When we discuss normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, hypothetical imperatives (or “anankastic conditionals”), motivating reasons, or weakness and strength of will, we often use verbs like “believe” and “want” to capture a relevant subject’s perspective. According to the received view, what these verbs do is describe the subject’s mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in this discourse. This book uses tools from formal semantics and the philosophy of language to develop an alternative account of sentences involving these verbs. According to this view, called parentheticalism in honour of J. O. Urmson, we very commonly use these verbs in a parenthetical sense. Clauses with these verbs thereby express backgrounded side-remarks on the contents they embed, and these latter, embedded contents constitute the at-issue contents of our utterances. Thus, instead of speaking about the subject’s mental states, we often use sentences involving “believe” and “want” to speak about the world in a way that, in the conversational background, relates our utterances to her point of view. This idea is made precise and used to solve various puzzles concerning normative discourse. The result is a new, unified understanding of normative discourse, which does not postulate conceptual breaks between objective and subjective normative reasons, or normative reasons and rationality, or indeed between the reasons we ascribe to an agent and the reasons she herself can be expected to cite.
Formalne aspekty argumentu z autorytetu
