Executing the Innocent

Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Linehan

The risk of executing innocent persons is a decisive objection to the institution of capital punishment in the United States. Consequentialist arguments for the death penalty are inconclusive at best; the strongest justification is a retributive one. However, this argument is seriously undercut if a significant risk of executing the innocent exists. Any criminal justice system carries the risk of punishing innocent persons, but the punishment of death is unique and requires greater precautions. Retributive justifications for the death penalty are grounded in respect for innocent victims of homicide; but accepting serious risks of mistaken executions demonstrates disrespect for innocent human life. United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1990’s (Coleman v. Thompson and Herrara v. Collins) illustrate the existence of serious risk and suggest some explanations for it.

1983 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phoebe C. Ellsworth ◽  
Lee Ross

A survey designed to examine the attitudinal and informational bases of people's opinions about the death penalty was administered to 500 Northern California residents (response rate = 96 percent). Of these, 58.8 percent were proponents of capital punishment, 30.8 percent were opponents, and 10.4 percent were undecided. When asked whether they favored mandatory, discretionary, or no death penalty for various crimes, respondents tended to treat these options as points on a scale of strength of belief, with mandatory penalties favored for the most serious crimes, rather than considering the questions of objectivity and fairness that have influenced the United States Supreme Court's considerations of these options. For no crime did a majority favor execution of all those convicted, even when a mandatory penalty was endorsed. Respondents were generally ignorant on factual issues related to the death penalty, and indicated that if their factual beliefs (in deterrence) were incorrect, their attitude would not be influenced. When asked about their reasons for favoring or opposing the death penalty, respondents tended to endorse all reasons consistent with their attitudes, indicating that the attitude does not stem from a set of reasoned beliefs, but may be an undifferenti ated, emotional reflection of one's ideological self-image. Opponents favored due process guarantees more than did Proponents. A majority of respondents said they would need more evidence to convict if a case was capital. Theoretical and legal implications of the results are discussed.


2005 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paige H. Forster

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court made a significant change to sentencing proceedings during capital trials. The Court ruled in Payne v. Tennessee that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit “victim impact evidence,” testimony about the character of the murder victim and the impact of the death on the victim’s family. The Payne decision permits highly emotional testimony from family members to enter into the penalty phase of a death penalty trial.


1980 ◽  
Vol 1 (5) ◽  
pp. 3-3
Author(s):  
George J. Annas

Proponents of the death penalty have shifted gears. In the past, gruesome public executions were extolled as a deterrent to others, and even in modern times death has been inflicted on convicted criminals by hanging, firing squads, electrocution and poisonous gas. All of these methods cause significant pain to the victim, and all have the potential for failure and added suffering — both physical and mental. Many have argued that all of these methods of execution are potentially or actually “cruel and unusual” means of punishment, and recent United States Supreme Court decisions have suggested that they could be declared unconstitutional on this basis.


2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Pessach

One of the most significant court decisions in copyright law has been the United States Supreme Court's decision in Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., and its path-breaking approach towards the requirement of originality. The grant of copyright protection, in an intangible work, is conditioned upon the fulfillment of the prerequisite of originality. Until the Feist decision, Anglo-American copyright law had a long tradition of interpreting the requirement of originality as imposing a minimum standard of labor, skill or judgment in the production of a work that is not a copy of another work. In Feist, a watershed decision, which had international impact and influence, the United States Supreme Court first introduced the requirement of creativity into Anglo-American copyright law. According to the court's ruling, only works that entail a minimum standard of creativity could pass the threshold of originality and therefore be eligible for copyright protection.


2003 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia A. Orpen

Since the United States Supreme Court held the capital sentence of mentally retarded John Paul Penry to be constitutional in Penry v. Lynaugh, the relationship between capital punishment, mental retardation and the Eighth Amendment has been widely debated. In a long awaited opinion, the Court finally held that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court overruled its holding in Penry, and recognized that capital sentences imposed on the mentally retarded constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although this appears to be a victory for the mentally retarded and their advocates, the real effect of the decision will depend largely on how the states apply the Atkins holding.


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