Waiving Jury Deliberation
This article argues that, given the current pervasive uncertainty about the reliability of jury deliberation, we ought to treat it with epistemic humility. I further argue that epistemic humility should be expressed and enforced by turning jury deliberation from a mandatory rule of the jury trial to a waivable right of the defendant. I consider two main objections to my argument: the first one concerns the putative self-defeatingness of humility attitudes; the second objection points to the burdensomeness of granting an unconditional jury deliberation waiver to the defendant.
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Making a Case: Narrative and Paradigmatic Modes in the Legal-Lay Discourse of the English Jury Trial
2007 ◽
Vol 10
(1)
◽
pp. 157-160
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2018 ◽
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