Understanding Hylomorphic Dualism

Author(s):  
Marco Stango ◽  

In this paper I will claim that the standard interpretation of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is not satisfactory. A better reading is possible, which I will call strong hylomorphic dualism. Thus, I intend to do three things: first, I introduce strong hylomorphic dualism by highlighting the shortcomings of the standard reading, to which I will refer as weak hylomorphic dualism; second, I reconstruct two arguments provided by Aquinas to prove that his position is in fact best understood as strong hylomorphic dualism. Finally, I suggest that Aquinas thinks of the relationship between intellect and phantasms in terms of what could be called diagrammatic causality, as exemplified by his theory of abstraction and attention to the phantasms.

Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent’s overall belief state is divided into several sub-states—fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s. Recently, it has attracted great attention again. This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible Introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation’s role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.


Author(s):  
Brian Leiter

Moral psychology, for purposes of this volume, encompasses issues in metaethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action, including questions concerning the objectivity of morality, the relationship between moral judgment and emotion, the nature of the emotions, free will, and moral responsibility, and the structure of the mind as that is relevant to the possibility of moral action and judgment. Nietzsche’s “naturalism” is introduced and explained, and certain confusions about its meaning are addressed. An overview of the volume follows


Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi

Not that long ago, discussions of selfhood in philosophy of mind tended to focus on diachronic identity and the so-called persistence question. Important as this question might be, it does, however, not exhaust the topic of selfhood. In recent years, the focus has shifted somewhat from diachronic to synchronic identity and given rise to a lively debate concerning the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. Are our conscious experiences self-involving or self-disclosing (in a manner yet to be determined), or was Lichtenberg right in his famous objection to Descartes: Experiences simply take place, and that is all. Is saying cogito and affirming the existence of an I already saying too much?


Media in Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 19-48
Author(s):  
Daniel Reynolds

This chapter proposes a theoretical approach to media use that treats media and their users’ minds as continuous with one another. It calls this approach “transactionism.” It shows how the philosophy of John Dewey is relevant to the study of contemporary media. The chapter shows how Dewey’s ideas can clarify historical problems from throughout the history of media studies. It uses examples from video games and films to illustrate the utility of transactionism in thinking about individual media and in thinking about relationships among media. It shows how contemporary philosophy of mind extends concepts from Dewey’s philosophy. This clarifies the relationship between Dewey’s ideas and the film and video game examples that the chapter presents.


2021 ◽  

The philosophy of language is central to the concerns of those working across semantics, pragmatics and cognition, as well as the philosophy of mind and ideas. Bringing together an international team of leading scholars, this handbook provides a comprehensive guide to contemporary investigations into the relationship between language, philosophy, and linguistics. Chapters are grouped into thematic areas and cover a wide range of topics, from key philosophical notions, such as meaning, truth, reference, names and propositions, to characteristics of the most recent research in the field, including logicality of language, vagueness in natural language, value judgments, slurs, deception, proximization in discourse, argumentation theory and linguistic relativity. It also includes chapters that explore selected linguistic theories and their philosophical implications, providing a much-needed interdisciplinary perspective. Showcasing the cutting-edge in research in the field, this book is essential reading for philosophers interested in language and linguistics, and linguists interested in philosophical analyses.


1983 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 126-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireille Corbier

In any discussion of the relationship between Fiscus and Patrimonium, the inscription from Saepinum dealing with incidents on the callis or tratturo from the Abruzzi to the Tavoliere which passed through the town must play a part. The inscription comprises three documents: a report from the Imperial freedman Septimianus to his superior, the freedman a rationibus Cosmus, on the maltreatment alleged by the conductores gregum oviaricorum in the region of Saepinum and Bovianum, at the hands of local magistrates and stationarii; a request from the a rationibus to the Praetorian Prefects; and a warning letter from these to the magistrates of Saepinum, placed at the head of the dossier.The standard interpretation of the Saepinum inscription explains the place which it holds in discussions of the Patrimonium; for let us suppose that the conductores gregum oviaricorum are the contractors for the Imperial flocks, the oves dominicae, and that the intervention of Cosmus is justified on the basis of his position, the flocks being sub cura mea; it would follow that at any rate under Marcus (the affair belongs to the years 169–72), the possessions of the Emperor were in the hands of the a rationibus and hence of the Fiscus.


Author(s):  
Robin Faichney

This article aims to show how mind, matter and meaning might be united in one theory using certain concepts of information, building on ideas of empathy and intentionality. The concept of intentionality in philosophy of mind (“aboutness”), which is “the ineliminable mark of the mental” according to Brentano, can be viewed as the relationship between model and object, and empathy can be viewed as a form of mental modelling, so that the inclination to attribute mentality can be identified with the inclination to empathise with the relevant entity. Physical information, a concept quite well established within the discipline of physics, is basically a reconceptualization of material form. Daniel Dennett's concept of the intentional stance allows the development of a concept of “intentional information,” a broad term that encompasses mental content and semantic information generally, as encoded within physical information/material form.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley Buckwalter ◽  
David Rose ◽  
John Turri

We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the distinction can be applied to debates in the philosophy of mind and metaethics.


F1000Research ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Senn

In analysing whether there is an editorial bias in favour of positive studies, researchers have made implicit assumptions that are implausible. In particular, to justify the conclusion that there is no bias because observed editorial acceptance rates do not favour positive studies, the assumption that the decision to submit an article is based solely on quality would be required. If, on the other hand, submission were based on perceived probability of acceptance, negative and positive studies would not differ in terms of acceptance rates, but in terms of quality.It is shown, using a simple graphical model, how similar underlying situations as regards the relationship between quality and probability of acceptance on the one hand and study outcome (positive or negative) and probability of acceptance on the other could produce dramatically different results depending on the behaviour of authors.Furthermore, there is, in fact, some evidence that submitted negative studies are, on average, of higher quality than positive ones. This calls into question the standard interpretation of the studies examining editorial bias. It would appear that despite similar probabilities of acceptance for negative and positive studies, editors could be discriminating against negative studies.


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