scholarly journals A beautiful mind meets free software: game theory, competition and cooperation DOI: 10.5585/exacta.v4iesp.680

Exacta ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (esp) ◽  
pp. 25-30
Author(s):  
Alexandre Oliva

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2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 192-193

Cade Massey of University of Pennsylvania reviews, “Schelling's Game Theory: How to Make Decisions” by Robert V. Dodge. The EconLit abstract of this book begins: “Explores Thomas Schelling's contributions to the field of rational strategic analysis and game theory, focusing on content from his Harvard University course on rational choice, bargaining, and strategy. Focuses on the Schelling approach to strategic thinking and decision making; strategies and tactics; models as metaphors for what decisions do; the prisoner's dilemma, competition, and cooperation; individual decisions and group agreement; decisions that mix and sort populations and decisions based on randomization; and a case study of the Cuban Missile crisis. Dodge is retired from teaching social studies at the Singapore American School. Index.”


2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
pp. 662-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tien-Chien Chen ◽  
Yu-Cheng Lin ◽  
Lung-Chuang Wang

Uncertainty in a contract for some BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) projects may allow an opportunistic developer to take advantage of information asymmetrical factors, long-term external changes, and agency dilemma to request renegotiation and to alter the contact after it has been awarded. Such requests often entrap the government in hold-up problems and result in improper payments to the developers and may even create general public dissatisfaction with a project. In this paper, the Game Theory model is used to analyze the Taiwan High Speed Railroad project to examine how developers implement different strategies at the various stages of a project to alter the contract's conditions in order to continually creating competitive advantage after they have been awarded the contract. This project developer is now facing serious financial difficulties. In this study, the financial information on the Taiwan High Speed Railroad operations was used as the foundation for conducting a simulation to calculate the project's value after this project began operation. The results will serve as reference to the best decision-making strategy for renegotiating costs in competition and cooperation so that a developer can select the optimum project offering the maximum reward. Also, the result will be offered to industries involved in market competition or act as an approach to establish future BOT policies on renegotiation.


Author(s):  
ZHIFENG YANG ◽  
YONG ZENG ◽  
YANPENG CAI ◽  
QIAN TAN

Water is a fundamental resource in our daily lives and for social development. Currently, water resources are under stressed conditions in north China due to the ongoing growth of demand for water and the frequent occurrences of natural disasters in this area. This problem is further intensified by the deterioration of water quality, which is a side effect of economic development, industrial expansion, and agricultural growth. These problems interconnect with each other, leading to a variety of conflicts over water resources. To resolve such conflicts, a two-person game-theory based model is developed for water resource management in the trans-boundary regions of a river basin. The model is tested on a river basin within this area of China in which water resources are contested. Through the developed model, potential policy alternatives can be generated for water resource management and pollution control within the context of a river basin. Cooperative and/or competitive mechanisms can thus be formulated through competition and cooperation over issues of water quantity and quality among different levels of jurisdictions in the same river basin. Then, Nash Solution is used to solve scenarios of competition and cooperation between the upstream and downstream based on the integration of optimization and simulation models. The developed model and the solution process is then applied to resolve water conflicts between Beijing and Hebei province, which are in the upstream and downstream of the Guanting Reservoir Basin (GRB), respectively, representing two major stakeholders in the contest over water quantity and quality. Non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios for the two-player game scenarios are developed to investigate and compare potential economic benefits of these scenarios. Results indicate that the developed model can be effectively and flexibly employed to resolve water conflicts between upstream and downstream stakeholders in the same river basin. The results can also be used to help formulate economic compensation mechanisms within these jurisdictions.


Author(s):  
Niko Vegt ◽  
Valentijn Visch ◽  
Arnold Vermeeren ◽  
Huib De Ridder

Serious gaming is used as a means for improving organizational teamwork, yet little is known about the effect of individual game elements constituting serious games. This paper presents a game design experiment aimed at generating knowledge on designing game elements for teamwork. In previous work, we suggested that interaction- and goal-driven rules could guide interdependence and teamwork strategies. Based on this finding, for the present experiment we developed two versions of multiplayer Breakout, varying in rule-sets, designed to elicit player strategies of either dependent competition or dependent cooperation. Results showed that the two rule-sets could generate distinct reported player experiences and observable distinct player behaviors that could be further discriminated into four patterns: expected patterns of helping and ignoring, and unexpected patterns of agreeing and obstructing. Classic game theory was applied to understand the four behavior patterns and made us conclude that goal-driven rules steered players towards competition and cooperation. Interaction rules, in contrast, mainly stimulated dependent competitive behavior, e.g. obstructing each other. Since different types of rules thus led to different player behavior, discriminating in game design between interaction- and goal-driven rules seems relevant. Moreover, our research showed that game theory proved to be useful for understanding goal-driven rules.


Author(s):  
Ein-Ya Gura ◽  
Michael Maschler
Keyword(s):  

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