scholarly journals MODELING AND VALIDATING A SECURE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM AND CORPORATE NETWORK USING COLORED PETRI NET

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-61
Author(s):  
Adriano Borrego ◽  
Adilson Eduardo Guelfi ◽  
Anderson Aparecido Alves da Silva ◽  
Marcelo Teixeira de Azevedo ◽  
Norisvaldo Ferraz Jr ◽  
...  

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) networks offer a high level of automation combined with high levels of control, quality,and process improvement. Since network corporate users have to access the ICS environment, these networks have to be interconnected. However, this interconnection can introduce risks to the systems and manufacturing processes, which leads to the need to ensure the interconnection is done safely. The objective of this paper is to perform modeling and validation of a proposed secure interconnection between ICS and corporate networks using Colored Petri Networks (CPN). In addition to the best practices published in related works, this paper recommends some integrated features like the use of terminal server service, secure manual uplinks, and unidirectional security gatewayto enhance environmental security. However, our main contribution is the validation process performed in a CPN, which made it possible to execute queries in the state space resulting from the simulation -that works as a proof of concept. As a result, thepaper presents a secure and validated model of interconnection between ICS and corporate networks, capable of being applied to any interconnection environment

2017 ◽  
Vol 139 (03) ◽  
pp. S13-S17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasis Keliris ◽  
Michail Maniatakos

This article discusses a comprehensive methodology for designing an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), which is a stealthy and continuous type of cyberattack with a high level of sophistication suitable for the complex environment of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). The article also explains defensive strategies that can assist in thwarting cyberattacks. The APT design process begins with Reconnaissance, which is continuously undertaken throughout the lifetime of a cyberattack campaign. With regard to securing the network infrastructure of an ICS, best practices for network security should be enforced. These could include the use of firewalls, Intrusion Detection or Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS), and network separation between corporate and field networks. A new field of research for securing ICS relates to process-aware defense mechanisms. These mechanisms analyze information directly from the field and try to detect anomalies specific to the physical characteristics of an ICS process.


Author(s):  
Roberto Mugavero ◽  
Stanislav Abaimov ◽  
Federico Benolli ◽  
Valentina Sabato

As cyberattacks are becoming the prevalent types of attacks on critical infrastructures, due protection and effective response are crucial in CBRN facilities. This article explores comprehensive cyber security vulnerability management related to CBRN Control Systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and provides recommendations that will increase CBRN operational cyber security and ensure further platform for the research in the field of operational vulnerability detection and remediation. The article reviews several key issues related to ICS vulnerability management cycle, vulnerability sharing with security developers, patch and network management, cyber offensive threats and threat actors and related cyber security challenges. It covers such specific issues as ICS connectivity to private/public networks, critical ICS accessibility via Web Access, Wi-Fi and/or unauthorised software inside corporate networks. The proposed solutions refer to some areas of vulnerability management for the awareness and development of countermeasures.


Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (23) ◽  
pp. 8119
Author(s):  
Ondrej Pospisil ◽  
Petr Blazek ◽  
Karel Kuchar ◽  
Radek Fujdiak ◽  
Jiri Misurec

In recent years, the Industry 4.0 paradigm has accelerated the digitalization process of the industry, and it slowly diminishes the line between information technologies (IT) and operational technologies (OT). Among the advantages, this brings up the convergence issue between IT and OT, especially in the cybersecurity-related topics, including new attack vectors, threats, security imperfections, and much more. This cause raised new topics for methods focused on protecting the industrial infrastructure, including monitoring and detection systems, which should help overcome these new challenges. However, those methods require high quality and a large number of datasets with different conditions to adapt to the specific systems effectively. Unfortunately, revealing field factory setups and infrastructure would be costly and challenging due to the privacy and sensitivity causes. From the lack of data emerges the new topic of industrial testbeds, including sub-real physical laboratory environments, virtual factories, honeynets, honeypots, and other areas, which helps to deliver sufficient datasets for mentioned research and development. This paper summarizes related works in the area of industrial testbeds. Moreover, it describes best practices and lessons learned for assembling physical, simulated, virtual, and hybrid testbeds. Additionally, a comparison of the essential parameters of those testbeds is presented. Finally, the findings and provided information reveal research and development challenges, which must be surpassed.


Information ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 533
Author(s):  
Tiago Espinha Gasiba ◽  
Ulrike Lechner ◽  
Maria Pinto-Albuquerque

Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in industrial control systems have been steadily increasing over the last few years. One possible way to address this issue is through raising the awareness (through education) of software developers, with the intent to increase software quality and reduce the number of vulnerabilities. CyberSecurity Challenges (CSCs) are a novel serious game genre that aims to raise industrial software developers’ awareness of secure coding, secure coding guidelines, and secure coding best practices. An important industry-specific requirement to consider in designing these kinds of games is related to the whole event’s duration and how much time it takes to solve each challenge individually—the challenge solve time. In this work, we present two different methods to compute the challenge solve time: one method based on data collected from the CSC dashboard and another method based on a challenge heartbeat. The results obtained by both methods are presented; both methods are compared to each other, and the advantages and limitations of each method are discussed. Furthermore, we introduce the notion of a player profile, which is derived from dashboard data. Our results and contributions aim to establish a method to measure the challenge solve time, inform the design of future challenges, and improve coaching during CSC gameplay.


2020 ◽  
pp. 931-963
Author(s):  
Roberto Mugavero ◽  
Stanislav Abaimov ◽  
Federico Benolli ◽  
Valentina Sabato

As cyberattacks are becoming the prevalent types of attacks on critical infrastructures, due protection and effective response are crucial in CBRN facilities. This article explores comprehensive cyber security vulnerability management related to CBRN Control Systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and provides recommendations that will increase CBRN operational cyber security and ensure further platform for the research in the field of operational vulnerability detection and remediation. The article reviews several key issues related to ICS vulnerability management cycle, vulnerability sharing with security developers, patch and network management, cyber offensive threats and threat actors and related cyber security challenges. It covers such specific issues as ICS connectivity to private/public networks, critical ICS accessibility via Web Access, Wi-Fi and/or unauthorised software inside corporate networks. The proposed solutions refer to some areas of vulnerability management for the awareness and development of countermeasures.


2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 02013
Author(s):  
Yufei Wang ◽  
Tengbiao Zhang ◽  
Qian Ye

Information and cyber security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has gained considerable importance. Situation Awareness (SA) is an exciting mechanism to achieve the perception, comprehension and projection of the ICS information security status. Based on the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA), a situation awareness framework for ICS is presented considering the ICS cyber kill chain. The proposed framework consists of IT SA Centre, OT SA Centre, and Comprehensive SA Centre. Comprehensive SA Centre is responsible for creating and maintaining an integrated and high level of security visibility into the whole environments. The introduced framework can be used to guide the development of the situation awareness infrastructure in organization with industrial control systems.


Electronics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawen Xiong ◽  
Gang Zhu ◽  
Yanhong Huang ◽  
Jianqi Shi

Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are special embedded computers that are widely used in industrial control systems. To ensure the safety of industrial control systems, it is necessary to verify the correctness of PLCs. Formal verification is considered to be an effective method to verify whether a PLC program conforms to its specifications, but the expertise requirements and the complexity make it hard to be mastered and widely applied. In this paper, we present a specification-mining-based verification approach for IEC 61131-3 PLC programs. It only requires users to review specifications mined from the program behaviors instead of model checking for specified specifications, which can greatly improve the efficiency of safety verification and is much easier for control system engineers to use. Moreover, we implement a proof-of-concept tool named PLCInspector that supports directly mining LTL specifications and data invariants from PLC programs. Two examples and one real-life case study are presented to illustrate its practicability and efficiency. In addition, a comparison with the existing verification approaches for PLC programs is discussed.


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