scholarly journals Self-Other Asymmetry

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Ruwen Ogien
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
Global Evaluation ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
Standard Objection ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this paper, I present a non standard objection to moral impartialism. My idea is that moral impartialism is questionable when it is committed to a principle we have reasons to reject: the principle of self-other symmetry. According to the utilitarian version of the principle, the benefits and harms to the agent are exactly as relevant to the global evaluation of the goodness of his action as the benefits and harms to any other agent. But this view sits badly with the “Harm principle” which stresses the difference between harm to others and harm to the self. According to the deontological version, we have moral duties to ourselves which are exactly symmetrical to our duties to others. But there are reasons to believe that the idea of a duty to the self is not coherent.

scholarly journals The harm principle and the greatest happiness principle: the missing link

2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (129) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Cinara Nahra
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Missing Link ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Classic Problem ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
Legal Force ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible.

4. The Place of Liberty

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff
Keyword(s):  
Harm Principle ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Intrinsic Good ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Freedom Of Thought ◽  
Liberty Principle ◽  
Freedom Of Action ◽  
The Harm Principle ◽  
Tyranny Of The Majority

This chapter explores the theory that, to avoid the ‘tyranny of the majority’, we should be given the liberty to act just as we wish, provided that we do no harm to others. The focus is on John Stuart Mill's Liberty Principle (also known as the Harm Principle), according to which you may justifiably limit a person's freedom of action only if they threaten harm to another. The chapter considers Mill's arguments based on the Liberty Principle, including his claim there should be complete freedom of thought and discussion, and that harming another's interests is not a sufficient condition to justify constraint. It also discusses justifications for the Liberty Principle by focusing on issues of rights and utility, individuality and progress, and liberty as an intrinsic good. It concludes with an analysis of some of the problems of the kind of liberalism espoused by Mill's Liberty Principle.

scholarly journals Should Unnecessary Harmful Nontherapeutic Cosmetic Surgery be Criminalized?

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis J. Baker
Keyword(s):  
Cosmetic Surgery ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Legal Case ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Harm To Others ◽  
Legal Justification ◽  
Moral Justifications ◽  
The U.S ◽  
The Harm Principle

In this article, it is argued that an application of the harm principle to many forms of nontherapeutic cosmetic surgery shows that these procedures are a form of physical harm, not a form of medicine, and therefore ought to be criminalized. Not only does the harm principle support the case for criminalization, but so too do the relevant precedents. This article focuses on the general moral justifications (wrongful harm to others) for criminalizing unnecessary harmful cosmetic surgery, but legal doctrine is also invoked to demonstrate that there is a legal justification for criminalization. The famous English case of R. v. Brown will be discussed to outline the core legal case for criminalization. This article does not aim to provide a comparative study of the U.S. and English authorities, but rather aims to make theoretical arguments for criminalization, and thus, works from the legal premise that in most states the U.S. courts have taken a similar position to that taken in the seminal English House of Lords decision in R. v. Brown.

I Like Her, Because I Like Myself: Self-Evaluation as a Source of Interpersonal Attitudes

2003 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 239-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Walther ◽  
Claudia Trasselli
Keyword(s):  
Opposite Effect ◽  
Learning Phase ◽  
The Self ◽  
Attitude Formation ◽  
Formation Processes ◽  
False Feedback ◽  
Self Evaluation ◽  
Evaluation Group ◽  
Group A ◽  
The Difference

Abstract. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that self-evaluation can serve as a source of interpersonal attitudes. In the first study, self-evaluation was manipulated by means of false feedback. A subsequent learning phase demonstrated that the co-occurrence of the self with another individual influenced the evaluation of this previously neutral target. Whereas evaluative self-target similarity increased under conditions of negative self-evaluation, an opposite effect emerged in the positive self-evaluation group. A second study replicated these findings and showed that the difference between positive and negative self-evaluation conditions disappeared when a load manipulation was applied. The implications of self-evaluation for attitude formation processes are discussed.

Kunst als reflexive Form und als reflektierende Bewegung

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Brigitte Hilmer
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Content ◽  
The Self ◽  
Aesthetic Judgement ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Self Reference

Kunst kann dann als reflexiv interpretiert werden, wenn Reflexivität nicht auf propositionalen Gehalt oder sogar sprachliche Artikulation angewiesen ist. Reflexion tritt auf in den Modi der Selbstbeziehung des Lebendigen, des Überlegens und der Selbstreferenz im Symbolischen. Kunst ist ein Reflexionsmedium, das diese Modi beansprucht und miteinander verflicht. Eine spezifisch ästhetische Reflexivität ist von und nach Kant nach dem Vorbild der transzendentalen Reflexion und in Konkurrenz zu ihr etabliert worden. Sie läßt sich als Reflexivität des ästhetischen Urteils, als emphatisches Gemachtsein, als Rückwendung auf Wahrnehmungsvollzüge oder als Begriffsreflexion verstehen. Dabei wird die Unterscheidung von Anschauung und Verstand in deren Zusammenspiel oder Abspaltung vorausgesetzt. Von der Analogie zur transzendentalen Reflexion löst sich aber erst ein Verständnis von ästhetischer Reflexivität, das von den drei Modi und ihrer Verflechtung ausgeht.<br><br>Reflexivity does not presuppose linguistic articulation or even propositional content. If it did, art could not be called reflexive. Reflexivity can be found in the self-contact of the living, in mental reflection or in symbolic self-reference. Art is a medium which claims these different modes of reflexivity and intertwines them. Aesthetic reflexivity as such has been established by Kant and his epigones, following the model of transcendetal reflection. Thus it could be specified as the reflexive structure of aesthetic judgement, or as an emphasis on a work’s being created, or as a reference to perception itself in the process of perceiving, or as a way of reflecting concepts. Aesthetic reflexivity can only be detached from the model of transcendental reflection, if it is seen as oriented towards the interaction among the three modes of reflection mentioned above, leaving aside the difference, interplay or competition between perception and conceptual capacities.

The Difference of The Self-Regulation and The Usage Motivation between The SNS and The Game Group in The Over usage of Smartphone of Adolescents

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 297
Author(s):  
Myeong Hee Jo ◽  
Jung Mo Kim ◽  
Seok Sang Rhu ◽  
In Hye Kim
Keyword(s):  
Self Regulation ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Difference

The Limits of Criminal Misconduct

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Role Theory ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Public Office ◽  
The Harm Principle

I turn my attention to the theoretical or moral justification for the offence of misconduct in public office. I argue that the offence of misconduct in office is only tenuously connected to the ‘harm principle’ justification for criminalization. I suggest that the offence is better explained by what I call the ‘role’ theory of criminalization. I also consider the legitimate scope of the offence: the kinds of misconduct that it should, and should not, cover. In that regard, we will see that codes of conduct that govern officials—a vital written element to the UK’s constitution—play a role not merely in setting boundaries but also in minimizing rule of law uncertainty about the kind of misconduct that may be found to fall within the scope of the offence.

scholarly journals Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti ◽  
Federica Liveriero
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Social Tolerance ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Harm Principle

AbstractTraditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.

"And the Wisdom to Know the Difference": Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting

1995 ◽  
Vol 144 (1) ◽  
pp. 243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica G. Weiner
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Help ◽  
The Difference
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