scholarly journals Mémoires, de Brian Mulroney, Montréal, Les Éditions de l’Homme, 2007, 1339 p.

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 250
Author(s):  
Mélanie Ouellette
Keyword(s):  
Brian Mulroney

scholarly journals Commerce et Constitution : une analyse de la stratégie de marchandage dans l'Accord canado-américain de libre-échange

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Michael Lusztig
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
First Order ◽  
Brian Mulroney ◽  
Political Entrepreneurship

This paper attempts to explain the controversial, and politically risky, Canada-us Free Trade Agreement (CUFTÀ) as a by-product of political entrepreneurship in pursuit of electoral realignment. Upon becoming Prime Minister of Canada in 1984, Brian Mulroney harbored one overriding ambition : to engineer electoral realignment whereby his Conservative Party would supplant the Liberals as the dominant federal party in Quebec, and by extension, in Canada. Mulroney sought realignment by satisfying Quebec's fundamental institutional demands, which took the form of the Meech Lake constitutional Accord. This objective necessitated the construction of a coalition that married the trade and constitutional issues. Mulroney's brokerage skills ensured that CUFTA progressed in tandem with Meech Lake as a means to realizing his first-order objectives.

Canadian Political Arithmetic: Quebec, and Canada, after Charlottetown

1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Feaver
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
English Canada ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
Brian Mulroney ◽  
Canadian Politics ◽  
Clear Majority

CANADIAN POLITICAL ARITHMETIC IS A TRICKY BUSINESS. IN Canadian politics, as in Alice's Wonderland, things become ‘curiouser and curiouser’. In suggesting, on the eve of the October, 1993 Canadian federal election, that it looked like ‘the Liberals’ election to lose’, I thought I had gone out on a limb. Brian Mulroney, who by the date of his departure was regarded throughout English Canada with almost universal antipathy, had retired. With their new leader, Prime Minister Kim Campbell, at the helm, polls published at the time the election was called indicated that the ruling Conservatives were favoured by 36 per cent of leaning and decided voters, as compare to 33 per cent for the Liberals. The Tories could win, or at least deny the liberals a clear majority.

Did the Best Candidate Win? A Comment on Levesque's Analysis

1983 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-794
Author(s):  
George Perlin
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
The Third ◽  
Registration Period ◽  
Brian Mulroney

Professor Levesque's note raises a number of interesting and important questions. I shall be concerned directly with only one of these—the question of whether or not John Crosbie was the “best candidate,” as that term has been defined in Levesque's note. I shall try to show that while there was good reason to suppose that Crosbie was the “best candidate,” in fact he was not. I shall then comment briefly on why Brian Mulroney won the convention. The data on which these observations are based are from a series of surveys of delegates to the convention—the first conducted by mail beginning in the first week of May, the second conducted face-to-face by student interviewers during the three-day registration period at the convention, and the third conducted by mail beginning two weeks after the convention.

Foreign policy advice in the Prime Minister’s Office: Mackenzie King to Brian Mulroney

2020 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-528
Author(s):  
Penny Bryden
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Policy Advice ◽  
Unique Position ◽  
Brian Mulroney ◽  
Mackenzie King

The Department of External Affairs (DEA) has always been anomalous—more closely associated with the prime minister than any other department, yet also more independent from cabinet in its necessarily far-flung structure than any other department. The unique position of the DEA has meant that its influence has been closely tied to changes in the structure of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). This article examines the ways that the advisory capacity of the DEA has gradually been eroded, while the foreign policy advice from the PMO has concomitantly increased, in the period between the 1930s and the 1990s.

scholarly journals Les conservateurs canadiens, la question d’Israël et l’antisémitisme

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-600
Author(s):  
Frédéric Boily
Keyword(s):  
Nous Montrons ◽  
Brian Mulroney ◽  
Nous Examinons

Depuis 2006, le gouvernement conservateur a donné à de multiples reprises son appui à l’État d’Israël. Ce soutien suscite de nombreuses controverses, parce qu’il est interprété comme une rupture par rapport aux positions traditionnelles du Canada face au conflit israélo-palestinien. Dans ce texte, nous examinons les positions conservatrices de Joe Clark et de Brian Mulroney pour évaluer en quoi l’approche actuelle de Stephen Harper s’en distingue ou non. Le texte revient en terminant sur les explications avancées pour comprendre cet appui à Israël et nous montrons que, s’il y a rupture, il existe aussi certaines continuités entre Stephen Harper et les autres conservateurs.

scholarly journals So Near and Yet So Far: The 1995 Quebec Referendum in Perspective

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Bayne
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
British Government ◽  
Pierre Trudeau ◽  
Jean Chretien ◽  
Brian Mulroney ◽  
Eu Referendum ◽  
Parti Quebecois ◽  
The Eu

Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney failed to reconcile Quebec with the rest of Canada. The Parti Québécois (PQ) government under Jacques Parizeau called a referendum in October 1995 to decide if the province would secede. While the federal government under Jean Chrétien barely intervened, the fiery rhetoric of Lucien Bouchard brought the separatists close to victory. Quebecers voted to stay in Canada by only 1 per cent. A massive late rally of non-Quebec Canadians pleading with Quebecers to remain probably tipped the balance. Bouchard, who succeeded Parizeau, never felt confident of winning another referendum. Later the PQ lost ground as separatism ceased to appeal. In the EU referendum of 2016 the British government failed to learn from Canada’s experience. The Remain side campaigned negatively rather than positively, and did not mobilize its supporters as well as the Leave camp did. Canadian comparisons also remain relevant for Scotland.

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