scholarly journals Las cualidades secundarias y el valor epistémico de la experiencia estética

Daímon ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nieves Acedo
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Aesthetic Judgment ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Secondary Qualities

Entendido lo estético como vinculado al carácter apreciativo de la experiencia sensible, el presente artículo explora su rescate del ámbito de la mera opinión vinculándolo con la intencionalidad de la sensación. Tras definir el problema en la introducción, el texto se centra en las llamadas cualidades secundarias, objeto inmediato de la sensación. Se parte de la hipótesis de que el débil contenido epistémico que se ha atribuido a las cualidades secundarias a lo largo de la historia es responsable de la difícil valoración del juicio estético. Se procede por ello a una reformulación del tipo de noticia que recibimos de dichas cualidades, partiendo de la definición de cualidad secundaria de John Locke, y revisándola a partir de algunos textos de John McDowell y Crispin Wright, en diálogo con la teoría aristotélica de los sensibles propios. El resultado de esta revisión afectará al papel que atribuyamos, dentro del espectro de las disciplinas, a la estética y, secundariamente, al arte. Considering Aesthetics as linked to the appreciative nature of sensorial experience, this article uses the concept of intentionality of sen-sation to rescue Aesthetics from being confined into the scope of mere opinions. After introducing and defining the problem, the text focuses on the so– called secondary qualities, immediate object of the sensation. The hypothesis is that the weak epistemic content attributed to secondary qualities throughout history is responsible for the difficult assessment of aesthetic judgment. A reformula-tion of the kind of news we receive from these qualities is proposed reviewing John McDowell and Crispin Wright review of Lockean’s secon-dary qualities, in dialogue with the Aristotelian theory of the proper sensible. The result of this review should influence the role we attribute, within the spectrum of disciplines, to Aesthetics and, secondarily, to Art.

Are the Colours of Things Secondary Qualities?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Stroud
Keyword(s):  
General Notion ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Independent Reality ◽  
Metaphysical Status

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.

The Simple View of Colours and the Reference of Perceptual Terms

Philosophy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-108
Author(s):  
Gabriele De Anna
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Michael Smith ◽  
Simple View ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
The Status ◽  
Animal Perception

This essay deals with the problem of the status of colours, traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case of secondary qualities: do colours exist only as aspects of experience or are they real properties of objects, existing independently of human and animal perception? Recently, John Campbell has argued in favour of the simple view of colours, according to which colours are real properties of objects. I discuss the place of Campbell's position in a debated which was started by John Mackie and continued by John McDowell, and defend it from a criticism due to Michael Smith. I conclude that the simple view is a philosophically credible position. Subsequently, I consider an alleged contradiction between the simple view and semantic externalism pointed out by Jim Edwards. I suggest that a supporter of the simple view may consistently maintain semantic externalism, if she also accepts epistemological externalism about the canonical warrant of perceptual judgements.

scholarly journals Realist and antirealist interpretations of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Andrej Jandric
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Rule Following ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Semantic Realism ◽  
Conceptual Distinction ◽  
Sceptical Paradox

The sceptical paradox which Kripke found in Wittgenstein?s rule-following considerations threatens the very notion of meaning. However, Kripke also offered a sceptical solution to it, according to which semantic sentences have no truth conditions, but their meaning is determined by assertability conditions instead. He presented Wittgenstein?s development as the abandoning of semantic realism of the Tractatus in favour of semantic antirealism, characteristic of Philosophical Investigations. Crispin Wright, although at points critical of Kripke?s interpretation, also understood the rule-following considerations as containing a crucial argument for antirealism. Contrary to Wright, John McDowell maintained that they offer a transcendental argument for realism. In this paper, I will argue that neither the realist nor the antirealist reading is faithfull to Wittgenstein, as his important conceptual distinction between criteria and symptoms is not adequately recoverable in any of them. Hence the upshot of rulefollowing considerations is that the distinction between realism and antirealism should not be articulated in terms of truth/assertability conditions.

Locke and the “Ancient Hypothesis”

1975 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-48
Author(s):  
David Palmer
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Mind

John Locke sometimes claims in An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding that secondary qualities are qualities of bodies and not simply ideas. Few commentators, however, have taken that claim seriously. This is at least partly because Locke also claims that ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the secondary qualities of bodies and the commentators have taken these two doctrines to be irreconcilable. In this paper I shall briefly present the traditional reasons for thinking the two doctrines incompatible, and then present Locke's neglected attempt to reconcile these two claims.Thomas Reid in his Philosophical Works tries to explain the traditional interpretation of Locke's claims about the nature of secondary qualities. In doing so he cites an “ancient hypothesis“:… the mind, like a mirror receives the images of things from without, by means of the senses; so that their use must be to convey the images into the mind.

scholarly journals Realismo y antirrealismo

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-34
Author(s):  
Manuel Liz
Keyword(s):  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Crispin Wright

Existen tres grandes estrategias para intentar combinar realismo y antirrealismo: una distinción de niveles, una distinción de aspectos y una distinción de partes. En el trabajo se analizan estas tres estrategias. La primera de ellas ha sido desarrollada por numerosos autores. Comentamos en detalle los planteamientos recientes de José Zalabardo a propósito de ciertas tesis de John McDowell, Crispin Wright y Wittgenstein. Esta estrategia plantea graves dificultades. La segunda estrategia parece poder escapar a ellas. Sin embargo, no puede ser adoptada en un sentido máximamente general. Proponemos una combinación basada en la tercera estrategia. Realismo y antirrealismo podrían combinarse de una manera muy natural cuando son adoptados en un sentido local.

Primary–secondary distinction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.D. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Single Family ◽  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Primary Qualities ◽  
The Status ◽  
Sensory Qualities ◽  
Physical Objects

The terminology of ‘primary and secondary qualities’ is taken from the writings of John Locke. It has come to express a position on the nature of sensory qualities – those which we attribute to physical objects as a result of the sensuous character of sensations they produce when they are perceived correctly by us. Since our senses can be differentiated from each other by the type of sensations they produce, sensory qualities are what Aristotle called ‘proper sensibles’ – those perceptible by one sense only. Colours, sounds, scents and tastes are always regarded as proper to their respective senses. What are the proper sensibles of touch, and whether there is similarly a single family of them, is a matter of controversy; but temperature at least is standardly regarded as proper to this sense. It is such sensory qualities that are candidates for being given the status of secondary qualities. To regard sensory qualities as secondary is to hold that an object’s possession of one is simply a matter of its being disposed to occasion a certain type of sensation when perceived; the object in itself possesses no sensuous character. Primary qualities, by contrast, are those which characterize the fundamental nature of the physical world as it is in itself. They are always taken to include geometrical attributes, and often some space-occupying feature; Locke’s candidate for this latter was solidity. Although the terminology dates from the seventeenth century, this general doctrine goes back to the Greek atomists.

John Locke and the Origins of Private Property

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Private Property

John Locke and the Ethics of Belief

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Wolterstorff
Keyword(s):  
John Locke ◽  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

Great works: A reciprocal relationship between spatial magnitudes and aesthetic judgment.

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelika Seidel ◽  
Jesse Prinz
Keyword(s):  
Aesthetic Judgment ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship
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