scholarly journals ¿Quién es el juez de los derechos fundamentales frente a la ley en el ámbito interno de aplicación del derecho comunitario?: (reflexiones sobre el control iusfundamental del derecho interno a la luz de la recepción nacional de los derechos fundamentales d

Author(s):  
Juan Ignacio Ugartemendia Eceizabarrena

The aim of this article is firstly to describe the phenomenum of «national or state incorporation« of European Union Fundamental Rights.That is a process that was launched by the European Court of Justice with its judgment Wachauf in 1989, when it established that Member states were obliged to respect European Community Fundamental Rights in the implementation of Community law rules. It implies that those afore mentioned rights become parameters of conformity with Community Law and are to be used by national courts and judges when they are asked to control national authorities’ acts (including national legislure’s) taking into account those parameters. From this point of view, this work tries likewise to analyse how that incorporation affects the activity of judicial review of national acts in the light of fundamental rights as recognized by the National constitution. And specially when judicial review deals with Acts and other legal rules with same rank.

Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolaos Lavranos

AbstractWith its Kadi-judgment, the European Court of Justice firmly rejected the Kadi/Yusuf-judgments of the Court of First Instance. The Court of Justice made unambiguously clear that Community law, in particular its basic, core fundamental rights values prevail over any international law obligations of the EC and its Member States, including UN Security Council Resolutions and the UN Charter. As a consequence thereof, individuals targeted by UN sanctions must have access to full judicial review in order to be able to ensure the effective protection of their fundamental rights, including procedural rights as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). As a result, the Court of Justice proved that the Community is indeed based on the rule of law and that the fight against terrorism – how important it may be – cannot be used as a justification for completely abrogating European constitutional law values as guaranteed within the Community and its Member States.


Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

This chapter aims to discuss the possibilities and limitations of the EU to provide for an effective and comprehensive data protection regime. In this respect, it presents an analysis of the data protection rules in EU law by examining the relevant constitutional and secondary law framework. It analyzes the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance on data protection issues, and argues that the European Court of Justice has interpreted an internal market measure (the Data Protection Directive) in such a way so as to foster the protection of fundamental rights. However, when it comes to the balancing between fundamental rights the Court leaves the question to be resolved by national courts. Finally, the contribution assesses the transborder data flows regime established by the Data Protection Directive and attempts to draw some conclusions on whether the ‘adequate protection’ test ensures a high protection in such flows.


1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-185
Author(s):  
Christine Boch ◽  
Robert Lane

Unless the law is enforced, it cannot command respect. Securing proper observance and protection of Community rights has long been recognized to be a fundamental challenge for the Community. The burden falls principally to the national courts, guided by the European Court of Justice. However, the guidance offered appears at times at variance with itself. It seems in particular that, in some instances, the obligation of result laid down in directives simply cannot be achieved. This article looks at the case law on remedies developed by the European Court, seeks to identify inconsistencies therein and suggests how they might be cured.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 287-302
Author(s):  
Paolisa Nebbia

As a general principle of Community law elaborated by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, ECJ or ‘the Court’), effectiveness ‘requires the effective protection of Community rights and, more generally, the effective enforcement of Community law in national courts’: its origins—it has been argued—‘lie in the interpretative techniques of the Court which, even at an early stage, favoured a liberalised construction of the Treaty provisions so as to ensure their effet utile’. In fact, the roots of the principle of effectiveness can be found in the seminal case of Van Gend en Loos, which, without expressly naming that principle, provided the conceptual tools that have moulded its construction throughout the Community case law.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Cramér

A little more than four decades ago, the European Court of Justice declared that the law of the European Communities constitutes the supreme law of the Member States. The national institutions, most importantly the national courts, were to apply rules of Community law and, in so doing, were required to set aside conflicting provisions of national law, however framed. Since then, this judicially formulated constitutional principle has been developed and restated in later judgments by the ECJ. However, during the same period the absolute character of the principle has been continually challenged by the Member States.


Author(s):  
Jan Zglinski

This chapter provides a conceptual analysis of judicial deference in free movement law. It argues that the reason for the growing relevance of deference in free movement cases is rooted in a shift in focus away from the scope of rights towards justification and proportionality. The European Court of Justice has created two deference doctrines: the margin of appreciation and decentralized judicial review. While the margin of appreciation doctrine is employed to pass certain regulatory decisions over to national legislatures and executives, decentralized judicial review is used to delegate responsibilities connected with free movement review to national courts. Both deference techniques represent a departure from the Cassis de Dijon approach, which has, for a long time, defined large parts of free movement adjudication, and have significant institutional consequences.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 537-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Itzcovich

In the legal literature on European integration there is a rather stereotyped tendency to constantly discover new elements of rupture with the past. In the legal domain, at every step we are confronted with some revolutionary novelty arising from European institutions and practices; on a regular basis, we face innovations which are said to mark significant developments in respect of the traditional forms of international governance as well as in respect of the traditional forms of national federalism. The vast literature on the interpretative criteria adopted by the European Court of Justice (hereafter the “ECJ”) only partially escapes this tendency. Surely the experience of European legal integration does not lack revolutionary ruptures and, also from the viewpoint of legal argumentation, it is true that the interaction between jurists coming from different legal experiences has produced some novelties: for example, an increasing hybridization and crossover effect (“Europeanisation”) between patterns of legal reasoning which are characteristic of different national legal cultures. However, this phenomenon has been largely tempered by the typically French syllogistic judicial style of ECJ's rulings. Moreover, despite the novelties identified, the literature on Community law interpretation cannot deny the apparent fact that the interpretative criteria and, more generally, the legal argumentation techniques of the ECJ are essentially the same ones which are familiar to the national legal contexts. It would be surprising if this were not the case, since the judges of the ECJ are trained within the national legal systems and the judgments of the Court are generally expected to be implemented by the national courts. Their grounds must thus be perceived as being legally sound, and not merely political or evocative.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Per Cramér

A little more than four decades ago, the European Court of Justice declared that the law of the European Communities constitutes the supreme law of the Member States. The national institutions, most importantly the national courts, were to apply rules of Community law and, in so doing, were required to set aside conflicting provisions of national law, however framed. Since then, this judicially formulated constitutional principle has been developed and restated in later judgments by the ECJ. However, during the same period the absolute character of the principle has been continually challenged by the Member States.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Tzanou

“Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and lose both.”On 3 September 2008, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its long-awaited decision on the Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation where, setting aside the relevant judgments of the European Court of First Instance (CFI), the Court held that the Community judicature must ensure the full review of the lawfulness of all Community acts. This included those deriving from UN Security Council's resolutions, in the light of the fundamental rights as protected by Community law.


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