless, our study reveals that discounts are more than proportional to valuation optimism. Consequently, while discounts absorb this valuation optimism, they also set a valuation pessimism. In other words, discounts avoid overpricing initial public offerings, yet they result in underpricing them. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic fair value estimate and pessimistic final offer price have approximate valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable underpricing initial public offerings than overpricing them.

scholarly journals Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. xiv-24
Author(s):  
Douglas Cumming ◽  
Sofia Johan
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Reverse Mergers ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Long Term Performance ◽  
Term Performance ◽  
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

The worldwide landscape for raising firm capital from Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has significantly evolved over the last few decades. This introductory chapter reviews more recent research on initial public offerings. The Oxford Handbook of IPOs comprises twenty-nine chapters from authors around the world. The chapters describe the economics of going public, short- and long-term performance of IPOs, regulation of IPOs, IPOs versus acquisitions, reverse mergers, special purpose acquisition companies, service providers including investment banks and auditors, venture capital funds, international differences in IPOs, and crowdfunding. The Introduction summarizes the chapters that appear in the Handbook and highlight research trends on topic.

scholarly journals Sins for some, virtues for others: Media coverage of investment banks’ misconduct and adherence to professional norms during the financial crisis

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (9) ◽  
pp. 1436-1463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J Roulet
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Professional Misconduct ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Professional Norms ◽  
The Face ◽  
Corporate Customers

Why does professional misconduct persist in the face of media scrutiny? In this study, we explain how professional norms can be at odds with societal norms and how the behaviours they trigger can be perceived as misconduct. Most audiences tend to disapprove of wrongdoings, but specific stakeholders may interpret this disapproval as an indication of the focal organization’s level of adherence to professional norms. Building on mixed methods, we explore the case of the investment banking industry during the financial crisis and suggest that corporate customers were favourably biased by the reporting of banks’ misconduct in the print media as they linked it to the banks’ quality of service. We capture the extent to which banks are associated with misconduct, signalling their adherence to negatively perceived professional norms. We then look at how such signalling affects the likelihood for banks to be invited into initial public offerings syndicates. Our findings show that the more banks are disapproved of for their wrongdoings, the more likely they are to be selected to join a syndicate. This study suggests that the coverage of misconduct can actually act as a positive signal providing banks with incentives to engage in what is broadly perceived as professional misconduct.

Die Fehlbewertung junger Aktiengesellschaften beim Gang an die Börse – Ursachen und wirtschaftspolitische Konsequenzen

2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Ploog ◽  
Michael Stolpe
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Investment Banks ◽  
Policy Options ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Speculative Bubbles ◽  
Privatisation Programme ◽  
Welfare Implications

AbstractThis paper discusses policy options to reduce underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs). It surveys recent theoretical insights into the causes and welfare implications of underpricing and reviews evidence on the signalling hypothesis, the winner’s curse model, the role of underwriters in assessing issuing firms’ future profitability and the genesis of speculative bubbles in IPO markets. The paper concludes that governments should curtail the abuse of market power in underwriting by prohibiting the allocation of shares to insiders and by reducing the incentives for investment banks to exploit underpriced share issues in order to cross-subsidise unrelated lines of business. Moreover, governments should seek to stabilize the IPO market by committing themselves to regular equal-sized issues of shares in government assets as part of a long-term privatisation programme.

Does Sentiment Drive the Retail Demand for IPOs?

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Dorn
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Equity Offerings ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Trading Decisions ◽  
Retail Trading ◽  
Public Equity ◽  
Retail Demand ◽  
As If

AbstractIndividual and institutional investors can trade German initial public equity offerings on an as-if/when-issued basis before the start of secondary trading. Using actual when-issued trades made by a sample of clients at a large German retail broker during 1999 and 2000, the paper documents that retail buyers consistently overpay for initial public offerings (IPOs) in the when-issued market relative to the immediate aftermarket. The observed willingness to overpay points to sentiment as a driver of retail trading decisions. Consistent with this interpretation and with sentiment affecting prices, IPOs that are aggressively bought by individuals in the when-issued market exhibit high first-day returns as well as poor aftermarket returns relative to benchmarks of similar stocks.

Stage financing and syndication in the IPO underpricing of venture-backed firms: Venture capital and IPO underpricing

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 289-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Awounou-N’dri Honorine ◽  
Dubocage Emmanuelle
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Venture Capital Investment ◽  
Ipo Performance ◽  
The Impact

The article investigates the impact of stage financing and syndication practices on the underpricing level of venture-backed firms (VBFs) undertaking their initial public offerings (IPOs). This empirical study uses a unique hand-collected data set concerning more than 260 VBFs that went public on Euronext Paris and Alternext between 1997 and 2013. Our findings suggest a lower level of underpricing for firms backed by syndicated venture capital investment. Additionally, we find that the syndicate size is negatively associated with the level of underpricing. However, there is no evidence that stage financing has a significant impact. Syndication thus appears to be the only relevant mechanism to improve IPO performance (measured by the underpricing level), as it reduces agency costs and information asymmetry between the different stakeholders in an IPO process.

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