scholarly journals EU Competition Law Put to the Brexit Test: What Impact Might the Exit of the UK from the Union Have on the Enforcement of the Competition Rules?

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 7-27
Author(s):  
Arianna Andreangeli

This contribution examines some of the consequences of the UK’s exit from the European Union for the enforcement of the competition rules. It reflects on the impact that Brexit is going to have on future transnational antitrust litigation in Britain and Europe. Thereafter it analyses the challenges that Brexit is likely to present for cooperation in public competition enforcement and suggests solutions for future development.

2020 ◽  
pp. 415-449
Author(s):  
Sylvia de Mars

This chapter analyses the foundations of EU competition law. Competition law is an attempt to regulate the behaviour of private companies when active in the internal market so as to ensure that competition between different entities remains and is fair. The rules of competition law aim both to assist the completion of the internal market as well as addressing consumer welfare in more general terms. A further particularly interesting dimension is that unlike most internal market law, competition law applies regardless of the nationality of the companies or businesses active in the internal market. As such, UK companies active on the continent after Brexit will have to know these rules, regardless of whether they continue to apply in the UK. The chapter then details the two Treaty provisions that address anti-competitive behaviour: Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (91) ◽  
pp. 191-210
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Mojašević ◽  
Stefan Stefanović

The subject matter of this paper are the short-term and long-term consequences of Brexit, a historical event and a turning point in the development of the European Union (EU), as well as for the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU competition law and policy. The article first provides a comparative analysis of the historical development of legal regulation of competition in the UK and the EU, including relevant cases from the practice of competition authorities. In particular, the authors focus on the decisions of the European Commission regarding anti-cartel policy. The article further examines to what extent Brexit will influence the mergers and acquisitions policy, antitrust policy, anti-cartel policy, and state aid policy in the UK and the EU. The central question refers to the extent of Brexit's influence on the change of the UK and the EU business environment, and the repercussions that this change will have for the competition law. In the concluding remarks, the authors discuss the direction of future development of the UK competition law, particularly in terms of whether and to what extent the UK law will be harmonized with the EU competition law and case law in this area, or whether there will be a radical turn towards adopting a completely new concept of competition law and policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 641-684
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the core elements of competition law in the European Union (EU). It provides a number of examples of the types of agreements covered by EU competition law and shows the dangers which may arise when independent undertakings come together to coordinate their activities to distort competition. The chapter reviews the impact of anti-competitive agreements on the internal market and focuses on the abuse of market power and controls over concentrations. Overall, the chapter discusses the provisions and enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).


Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood

Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter focuses on Article 101, but begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
João Pateira Ferreira

Summary The Court of Justice of the European Union (“Court of Justice”) issued its first ruling on pay-for-delay agreements, in reply to a reference for a preliminary ruling from the UK’s Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) during its review of the appeal of a Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) decision applying a fine to GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) and five generic manufacturers for having entered into agreements settling patent disputes relating to GSK’s antidepressant paroxetine, on the basis that such agreements infringed competition rules. In its Paroxetine ruling of 30 January 2020[1], the Court of Justice found that patent settlements are not, by their very nature, anticompetitive; however, generic manufacturers can be regarded as potential competitors to the originator manufacturers when they have announced their intention to compete in the same market as the originator and, as such, patent settlement agreements are to be reviewed as horizontal agreements between competitors. Finally, a payment from the originator to the generic manufacturer in a patent settlement agreement is not enough to qualify such an agreement as a restriction of competition by object (the agreement is not anticompetitive by its very nature), unless there is no other justification for the payment other than to compensate the generic manufacturer for accepting to delay its entry in the market. In those circumstances, the Court finds that such an agreement will constitute a restriction of competition by object[2]. In this comment, we review the Court’s findings in relation to the issue of potential competition between the originator and the generics manufacturers and the qualification of this agreement as a restriction of competition by object. Keywords: pay-for-delay; restriction; competition; agreement; settlement; patent


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-170
Author(s):  
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules are judged by national courts in the EEA Member States, which is why some aspects of private enforcement of competition law have become a point of interest for the EFTA Court, being – together with the Court of Justice of the European Union – the EEA court. Firstly, the article aims at checking if the EFTA Court jurisprudence on antitrust damage claims follows the guidelines formulated in the case law of the Court of Justice. Since the positive answer to this question is highly probable, secondly, the article aims at identifying the extent of the impact of EU jurisprudence in private enforcement cases on judgments of the EFTA Court. The article concludes that the EFTA Court’s activities regarding antitrust damage claims follow the route indicated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Four identified judgments regarding – directly or indirectly – antitrust damage claims (Nye Kystlink, Fjarskipti, Schenker I and Schenker V), delivered by the EFTA Court, seem to strengthen its position as an institution that is able to guarantee a coherence between EEA and EU competition law. EFTA Court’s judgments in private enforcement cases are also a point of interest and reference for EU Advocates General and can become an inspiration for both EU and national case law.


Author(s):  
Anthony Salamone

As Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson was a prominent campaigner for a ‘Remain’ vote in the European Union referendum of June 2016. Following the 2017 general election, meanwhile, Davidson repositioned herself as someone who could – aided by 13 Scottish Tory MPs in the House of Commons – influence the Brexit negotiations and nudge the UK Conservative Party towards a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ deal with the EU. This chapter considers the impact of Brexit on the Scottish Conservatives during the leadership of Ruth Davidson in four dimensions: Brexit’s distinct Scottish political context, its electoral consequences, the conduct of Brexit within the UK, and the Brexit negotiations themselves. It concludes with reflections on the future prospects for the Scottish party in light of all four dimensions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1019-1055
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter deals with four issues. First it will briefly examine three sectors of the economy that are wholly or partly excluded from EU competition law, namely nuclear energy, military equipment and agriculture; the special regime that once existed for coal and steel products under the former European Coal and Steel Community (‘the ECSC’) Treaty is also mentioned in passing. Secondly, it will explain the application of the EU competition rules apply to the transport sector. Thirdly, the chapter will consider the specific circumstances of four so-called ‘regulated industries’, electronic communications, post, energy and water, where a combination of legislation, regulation and competition law seek to promote competition. Last, but by no means least, the current debate concerning digital platforms is discussed where it is likely that ex ante regulatory rules will be introduced, both in the EU and the UK, to address concerns about anti-competitive conduct and a tendency towards the monopolisation of markets.


2021 ◽  
pp. 717-778
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter assesses the EU competition law on private undertakings. The relevant Treaty section is here built upon three pillars. The first pillar deals with anticompetitive cartels and can be found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The second pillar concerns situations where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power and is found in Article 102. The third pillar is unfortunately invisible, for when the Treaties were concluded, they did not mention the control of mergers. This constitutional gap has never been closed by later Treaty amendments, yet it has received a legislative filling in the form of the EU Merger Regulation.


Author(s):  
Eleonora Rosati

This chapter discusses the impact of CJEU copyright case law on national copyright regimes, even beyond the wording of EU directives as transposed into national legal systems. To this end, it focuses on the UK and, following a discussion of what immediate changes the departure from the EU and the EEA (Brexit) would have (also with regard to issues of exhaustion), it explores to what extent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has changed UK copyright law. EU decisions have had an impact in areas such as: copyright subsistence, subject matter categorization, primary/accessory liability, standard of infringement, exceptions and limitations, and enforcement (with particular regard to website blocking jurisprudence). Overall, this chapter shows the legacy of CJEU case law, and how pervasive the impact of such case law is.


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